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The euro and competition 
Jean-François PONS and Joachim LUCKING 
Since 1 January 1999, the euro has 
become the single currency of 
eleven Member States, whose 
national currencies are now 
divisions of the euro. The 
introduction of this common 
currency will have a profound 
impact on competition in Europe. 
1. In general, European Monetary 
Union (EMU) will intensify 
competition for three reasons: 
a) The euro will reinforce the 
positive effects of the Single 
Market Programme. The Single 
Market has had a pro-
competitive impact by 
integrating markets effectively 
and making the relevant 
markets broader. The euro 
should enhance this effect 
because, for trade between the 
participating Member States, it 
will eliminate exchange-rate 
risk and the transaction costs 
associated with converting one 
currency into another. As a 
consequence, trade flows are 
likely to increase. 
Whereas the effects of the Single 
Market Programme were mainly 
concentrated on certain 
manufacturing sectors which had 
hitherto been protected by high 
non-tariff barriers, the euro is 
likely to affect a wide range of 
sectors, including notably financial 
services and distribution. In 
particular, the markets for many 
financial services, which are at 
present national because of the 
existence of separate currencies, 
will gradually be widened to cover 
the whole euro zone. 
The broadening of geographic 
markets offers new opportunities 
to exploit economies of scale and 
will lead to an increase in merger 
and acquisition activity. This will 
especially be true for the financial 
sector and for industries where 
sales networks have previously 
been largely confined to national 
boundaries and where companies 
see prospects for obtaining 
important cost savings by 
enlarging these to a European 
scale. 
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On the other hand, 
competition will expose the 
weaknesses of less efficient 
companies, which will 
become prone to take-over 
bids. In general, the 
restructuring arising from 
EMU will pose no 
competition problems and 
should enhance the overall 
efficiency of the Community 
economy. Provided that 
market entry is easy, no 
major competition problems 
should result from the 
reduction in the total number 
of firms as inefficient firms 
exit and more efficient firms 
expand. Although the number 
of domestic suppliers in any 
local market should fall, the 
total number of actual or 
potential competitors in that 
market should increase after 
it has been incorporated into 
a wider geographic market. 
b) The euro will increase price-
transparency. After the 
introduction of the euro, the 
greater ease with which 
prices in different countries 
can be compared will mainly 
affect those sectors where 
price dispersion between 
Member States is high and 
not due to structural reasons 
such as differences in 
consumer tastes and indirect 
taxation, but rather to the 
market-segmentation strate-
gies of firms. 
A recent study by BEUC -
. the European Consumers' 
Organisation - shows that the 
prices of some goods and 
services can differ widely 
from one Member State to 
another. Certain consumer 
durables sectors, such as 
motor vehicles, are likely to 
be particularly strongly 
affected by increased price-
transparency, since each 
purchase represents a high 
proportion of the consumer's 
total expenditure. For such 
products, the potential 
savings which the consumer 
can achieve by cross-border 
purchasing can easily 
outweigh the additional costs 
which he incurs. 
c) The euro will allow easier 
financing, leading to market 
entry and more mergers. The 
impact of the euro on the 
market for corporate equity 
will reduce the cost of capital 
which could lead to an 
increase in the number of 
mergers. In fact, this number 
has already increased 
substantially in anticipation 
of monetary union, notably in 
the financial sector (banks, 
insurance companies). New 
financing techniques and 
markets can be put to work 
for a new generation of EU 
entrepreneurs thus leading to 
market entry. Therefore, in 
principle, the change in the 
market for capital should 
further increase the pro-
competitive impact of EMU. 
For the consumers, the cost of 
the exchange and the fees for 
international payments will 
be reduced in the eurozone. 
2. Competition policy has an 
important role to play in 
safeguarding and enhancing 
the pro-competitive effects of 
the euro on the markets for 
products and services. 
In particular, there appear to 
be two types of risk, relating 
to antitrust on the one hand 
and to state aid on the other 
hand: 
a) Antitrust risks: 
The threat of potentially 
increased competition could 
also lead to attempts by 
companies to find ways to 
reduce the actual level of 
competition. For example, 
the euro will allow consumers 
to immediately compare 
prices and other terms of 
transactions across borders. 
This will create further 
incentives for parallel trade, 
but will also increase the 
temptation for companies to 
create new obstacles to 
arbitrage. 
Similarly, new competitive 
threats arising from EMU 
may induce incumbents to 
enter into vertical or 
horizontal agreements with 
the object of foreclosing 
rivals' markets, or 
alternatively to seek state aid. 
Finally, in the longer run, the 
expected increase in mergers 
and acquisitions could create 
oligopolies in some 
industries. Companies in 
these industries could be 
tempted to reduce the 
competitive pressure either 
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by engaging in tacit collusion 
or by forming cartels. This 
will be made easier as the 
increased price transparency 
will facilitate the monitoring 
of competitors' prices. It will 
also be more difficult to 
deviate from agreed prices 
and hide this fact behind 
exchange rate fluctuations. 
A recent example of antitrust 
risks is given by the decisions 
of the banks regarding the 
fees for international 
payments inside the 
eurozone. These decisions 
have given rise to the concern 
that they were devised 
between the banks at a 
national level. For this 
reason, the Commission has 
decided to start an 
investigation. 
b) State aid risks: 
Some companies will 
inevitably experience 
difficulties as a result of more 
intense competition. 
Consequently, Member States 
are likely to experience 
strong pressure to protect 
these companies by means of 
state aids, notably rescue and 
restructuring aids. Such aids 
can lead to important 
distortions of competition at 
the expense of more efficient 
companies. Another danger 
associated with such aid is 
that it will perpetuate the old, 
unviable structures rather 
than promote a genuine 
adjustment to new economic 
realities. 
Finally, the knowledge that 
government is willing to 
intervene to rescue firms in 
difficulty may give rise to 
"moral hazard". The 
expectation that, if the worst 
comes to the worst, the 
government will not allow the 
company to fail may lead 
some managers to delay 
making difficult decisions on 
restructuring and may tempt 
others to expose their 
companies to excessive risks. 
Lenders may also be tempted 
to underestimate commercial 
risks in cases where the 
borrower is perceived as "too 
big to fail". 
# # # 
Competition policy therefore 
needs to remain vigilant to 
ensure that the euro can deliver 
its full benefits. Both 
Community and national 
competition policy have a vital 
role to play in ensuring that 
product and service markets 
(including especially the 
financial services) are flexible so 
that European consumers will 
truly benefit from the common 
currency. 
In DG IV, Unit A-l will be 
specifically in charge of 
following and analysing the 
impact of the euro on 
competition. All relevant 
analyses and information can be 
send to the following address: 
Joachim Lucking, DG IV Unit 
A-l/European Commission/Rue 
de la Loi/Wetstraat 200/B-1049 
Bruxelles/Brussel/E-Mail: 
j oachim. Iuecking@dg4.cec .be 
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EC COMPETITION LAW AND 
DIGITAL PAY TELEVISION 
Linsey MC CALLUM, DG IV-C-2 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The past decade has seen 
significant changes in the 
television sector in the EU with 
the development of commercial, 
advertising-funded broadcasters, 
trans-national channels, and the 
emergence of subscription-
funded broadcasters or pay-TV 
operators. The introduction of 
digital television is now set to 
change the sector even more 
radically by increasing the 
capacity of transmission 
networks and allowing new types 
of services, such as pay-per-
view, interactive banking or 
shopping and internet access via 
television. Pay-TV operators 
have led the way in introducing 
digital television in the EU, but 
the coming decades will see a 
more general transition to digital 
television by all operators in the 
sector, whether State-funded, 
advertising-funded or subscrip-
tion-funded. 
This article describes the 
Commission's policy in applying 
EC competition law to the pay 
television sector, with particular 
emphasis on digital pay 
television. Broader issues 
relating to the television sector, 
and in particular the role of 
public service broadcasters, fall 
outside its scope. 
2 . E C COMPETITION LAW 
AND DIGITAL PAY TELE-
VISION 
2.1. A balanced approach 
Co-operation between underta-
kings with the aim of entering a 
new and untested market has 
been recognised by the 
Commission over decades as 
having benefits for the 
Community's industrial, 
technological and social 
development by virtue of the 
increased competition which it 
can foster. Co-operation can 
take the form of a joint venture 
between undertakings, merger 
of the undertakings' interests or 
acquisition by one undertaking 
of another. 
Analysis of the effects of such 
co-operation concentrates on its 
net impact on competition 
within the common market, that 
is the balance between technical 
progress and restriction of 
competition. Thus, even where 
the undertakings concerned are 
actual or potential competitors 
on the market in question, the 
Commission will generally take 
a favourable approach if the 
overall effect of the co-
operation is pro-competitive. 
However, where co-operation 
will eliminate competition on 
the market in question by 
foreclosing the access of third 
parties and creating a dominant 
position, then the limits of the 
advantages of co-operation 
have been reached. The 
creation or strengthening of 
dominance by joint venture, 
merger or acquisition will 
always . fall foul of the 
competition rules, unless 
remedies can be found which 
prevent such effects. This 
principle applies equally to 
undertakings which have 
achieved a position of market 
dominance through superior 
performance. The Commission 
will object to any further 
strengthening through joint 
venture, merger or acquisition 
or indeed through abusive 
behaviour. 
This balanced approach has been 
approved over the years by the 
Court of Justice and Court of 
First Instance. It is also the 
approach followed by the 
Commission in respect of digital 
pay television as the competition 
rules set out in Articles 85-90 of 
the EC Treaty1 apply to this 
sector as to all others which have 
not been specifically excluded 
from their scope by the Treaty2. 
As implemented by Council Regulation 
17/62 concerning the application of 
Articles 85 and 86 EC and Council 
Regulation 4064/89, as amended by 
Council Regulation 1310/97, concerning 
the control of concentrations between 
undertakings ("the Merger Regulation"). 
See joined cases 209-213/84 Asjes 
[1986] ECR 1425 at paragraphs 40-42. 
The cultural exception relating to state 
aids and Article 90(2) may affect the 
evaluation of such aids granted to the 
television sector. However, even this 
does not amount to a sectoral exemption. 
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Geographic markets in the 
television sector tend to be 
national for linguistic, cultural 
and regulatory reasons. The 
introduction of digital television 
will not change this fact, as is 
bome out by the comments on 
the Convergence Green Paper: 
"Markets for broadcasting were 
expected to remain fragmented 
along national and regional 
lines for cultural and linguistic 
reasons but also because of the 
geographic scope of certain 
aspects of the business "3. 
2.2. Essential policy goal 
pursued by Commission 
and ensuing benefits 
The essential policy goal of the 
Commission in relation to digital 
pay-TV is thus to maintain open 
market structures and prevent the 
erection of barriers to entry to 
national or language-based 
markets which foreclose further 
access. This policy has four 
fundamental benefits. 
2.2.1. Benefits for consumers 
The competition rules seek to 
ensure that the Community's 
citizens are not exploited by 
dominant undertakings through 
high prices and poor quality 
service. As the Commission 
recognised in its communication 
on "Services of general interest 
in Europe"4: 
5 SEC ( 1998) 1284 final, at page 20. 
4 OJ C 281, 16.09.96, p. 3, at paragraph 
15. 
"'Market forces produce a better 
allocation of resources and 
greater effectiveness in the 
supply of services, the principal 
beneficiary being the consumer, 
who gets better quality at a 
lower price". 
The benefits of competition in 
the digital pay television sector 
for consumers have recently 
been illustrated in France and the 
UK. Within a month of the 
appearance of a competitor in the 
form of Télévision Par Satellite 
(TPS), CanaB- reduced its 
subscription price5. Similarly, 
the prospect of competition from 
the digital terrestrial pay-TV 
operator, ONdigital (formerly 
British Digital Broadcasting, 
BDB), has led BSkyB not only 
to reduce its prices for digital 
pay television, but also to offer 
consumers a wider choice of 
services6. The creation of 
ONdigital has already been 
approved by the Commission. In 
the case of TPS, the Commission 
has announced its intention to 
take a favourable decision7. 
Some commentators have also 
Subscription prices were reduced from 
186 FF for the basic package plus two 
film channels (1994 price) to 130 FF for 
the basic package plus 4 cinema 
channels plus the Diney Channel (prices 
between March and July 1997). 130 FF 
was the price then charged by TPS. 
http://www.inside-cable.co.uk - see 
article of 16 August 1998 "Sky's digital 
pricing revealed". New Media Markets 
of 13 August 1998 "The decision to 
launch a £6.99 "special value" value 
package ... confirms BSkyB's desire to 
build a mass market digital market and 
to counteract the rival digital terrestrial 
service of ONdigital ". 
Notice pursuant to Article 19(3) of 
Regulation 17, OJ C 65 [1998] of 28 
February 1998. 
argued that the degree of 
subsidisation of the retail price 
of digital set top boxes is also 
due to increased competition. 
It is also striking to note that 
plans for digital pay television in 
Germany are proceeding apace, 
despite the declarations of 
Bertelsmann, Kirch and 
Deutsche Telekom that the 
prohibition of their co-operation 
plans would inevitably mean the 
abandonment of digital 
television there. Deutsche 
Telekom has signed agreements 
with channel providers for the 
marketing and distribution of 
their digital pay-TV services8. 
Kirch had claimed that it would 
cease operation of its digital pay-
TV platfrom, DF 1. Not only has 
this not happened, but Kirch is 
seeking investors to develop it9. 
Finally, Premiere has continued 
to add subscribers to its digital 
pay-TV service. Thus, the 
prohibition decision adopted by 
the Commission on 27 May 
1998 has not been to the 
detriment of German consumers. 
2.2.2. Creation of the internal 
market for television 
services 
The benefits of competition also 
underlie the Commission's 
commitment to the creation of a 
single market in the television 
sector10. 
8 TV Express of 10 December 1998, p. 14. 
Financial Times of 7 January 1999, 
"Kirch woos investors with new deal". 
As expressed in particular in the 
Television Without Frontiers Directive -
Council Directive 89/552/EEC of 3 
October 1989 as amended by Directive 
Competition Policy Newsletter ***. 1999 Number 1 February 
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"Its (the Single Market's) aim 
was not only to achieve 
economies of scale but also to 
set free the dynamism and the 
creativity inherent in 
competition ' n 
12 
The Commission's objection to 
the creation of national dominant 
positions12 in the digital pay 
television sector is a reflection of 
this fundamental goal. The 
abolition of State measures 
which partition national markets 
would be fundamentally under-
mined if competition law did not 
prevent private or public 
undertakings from replicating 
97/36/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 30 June 1997. 
White Paper on growth, competitiveness, 
and employment, COM(93) 700 final. 
One of the conditions of application of 
Articles 85 and 86 EC is that the 
agreement or conduct in question "may 
affect trade between Member States". In 
cases 6 & 7/73 Commercial Solvents v. 
Commission [1974] ECR 223 at 
paragraphs 30-35 the Court of Justice 
confirmed that an agreement which alters 
the competitive structure within the 
Common Market to an appreciable 
extent, or has "repercussions" for that 
structure will meet the "effect on trade" 
test. In case 22/79 Greenwich Film 
Production v. SACEM [1979] ECR 3275 
at paragraph 11 the Court of Justice 
confirmed that this applies equally to the 
provision of services as to supply of 
goods. The Court of Justice confirmed 
in case 8/72 Cementhandeleren v. 
Commission [1972] ECR 977 that an 
agreement covering the territory of a 
single Member State may affect trade if 
alters the competitive structure there and 
directly or indirectly affects trade flows. 
This principle applies a fortiori where 
the agreement makes penetration of a 
national market more difficult: case 
61/80 Cooperative Stremsel-en 
Kleurselfabriek v. Commission [1981] 
ECR 851. 
Under the Merger Regulation, there is no 
jurisdictional equivalent to the "effect on 
trade" test. 
their effect13. The development 
of a European-scale audio-visual 
industry would be impossible if 
entry into national markets was 
blocked. 
2.2.3. Media plurality 
While the competition rules are 
of general application, they must 
take account of each sector's 
special characteristics14. In the 
case of television, there are 
many such characteristics which 
will be discussed in the annex on 
market definition. However, one 
quite specific point should be 
stressed here, namely the 
dangers inherent in the creation 
or strengthening of dominant 
positions for media plurality. 
The goal of media plurality 
must, therefore, always be kept 
in mind15. 
"An agreement (...) which might tend to 
restore the national divisions in trade 
between Member States might be such as 
to frustrate the most fundamental object 
of the Community. The Treaty, whose 
preamble and content aim at abolishing 
the barriers between States (..) could not 
allow undertakings to reconstruct such 
barriers" Cases 56 & 58/64 Consten & 
Grundig v. Commission [1966] ECR 299 
at 340. The Court of Justice has said that 
"without (competition law) numerous 
provisions of the Treaty would be 
pointless", Case 6/72 Europemballage 
and Continental Can V. Commission 
[1973] ECR 215 at 244. 
1 4 See case 45/85 Verband der 
Sachversicherer v. Commission [1987] 
405 at paragraphs 12-15. 
See also Article 21(3) of the Merger 
Regulation which recognises the 
preservation of media plurality as a 
legitimate interest and thus allows 
Member States to apply national rules to 
cleared operations. 
2.2.4. Digital television as 
platform for convergence 
and further technological 
progress 
Although technological conver-
gence of the television, telecom-
munications and information 
technologies sectors is a reality, 
the types of retail services which 
will emerge and consumers' 
demand for them remains 
unclear. There is broad 
agreement on one point, 
however, namely that digital 
television will be one of, if not 
the, most important platforms for 
the widespread introduction of 
"convergent services" in the EU. 
The BiB joint venture is a good 
example of this: e-mail, limited 
internet access, home-banking 
and shopping are to be made 
available to UK consumers via 
digital television platforms. The 
Commission proposes to take a 
favourable attitude to this joint 
venture after imposing signi-
ficant conditions to ensure that 
BiB will not create a dominant 
position nor strengthen the 
dominant positions of two of its 
parents, BSkyB and BT, in the 
closely related pay-TV and 
telecommunications customer 
access infrastructure markets16. 
The benefits of convergence for 
all European citizens will only 
be reaped if market structures 
remain open and technical 
progress through innovation is 
free to develop. This has been 
° Notice published pursuant to Article 
19(3) of Regulation 17, OJ C 322 
[1998]of21 October 98. 
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recognised by industry in the 
comments on the Commission's 
convergence green paper. 
"There was widespread support 
for their (competition rules') 
strict application "n. 
2.3. Application of policy goal 
Despite these benefits, some 
commentators plead for a lax 
application of the Community's 
competition rules to the sector, 
in particular, in view of the scale 
of investment and risk involved 
in launching digital pay 
television. A number of different 
arguments are advanced in 
support of this proposal: national 
monopolies in digital pay 
television will be required in 
order to recoup the costs of 
entry; concentration in digital 
pay television is necessary to 
rebalance the audiovisual trade 
deficit with the US; globalisation 
means that national pay 
television monopolies are 
constrained by global potential 
competition. In sum, therefore, 
these commentators argue that 
technological progress, in the 
form of the introduction of 
digital television, and application 
of the Community's competition 
rules can be difficult to 
reconcile. However, they 
provide little or no justification 
of this proposed specific 
approach to digital pay television 
in either legal or economic 
terms, nor of its longer term 
implications. 
Against the background of this 
criticism, the remainder of this 
1 7 SEC( 1998) 1284 final, at p. 24. 
article is devoted to a more 
detailed description of the 
Commission's application of the 
competition rules to digital pay 
television, with reference to 
specific cases. It seeks to 
explain the broad lines of the 
Commission's policy in relation 
to the issues raised by these 
cases, which are complex and 
involve examination of the 
competitive situation at all levels 
of the vertical supply chain: 
• Content - access to 
important programming rights, 
and in particular to films and 
attractive sports events; 
• Transmission - access to 
digital terrestrial, cable and 
satellite capacity and in the case 
of more advanced convergent 
services to broadband customer 
access infrastructure; and 
• Set top boxes -access to 
proprietary digital conditional 
access, electronic programme 
guides and application pro-
gramming interfaces embedded 
in digital set top boxes (often 
referred to as the technical 
services necessary for pay 
television). 
Section 3 examines horizontal 
agreements on the pay TV 
market itself. Section 4 deals 
with horizontal issues at each 
level of the vertical supply chain 
and the effects of vertical 
integration. Given the 
importance of market definition, 
the principles underlying the 
Commission's approach and 
their application to the markets 
pertinent to digital pay television 
are set out in annex. 
3. PAY-TV MARKET 
HORIZONTAL AGREEMENTS 
The Commission has been called 
upon to consider a number of 
pay-TV mergers, acquisitions 
and joint ventures. These can be 
distinguished into two broad 
categories: 
• Alliances between compa-
nies active on different geogra-
phic markets; and 
• Alliances between compa-
nies active on the same geogra-
phic market. 
The considerations specific to 
these categories are set out 
below. 
3.1. Alliances between 
companies on different 
geographic markets 
This form of co-operation is 
unlikely to pose competition 
problems as there will be little or 
no overlap in the geographic 
areas of activity of the 
companies in question. Thus, no 
objection was raised when Kirch 
and Richemont entered the 
Italian pay-TV market through 
acquisition of joint control in 
Telepiu18. Kirch had previously 
been active only in the German 
pay-TV market, whereas 
Richemont through its holding in 
FilmNet had been active in the 
pay-TV markets in Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, 
Sweden and Finland. Equally, 
no objection was raised when 
Richemont and Multichoice 
M. 410 Kirch/Richemont/Telepiu, 
Commission decision of 2 August 1994. 
OJ C 225 [1994] p. 3. 
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merged their pay-TV interests in 
the EEA in Nethold (which held 
100% of the voting rights in 
FilmNet) with a resulting change 
in the control of Telepiu19. The 
concentration of Bertelsmann 
and CLT's radio and television 
businesses, including pay-TV, in 
a newly-created joint venture 
CLT-UFA was also declared to 
be compatible with the common 
market20. With the exception of 
Germany, Bertelsmann and 
CLT's activities took place on 
separate geographic markets. In 
Germany, the two companies' 
already operated the channel 
RTL through a joint venture. In 
clearing the merger, the 
Commission refused to follow 
the comments of third parties 
that the merged entity, CLT-
UFA, would hold a dominant 
position and stated that, "the 
mere combination of resources 
and possible synergies is not 
sufficient to establish a dominant 
position in the foreseeable 
future ". 
As a general rule, therefore, the 
Commission will take a positive 
attitude under the competition 
rules to the creation of cross-
border alliances between 
companies active in different 
geographic markets. These are 
unlikely to result in the creation 
of dominant positions. 
Moreover, they contribute to the 
creation of companies in the 
European audio-visual sector 
1 9 M. 584 Kirch/Richemont/Multichoice/ 
Telepiu, Commission decision of 5 May 
1995, OJ C 129 [1995] p. 6. 
?o 
M. 779 Bertelsmann/CLT, Commission 
decision of 7 October 1996, OJ C 364 
[1996] p. 3. 
which can benefit from 
economies of scale and scope. 
There is only one caveat, namely 
that if a network of strategic 
alliances between all major 
European players were to be 
created, the impact of individual 
operations would have to be 
assessed against such a 
background21. There might be a 
risk of partitioning of national 
markets and a consequential 
creation or strengthening of 
dominant positions in those 
markets, in particular if two 
companies with strong market 
positions were to ally. However, 
such an effect would have to be 
proved (and has not yet 
materialised). 
3.2. Alliances between 
companies active on the 
same geographic market 
It is useful to distinguish two 
types of pay-TV alliances 
between companies which are 
active on the same geographic 
market. 
See XVIth Competition Policy Report at 
paragraph 82. "At present, more and 
more cross-border alliances are being 
planned or forged, typified by a pan-
European outlook. If all these projects 
come to fruition, most major television 
distributors in Europe may well be 
linked through networks of alliances. 
The Commission will accordingly have 
to examine these transactions carefully. 
In particular, it will have to evaluate the 
alliances' overall impact at European 
level, going beyond the direct 
consequences for the specific national 
markets. 
3.2.1. Alliances between 
companies which are not 
active on the pay-TV 
market, or have only 
limited activities. 
Alliances of this type will 
generally be considered to be 
pro-competitive and to raise no 
fundamental competition law 
concerns. 
Thus, in May 1998 the 
Commission cleared the creation 
of a digital terrestrial pay-TV 
joint venture between Carlton 
and Granada, British Digital 
Broadcasting (BDB, now known 
as ONdigital) in the UK. 
Carlton and Granada each 
operate regional advertising-
funded television channels in the 
UK and both already have 
interests in pay-TV channels. 
Granada also has a shareholding 
in BSkyB and operates a pay-TV 
joint venture with BSkyB. 
While some amendments to the 
notified agreements were 
required, there was no doubt that 
the creation of BDB was, in 
principle, pro-competitive as it 
would provide competition to the 
dominant incumbent operator, 
BSkyB. 
The Commission also announced 
its intention in February 199822 
to clear the creation of a 
company, Télévision Par 
Satellite (TPS) to provide digital 
satellite pay-TV services in 
France. TPS's parents 
companies are the French 
99 
Notice pursuant to Article 19(3) of 
Regulation 17, OJ C 65 [1998] of 28 
February 1998. 
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advertising-funded television 
operators, TF1, France 2, France 
3 and Métropole Télévision 
(M6), the telecommunications 
operator France Télécom and the 
cable operator Suez Lyonnaise 
des Eaux. Although some 
modifications to the agreement 
were necessary, no fundamental 
competition problems arise from 
the creation of TPS, as TPS will 
compete with the well-
established French pay-TV 
operator, Canal+. 
3.2.2. Alliances concerning 
companies which already 
hold strong positions on 
the pay- TV market. 
While competition law does not 
object to the creation or 
strengthening of dominance 
through superior performance, it 
does object to the creation or 
strengthening of dominance by 
any other means, including 
merger, acquisition or creation 
of a joint venture. The 
Commission has examined two 
such cases relating to digital 
pay-TV. 
The first arose in the UK. As 
originally constituted, BSkyB 
was a party to the BDB joint 
venture referred to above. After 
informal discussions with the 
Commission, the UK authorities 
insisted that BSkyB exit the joint 
venture as a shareholder as 
BSkyB's jointly-controlling 
shareholding in BDB risked 
strengthening BSkyB's existing 
dominant position in the UK 
pay-TV market. In particular, 
BSkyB would be able to ensure 
that there was co-ordination 
between BDB and BSkyB on the 
UK pay-TV market, rather than 
direct competition. 
In the second case, the 
Commission prohibited the 
merger of Bertelsmann and 
Kirch's pay-TV interests in 
Germany23. Together, the 
parties operated the only pay-TV 
platforms in Germany, Premiere 
and DF1, held all important 
German-language pay-TV 
programming rights, controlled 
the de facto standard digital set 
top box and, by virtue of their 
alliance with Deutsche Telekom 
could prevent the emergence of a 
digital cable pay-TV competitor. 
As the parties were unwilling to 
provide the Commission with the 
undertakings necessary to 
prevent the merger resulting in 
an enduring near-monopoly in 
pay-TV in German-speaking 
Europe, the operation was 
declared incompatible with the 
common market. 
4. EFFECTS ON COMPETITION 
ON THE PAY-TV MARKET 
Competition on the pay-TV 
market can be affected by the 
existence of bottlenecks at each 
level of the vertical supply chain 
- the various markets for 
content, transmission networks 
and/or technical services - as 
each of these constitutes an 
essential in-put for a pay-TV 
operator. Competition on the 
pay-TV market can be affected 
by leveraging of market power 
from one level to another or 
through foreclosure effects 
caused by vertical integration. 
Indeed, the conclusion that an 
undertaking holds a dominant 
position on the pay-TV market 
pre-supposes the existence of 
barriers to entry at one or more 
of these levels which prevent the 
emergence of substantial 
competition. Specific competi-
tion issues can also arise at each 
level of the vertical supply chain. 
It follows from this that cases 
which affect the pay television 
market require a complex 
examination of a number of 
different markets. In the 
Bertelsmann/Kirch/Deutsche Te-
lekom cases the markets for pay-
TV, cable infrastructure and 
technical services were affected. 
In the BiB case, the markets for 
digital interactive TV services, 
pay-TV, technical services, 
wholesale film and sport content 
markets and telecommunications 
customer access infrastructure 
have been examined. 
These issues are dealt with 
below. 
4.1. Issues at each level of the 
supply chain 
4.1.1. Content 
The programming rights for 
films and sports events are 
generally sold exclusively and in 
respect of national territories. 
The competition rules do not 
object to either of these standard 
23 M. 993 Bertelsmann/Kirch/Premiere, 
Commission decision of 27 May 1998, 
not yet published. 
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industry practices24. However, 
where the duration or the scope 
of the exclusivity embodied in a 
particular contract unduly 
forecloses the access of other 
pay-TV operators, then Article 
85(1) EC will be applicable and 
an exemption under Article 
85(3) EC will be required. 
The Commission has applied this 
principle to rights contracts in 
respect of both films25 and 
sports26 in the context of 
notifications of rights contracts. 
The considerations relevant to 
film and sports rights vary. A 
longer duration of exclusivity for 
film rights will generally be 
accepted than for important 
sports rights as the latter 
constitute "perishable goods" 
whose value decreases rapidly 
with time. The Commission's 
object has been to maintain 
access to such rights for third 
parties within a reasonable time-
scale. 
However, the existence of 
networks of long-term exclusive 
film and sports contracts is also 
of relevance to the consideration 
of operations on the pay-TV 
market itself as a lack of access 
to such premium content acts as 
a barrier to entry. Thus, in the 
2 4 Coditel I [1982] ECR 3381 and Coditel 
II [1980] ECR 881 judgments of the 
European Court of Justice. 
95 
ARD decision, Commission Decision of 
15 September 1989 OJ L 284, 
03/10/1989, p. 36. 
For example, the granting of a "comfort 
.letter" to the BBC/BSkyB/Premier 
League agreement in 1993. See press 
release 1P(93)614 of 20 July 1993. 
Further cases are currently under 
consideration. 
Bertelsmann/Kirch case referred 
to above, the Commission 
sought to ensure that the 
operation would not foreclose 
access to the pay-TV market for 
other operators by seeking an 
undertaking from the parties to 
cede programming rights. While 
Kirch and Deutsche Telekom 
were willing to provide the 
Commission with the minimum 
undertakings necessary to ensure 
competition on the pay-TV 
market, in particular, by ceding 
programming rights and 
allowing private cable operators 
to independently market 
Premiere in combination with 
their own channels, Bertelsmann 
was not. The Commission 
therefore prohibited the 
operation. 
4.1.2. Transmission networks 
In the long term, digitisation will 
reduce capacity shortages of 
broadcast transmission networks 
(whether satellite, cable or 
terrestrial), at least for backbone 
transmission capacity. However, 
as the Convergence Green Paper 
recognises, digitisation will not 
be completed in the short to 
medium term. The transition 
phase is, therefore, likely to be 
lengthy: while it lasts the 
operators of cable networks and 
suppliers of satellite transponder 
capacity are in a position to 
prevent the emergence of 
competition in the pay-TV 
market by refusing to carry a 
particular pay-TV service or to 
lease transponder capacity. 
Ensuring non-discriminatory 
access to transmission networks 
is thus essential: the Commission 
is examining cases concerning 
access to both cable networks 
and satellite transponder 
capacity. 
However, digitisation will not 
remove all competition problems 
in relation to transmission 
networks. In particular, there is 
likely to be a continuing 
bottleneck in the market for 
broadband customer access 
infrastructure. While digital 
television services can be 
provided by means of digital 
terrestrial, digital satellite or 
digital cable networks, this is not 
the case of genuine broadband 
services which require two-way 
transmission networks. Digital 
cable and upgraded telecommu-
nications customer access 
infrastructure will be the only 
means of transmission suitable 
for such services in the medium 
term27. Dual ownership by 
telecommunications operators of 
both cable and 
telecommunications infrastruc-
tures can therefore pose a 
particular problem which the 
Commission is seeking to 
address through its proposal to 
revise Directive 90/388/EEC as 
amended by Directive 95/51/EC. 
This proposal concerns legal 
separation of cable and 
telecommunications infrastruc-
tures. There have already been 
moves in a number of Member 
States28 against such dual 
ownership which go beyond 
legal separation. It is likely that 
27 Broadband radio services are not an 
option for the foreseeable future. 
2 ° The Netherlands, Ireland and Germany, 
in particular. 
10 Competition Policy Newsletter ti^-ù ii 4 
( % 
1999 Number 1 February 
ARTICLES 
divestiture of one of these 
interests may be required on a 
case by case basis as a condition 
of approval of a telecom-
munications operator's partici-
pation in pay-TV or multimedia 
joint ventures. Precisely this 
issue has recently arisen in the 
Bertelsmann/ Kirch/Deutsche 
Telekom and BiB cases which 
are described below. 
4.1.3. Technical services 
There are two broad issues 
relating to proprietary digital set 
top boxes. The first concerns the 
access of competing pay-TV 
operators to existing installed 
bases of set top boxes. The 
second concerns interoperability 
of proprietary digital set top 
boxes. 
4.1.3.1. Access 
Generally in the EU, pay-TV 
operators are also suppliers of 
technical services. When pay-TV 
operators entered the market, the 
technical services necessary for 
pay-TV did not exist. It was 
therefore logical that they 
developed the technical services 
themselves. In theory, a new 
entrant into the pay-TV market 
has a choice between launching 
a set top box population using 
his own technical services for 
reception of his service and 
seeking to use the set top box 
population of the incumbent pay-
TV operator. In practice, 
however, the scale of investment 
required means that the new 
entrants' most realistic option is 
to provide a pay-TV service 
using the set top boxes which 
already exist. Quite apart from 
the investment required, 
consumers are reluctant to buy 
or rent more than one digital set 
top box. 
There are three essential 
components of a set top box 
which govern the conditions of 
access: conditional access 
systems, electronic programme 
guides and application 
programming interfaces. If these 
components are not based on 
proprietary technology, a new 
entrant can access the set top box 
independently of the existing 
operator of technical services. 
However, the components are 
generally proprietary which 
means that a new entrant will be 
dependent on his incumbent 
competitor for access to the 
marketplace. If access to 
existing boxes was refused or 
granted only on discriminatory 
terms, competition on the pay-
TV market would be 
significantly impeded. 
The Advanced TV Standards 
Directive29 accepted the 
commercialisation of proprietary 
digital set top boxes by pay-TV 
operators within the EU. 
However, it regulates the 
provision of digital conditional 
access services for "digital 
television services". It does not 
deal with the provision of digital 
conditional access services for 
other types of service, such as 
digital radio or on-line services, 
2 9 Directive 95/47/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council of 24 
October 1995 on the use of standards for 
the transmission of television signals, OJ 
[1995] L 281/51. 
nor does it deal with provision of 
access to electronic programme 
guides or application 
programming interfaces. How-
ever, the scope of the 
competition rules is not limited 
by the Directive. Thus, the 
Commission has examined 
issues relating to proprietary 
digital conditional access 
systems, electronic programme 
guides and application program-
ming interfaces in the 
Bertelsmann/Kirch/Deutsche Te-
lekom and BiB cases which are 
described below. 
4.1.3.2. Interoperability 
In the future, digital set top 
boxes will be replaced by 
integrated digital television sets. 
The Advanced TV Standards 
Directive referred to above 
requires such integrated sets to 
allow for the addition of 
modules containing different 
proprietary conditional access 
systems and other relevant 
technical services30. In this way, 
consumers can be confident in 
buying such a set that they will 
not be tied to any one digital 
service provider. 
However, the transition to 
integrated digital television sets 
is likely to take a significant 
number of years. In the 
meantime, there is a need to 
ensure that consumers buying a 
30 Article 4(a) "Where television sets 
contain an integrated digital decoder 
such sets must allow for the option of 
fitting at least one standardised socket 
permitting connection of conditional 
access and other elements of a digital 
television system of the digital decoder ". 
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proprietary digital set top box 
are not tied to a single provider 
of digital services. The 
Directive does not deal with this 
issue. Enforced standardisation 
of digital set top boxes appears 
to be premature. Indeed, it may 
even be dangerous to do so 
before the market has had time 
to settle. However, some degree 
of interoperability of digital set 
top boxes can be ensured by 
obliging suppliers of technical 
services based on proprietary 
technology to enter simulcrypt 
agreements. Simulcrypt 
involves a commercial 
agreement between the suppliers 
of different proprietary 
conditional access systems to 
synchronise the different 
systems such that populations of 
digital set top boxes embedding 
each system are able to 
descramble signals using both 
conditional access systems31. In 
the BiB case, BSkyB has been 
obliged to enter such agreements 
with operators of different 
proprietary conditional access 
systems as one of the proposed 
conditions of clearance of the 
joint venture. 
4.2.Vertical integration 
Vertical integration occurs when 
a company extends its scope of 
activity by merger, acquisition or 
joint venture into markets which 
are upstream or downstream of 
its core area of business. The 
essential rationale for vertical 
31 For a more technical definition see 
notice published pursuant to article 19(3) 
of Regulation 17, OJ C 322 [1998] of 
October 98. 
integration is presumed to be 
increased efficiency and, as 
such, it is generally considered 
by the Commission to be 
unlikely to pose serious 
competition problems. How­
ever, where the companies 
involved have strong positions 
on their core markets, a close 
examination of the effects of 
vertical integration is required in 
order to ensure that it does not 
threaten to erect barriers to entry 
by foreclosing access to supplies 
or markets. 
National markets for content, 
transmission networks, technical 
services and pay­TV in the EU 
are characterised by the 
existence of dominant incumbent 
operators. Agreements between 
these operators may well have 
the effect of strengthening 
existing dominant positions in 
core markets and of creating 
dominant positions in new 
markets. Such agreements will 
be acceptable under Community 
competition law only where the 
parties accept conditions which 
prevent such effects. Structural 
conditions are likely be 
necessary, such as divestiture of 
pay­TV content rights, ceding 
control of transmission networks 
and control over proprietary 
technical services embedded in 
set top boxes. Behavioural 
conditions will be considered to 
be adequate only in very limited 
circumstances. Behavioural 
undertakings not to abuse a 
newly created dominant position 
will be rejected. 
The Commission has concluded 
in three cases concerning pay­
TV that the undertakings offered 
by the parties were insufficient 
to prevent vertical integration 
creating or strengthening 
dominant positions. In MSG32, 
the creation of a technical 
services joint venture by 
Bertelsmann, Kirch and 
Deutsche Telekom was 
prohibited as MSG would hold a 
dominant position on the 
technical services market which 
would have the effect of 
strengthening the existing 
dominant positions of the parents 
on the pay­TV and cable 
networks markets respectively. 
In the Nordic Satellite 
Distribution case (NSD)33, the 
Commission prohibited a joint 
venture between Telenor, 
TeleDanmark and Kinnevik to 
provide transponder capacity and 
the transmission and distribution 
of satellite TV channels to the 
Nordic area. The Commission 
concluded that NSD would hold 
a dominant position on the 
market for satellite TV 
transponder services suitable for 
Nordic viewers. NSD's 
dominance would strengthen 
TeleDanmark's dominant 
position on the cable TV market 
in Denmark. Finally, the 
creation of NSD would lead to 
Viasat (Kinnevik's subsidiary) 
acquiring a dominant position on 
the market for distribution of 
pay­TV and other encrypted 
channels to direct­to­home 
households. 
3 2 M. 649 Media Services Group [1994] OJ 
L 364/1. 
3 3 M. 490 Nordic Satellite Distribution 
[1995] OJL 53/20. 
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In the recent Bertelsmann/ 
Kirch/Deutsche Telekom 
decisions34, the creation of joint 
ventures to supply technical 
services for pay-TV distributed 
by cable and satellite was 
prohibited as the joint ventures 
would hold dominant positions 
on the technical services market 
which would strengthen the 
dominant positions of Deutsche 
Telekom on the cable network 
market and of Bertelsmann and 
Kirch's joint venture Premiere 
on the pay-TV market. In these 
cases, the essential problem was 
Bertelsmann and Kirch's 
stranglehold over the pay-TV 
rights which prevented the 
emergence of a competitor on 
the pay-TV market. There 
would be no new entry in the 
technical services market 
without a second pay-TV 
operator. Deutsche Telekom's 
position on the German cable 
network market prevented the 
emergence of competition from 
the private cable operators. 
While Kirch and Deutsche 
Telekom were willing to provide 
the Commission with the 
minimum undertakings 
necessary to ensure competition 
on the pay-TV market, in 
particular, by ceding 
programming rights and 
allowing private cable operators 
to independently market 
Premiere in combination with 
their own channels, Bertelsmann 
was not. 
3 M. 993 Bertelsmann/Kirch/Premiere and 
M. 1027 Deutsche Telekom/ Beta-
Research, Commission decisions of 27 
May 1998, not yet published. 
In the BiB case, on the other 
hand, the parties have been 
willing to agree to substantial 
conditions on the operation of 
the joint venture. On this basis, 
the Commission proposes to take 
a favourable attitude to the 
creation of BiB35. BiB is a joint 
venture between BSkyB, BT, 
Matsushita and Midland Bank. 
It will provide digital interactive 
TV services in the UK, such as 
limited internet access, home-
banking, home-shopping and e-
mail via television sets, by 
means of digital satellite 
broadcasting with a telecom­
munications return path. In 
contrast to the cases cited above, 
BiB will not itself be active on 
the pay-TV market. BSkyB and, 
to a lesser extent BiB, will be 
active on the technical services 
market. 
As originally notified to the 
Commission, there was a serious 
concern that BSkyB and BiB 
would not allow third parties, 
whether pay-TV operators or 
digital interactive TV services 
operators, to have non­
discriminatory access to the 
digital set top boxes which BiB 
will subsidise. Conditions36 
3 5 Notice published pursuant to Article 
19(3) of Regulation 17, OJ C 322 [1998] 
of 21 October 98. 
3 6 The most important conditions can be 
summarised as follows: legal separation 
of BIB's subsidy payment/recovery and 
digital interactive TV services 
operations, removal of all exclusive 
rights concerning access to the set top 
box, provision of necessary information 
about the set top box and proprietary 
technical systems to all third parties, 
obligation to enter simulcrypt 
agreements, obligations concerning the 
manner in which subsidy recovery will 
have been agreed to ensure that 
third parties, whether operators 
of digital television or digital 
interactive TV services, have 
fair, reasonable and non­
discriminatory access to all 
proprietary components of the 
digital set top box which BiB 
will subsidise (digital 
conditional access services, the 
electronic programme guide and 
application programming inter­
face). As described above, 
BSkyB has also been obliged to 
enter simulcrypt agreements. 
There was also a concern that 
BT's dominant position in the 
telecommunications customer 
access market would be abused 
as a result of its participation in 
BiB. In particular, BT owns 
both the only national 
telecommunications customer 
access network in the UK which, 
if upgraded, would be suitable 
for the provision of genuine 
broadband services in 
competition with BiB and also 
cable networks. BT has 
accepted not to expand its cable 
interests, and to divest its 
existing cable interests, in the 
UK. Moreover, the Commission 
will keep under close review 
developments in the UK 
broadband customer access 
infrastructure market in order to 
ensure that BT's participation in 
BiB does not lead to a reduced 
incentive in the short to medium 
be operated, obligations on the provision 
of digital conditional access services for 
on-line services and removal of 
obligation on customers to subscribe to 
BSkyB's digital satellite pay-TV service 
as a condition of purchase of a BiB 
subsidised set top box. 
Competition Policy Newsletter Λ ir 
^ s.* ( ^ 
1999 Number 1 February 13 
ARTICLES 
term to invest in the upgrade of 
BT's infrastructure. 
The combination of these 
conditions should prevent the 
BiB joint venture from 
strengthening BSkyB or BT's 
dominant positions on the pay-
TV and customer access 
infrastructure markets respec-
tively. They should also ensure 
that there are no structural 
barriers to the emergence of 
competition on the digital 
interactive TV services market. 
A final decision is expected in 
1999. 
5. CONCLUSION 
The relationship between 
competitive, open market 
structures and technological 
progress finds supports not only 
in economic theory, but also in 
practice, as the developments in 
EU digital pay-TV markets 
demonstrate. Competition 
promotes technical progress, 
without sacrificing the interests 
of European citizens. Lower 
prices and wider choice are the 
result. Where agreements raise 
fundamental competition 
problems, efforts have been 
made to find solutions. These 
were accepted by the parties to 
the BiB case, but rejected by 
Bertelsmann in the Bertelsmann/ 
Kirch/Deutsche Telekom cases. 
However, in no circumstances 
can the Commission coun-
tenance the creation or 
strengthening of national 
dominant positions which 
foreclose further market entry: 
consumers would suffer and the 
creation of the internal market 
would be jeopardised if national 
markets were to be further 
partitioned. The Commission's 
balanced approach to the 
application of the competition 
rules as illustrated in the present 
note serves to promote 
technological development in the 
form of the introduction of 
digital pay television, and also 
the further developments which 
convergence will enable, for the 
benefit of all European citizens. 
ANNEX 
MARKET DEFINITION 
1. COMMISSION'S GENERAL 
APPROACH TO MARKET 
DEFINITION 
Market definition is a tool to 
identify and define the 
boundaries of competition 
between undertakings. It 
consists essentially in identifying 
the effective alternative sources 
of supply for the customers of 
the undertakings involved37, 
both in terms of products/ 
services and geographic location 
of suppliers. The relevant market 
within which to assess a given 
competition issue is therefore 
established by the combination 
of the product and geographic 
markets. Market definition ís 
thus the essential first step in the 
examination of any agreement, 
as it makes it possible to assess 
37 
In the case of a concentration, the 
undertakings involved will be the parties 
to the concentration; in investigations 
under Article 86 EC, the undertaking 
being investigated or the complainants; 
in investigations under Article 85 EC, 
the parties to the agreement. 
the impact of an agreement on 
competition. In particular, it 
allows calculation of market 
shares that convey meaningful 
information about market power 
for the purposes of assessing 
dominance38. The Commis-
sion's general approach to 
relevant market definition is set 
out at length in its 1997 
Notice39. 
Three main sources of 
competitive constraints on the 
behaviour of an undertaking are 
identified: demand substituta-
bility, supply substitutability and 
potential competition. Of these, 
demand substitution constitutes 
the most immediate and effective 
disciplinary force on the 
suppliers of a given product/ 
service, in particular in terms of 
their pricing decisions. Supply 
substitution is taken into account 
when it is equivalent to demand 
substitution in terms of 
effectiveness and immediacy. 
Potential competition is not 
taken into account when defining 
markets since the conditions 
under which potential 
competition actually represent an 
effective competitive constraint 
depends on an analysis of the 
specific factors relating to the 
conditions of entry. However, 
potential competition will be 
taken account of in the 
subsequent competition analysis. 
T O 
Market share alone is not indicative of 
dominance. Other factors are relevant, 
such as the existence of barriers to entry 
and the capacity of reaction of 
customers. 
3Q 
Commission Notice on the definition of 
the relevant market for the purposes of 
Community competition law, OJ C 372 
[1997] of 9/12/1997. 
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2. APPLICATION TO PAY 
TELEVISION SECTOR 
2.1. Retail markets 
Examination of the demand 
substitution of consumers of 
"free to air" and pay television 
clearly demonstrates that pay 
television constitutes a separate 
relevant product market™. It is 
y in the case of pay television 
.at consumers have a direct 
trading relationship with a 
television broadcaster. Pay-TV 
operators thus compete for 
subscribers, whereas "free to air" 
broadcasters compete for 
viewers as audience share is the 
determinative factor in the 
television advertising market. 
There is no direct competitive 
relationship as the actors on the 
two markets differ. There is, 
however, a link between the 
quality of the "free to air" TV 
offering and the scope for the 
introduction of pay TV. 
However, this fact does not 
undermine the conclusion that 
separate markets exist. Viewers 
do not consider "free to air" and 
pay television to be substitutes, 
but rather complements. As 
digital pay-TV is a development 
of analogue, it does not 
constitute a separate product 
market. 
It remains to be seen whether 
new forms of service, such as 
pay-per-view form a distinct 
product market. This may be the 
case, in particular, in respect of 
See for example, paragraph 32 of MSG 
decision, M.649 Media Services Group 
[1994] OJL 364/1. 
pay-per-view services for sports 
events. Equally, services in 
which viewing is not the main 
object, such as home-banking or 
home-shopping cannot be 
considered to be substitutes for 
entertainment channels. Given 
the current difference in 
penetration rates between 
personal computers (PC) and 
television sets in the EU, 
separate markets are also likely 
to exist in respect of interactive 
services delivered via PC and 
television. 
The geographic market for pay 
television is generally national. 
Cultural, linguistic and 
regulatory differences between 
Member States means that 
viewers in one country do not 
consider pay-TV services aimed 
at another country, in another 
language to be substitutes. 
Where there are no such 
language barriers and the 
cultural differences are not 
extreme, it may be the case that 
geographic markets delimited by 
language areas exist. The 
comments on the convergence 
green paper bear out the fact that 
this phenomenon is unlikely to 
be affected by the introduction 
of digital television or further 
convergence 41 
2.2. Wholesale markets 
2.2.1. Content 
The acquisition of exclusive 
television rights to films and 
attractive sports events has been 
a determining factor in the 
4 1 SEC(1998)1284 final, at page 20. 
success of pay-TV operators as 
viewers' willingness to pay for 
film and sports channels has 
been shown to be higher than 
willingness to pay for other 
forms of programming. 
Attractive content is a scarce 
resource. 
Copyright licences of film rights 
distinguish between exploitation 
windows and national territories: 
there are separate windows for 
exploitation on pay-per-view, 
pay TV and free TV. The 
licences are generally exclusive 
in respect of each window and 
territory. As the price charged 
by suppliers of film rights for 
pay-TV is not constrained by 
suppliers of other forms of 
programming, the acquisition of 
film rights for pay-TV 
constitutes a separate market. Its 
geographic scope will be 
determined by the territory 
covered by the licence. Sports 
rights are also generally sold 
exclusively. However, 
exclusivity in this case generally 
applies to all forms of 
exploitation. As demand for 
sports rights is particularly 
inelastic, a market for the 
acquisition of sports rights 
exists. Moreover, separate 
markets may exist for the rights 
to specific sports, such as 
attractive football. The 
geographic market will again be 
determined by the scope of the 
licence. 
2.2.2. Transmission 
For the moment, television can 
be transmitted by three means: 
terrestrial, cable and satellite 
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direct-to-home. The technical 
characteristics of these forms of 
transmission vary: only cable has 
genuine broadband capa-
bilities42. As terrestrial frequen-
cy is scarce, a pay-TV 
broadcaster generally has a 
choice only between satellite and 
cable transmission. The price of 
leasing satellite transponder 
capacity and cable carriage vary 
significantly. Where reception 
of television by cable is the 
norm, satellite is unlikely to act 
as a price constraint. The 
availability of all three options 
for a pay-TV broadcaster will 
also vary between Member 
States: this is particularly true in 
respect of cable. Separate 
product markets are likely to 
exist in respect of each of these 
forms of transmission network. 
Markets will be national in scope 
for terrestrial and cable 
transmission. The geographic 
scope in terms of satellite will 
depend on two things: the 
footprint43 of the satellites and 
whether a policy exists to 
allocate certain transponders to 
certain national markets. 
Looking more to the future, a 
provider of genuinely broadband 
interactive services44 will require 
"Broadband" infrastructure is not a 
precisely defined term. It is used here to 
refer to a network which is two-way and 
has significant transmission capability. 
3 The "footprint" of a satellite means the 
territories which can receive a signal 
from that satellite. See paragraph 16 of 
the Nordic Satellite Distribution decision 
for a definition M. 490 Nordic Satellite 
Distribution [1995] OJ L 53/20. 
As distinct from the simulated broadband 
effect which is possible using satellite 
transmission and a PSTN (public 
a customer access transmission 
network which has such 
capabilities. For the moment, 
there are two options (although 
broadband wireless infrastruc-
ture may emerge in the future). 
The first is cable, the second is 
upgraded local loop telecommu-
nications infrastructure^-*. A 
broadband customer access 
network market is therefore 
likely to develop in the future. 
2.2.3. Technical services for pay-
TV and interactive servi-
ces 
Pay-TV operators require a 
special technical infrastructure 
which allows them to ensure that 
only viewers authorised to watch 
their service are able to do so. 
These technical services 
essentially comprise a set top 
box, conditional access system 
and related smart cards and 
subscriber management sys-
tenT™. Depending on the 
sophistication of a given set top 
box, access to electronic 
programme guides and appli-
cation programming interfaces 
may also be relevant. 
Digital set top boxes will also be 
used by "free to air" broadcasters 
switched telecommunications network) 
return path. 
Digital technologies such as the DSL 
family (ADSL/VDSL, HDSL and DSL 
Lite) can increase the capacity of the 
traditional copper wire local loop 
infrastructure. 
See paragraphs 20-26 of MSG decision 
M. 649 Media Services Group [1994] OJ 
L 364/1 and paragraphs for an 
explanation of these various elements. 
to demodulate their digital 
signals (until all consumers have 
bought integrated digital 
television sets). Digital set top 
boxes and the related technical 
services will also be required for 
digital interactive TV services. 
These services comprise a 
distinct product market. The 
geographic market will tend to 
follow that of the pay-TV and 
other services markets for which 
the technical services are to be 
used. 
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Application of Articles 85 & 86 EC and 65 ECSC 
Main developments between Γ' October 1998 and 31s' January 1999 
Recent Commission Decisions 
concerning the scope of the 
Group Exemption for Liner 
Conferences 
David WOOD, DGIV-D-2 
INTRODUCTION 
This article contains a summary 
of recent decisions adopted by 
the Commission concerning the 
scope of Article 3 of Council 
Regulation 4056/86: the group 
exemption for liner conferences. 
The group exemption for liner 
conferences is unusual in a 
number of respects. It is a 
Council Regulation. It was 
adopted even though :' the 
Commission had no experience 
of granting individual 
exemptions. It allows horizontal 
price fixing. It is unlimited in 
time. It contains no market share 
thresholds. In a word, it is 
generous. 
First, reference should be made 
to the CEWAL47 case. That case 
has established that whilst 
shipping conferences are, in 
general, considered to bring about 
certain benefits and thereby 
justify the exemptions granted by 
the regulation, this fact cannot 
signify that every impairment of 
competition brought about by 
shipping conferences falls outside 
the prohibition broadly laid down 
by Article 85(1) of the Treaty. It 
also stated that the general rule 
that all derogations must be 
interpreted strictly48 also applies 
under Regulation 4056/86. 
THE SCOPE 
CONFERENCE 
EXEMPTION 
OF THE 
GROUP 
47 Joined Cases C-395/96 Ρ & 396/95 Ρ, 
CMB ν Commission. 
There are six aspects of the 
group exemption which the 
Commission has addressed in its 
recent decisions: inland price 
fixing, the meaning of 'uniform 
or common', capacity 
management, service contracts 
and freight forwarder 
compensation. 
Inland Price Fixing 
It is nearly ten years since Sir 
Leon Brittan wrote, with the 
See Judgments of the Court of Justice of 
24 October 1995 in Case C-70/93, BMW v 
ALD [1995] ECR 1-3439, at paragraph 28 
and of Case C-266/93, Bundeskartellamt v 
Volkswagen and VAG, [1995 ] ECR I-
3477, at paragraph 33 "... having regard to 
the general principle prohibiting 
anticompetitive agreements laid down in 
Article 85(1) of the Treaty, provisions in a 
block exemption which derogate from that 
principle cannot be interpreted widely and 
cannot be construed in such a way as to 
extend the effects of the regulation beyond 
what is necessary to protect the interests 
which they are intended to safeguard." 
agreement of Karel Van Miert in 
his then capacity as Transport 
Commissioner, to the Far 
Eastern Freight Conference. He 
expressed the view that inland 
price fixing by conferences was 
not permitted under the terms of 
the group exemption for liner 
conferences contained in Article 
3 of Regulation 4056/86. 
This question occupies a central 
place in the TAA49 and FEFC50 
cases which are currently before 
the Court of First Instance. It 
came close to being resolved in 
the reference to the Court of 
Justice from the High Court in 
the SUN AG case51 for a ruling 
on a point of interpretation. But 
that case was settled before the 
ruling was given. 
The debate over the scope of the 
group exemption does not only 
apply to price fixing for inland 
transport. One of the issues not 
yet fully addressed is where 
maritime transport services end 
and land transport services begin. 
In the FEFC decision the 
Commission expressly avoided 
taking a position on this question 
stating that this Decision does not 
address the question whether 
price fixing agreements relating 
to port handling senices fail 
within the scope of application of 
Article 3 of Regulation No 
4056/86. 
4 9 Case T-395/94, ACL v Commission. 
50 
51 
Case T-96/95, CMB v Commission. 
Case C-339,95 Compagnia di Naviga­
zione Marittima v CMB. 
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However, the Commission has 
found that ground handling 
services at airports52 fall within 
the scope of Regulation 17 and 
not one of the transport 
regulations. In the Frankfurt 
airport case, the Commission 
found that, inter alia, the loading 
and unloading of baggage, cargo 
and mail fell within the scope of 
Regulation 17 where it took 
place on the ramp (or apron) of 
the airport. 
So far as individual exemption 
of inland price fixing is 
concerned, the Commission's 
position has been clear since the 
adoption of its Report to the 
Council in 199453: if conference 
members wish to fix inland 
prices they must engage in co-
operation of a type which 
necessitates the fixing of inland 
prices. This position was 
endorsed by the Group of Wise 
Men set up under the 
chairmanship of Sir Bryan 
Carsberg54. 
Uniform or Common 
According to Regulation 
4056/86, 'liner conference' 
means a group of two or more 
Olympic Airways, decision of 23 January 
1985. Commission Decision of 14 
January 1998 relating to a proceeding 
under Article 86 of the EC Treaty -
Flughafen Frankfurt/Main AG. 
98/513/EC: Commission Decision of 11 
June 1998 relating to a proceeding under 
Article 86 of the EC Treaty - Alpha 
Flight Services/Aéroports de Paris, OJ L 
230 p. 10. 
5 3 SEC(94) 933 final, adopted by the 
Commission on 8 June 1994. 
See the Final Report of the Multimodal 
Group submitted to Commissioner Van 
Miert on 18 November 1997. 
vessel-operating carriers 
which has an agreement or 
arrangement.. .within the frame-
work of which they operate 
under uniform or common 
freight rates ... 
The Commission has interpreted 
the expression 'uniform or 
common' as meaning that a 
conference price must be common 
or uniform not only as between 
the shipping lines but also with 
regard to all shippers of the same 
commodity. Not only does 
'common or uniform' preclude a 
two- or multi-tier price structure 
as between carriers, it precludes 
the creation of different classes of 
shipper55. 
Once again, this is an 
interpretation of Regulation 
4056 which is before the Court 
of First Instance in the TAA 
case. 
Capacity Management 
A "capacity management 
programme" is an agreement 
under which the parties agree not 
to use a proportion of the space 
on their vessels for the carriage 
of goods in a particular trade. 
The proportion set aside is part 
of the forecast excess of supply 
over demand. 
5 5 Commission Decision 94/980/EC of 19 
October 1994 relating to a proceeding 
pursuant to Article 85 of the EC Treaty -
Trans-Atlantic Conference Agreement, 
OJ L 376, 31.12.1994, pi, at paragraphs 
322 & 323; Commission Decision of 16 
September 1998 relating to a proceeding 
pursuant to Articles 85 and 86 of the EC 
Treaty - Trans-Atlantic Conference 
Agreement, not yet published, at 
paragraph 456. 
Capacity management program-
mes have operated on the 
transpacific from 1989 to 1995 
(the Transpacific Stabilization 
Agreement), on the transatlantic 
from 1992 to 1994 (the TAA) 
and on the North Europe/Far 
East trades during 1993 (the 
EATA). 
Only the TAA has claimed to be 
a liner conference covered by the 
group exemption. The TAA 
parties argued that their capacity 
management programme was 
covered by the exemption since 
Article 3(d) expressly refers to 
"the regulation of the carrying 
capacity offered by each 
member". 
The Commission considers that 
Article 3(d) enables the members 
of a conference collectively to 
adjust the number of sailings and 
vessels to seasonal and cyclical 
variations in demand for 
transport, to determine the type 
of vessel used, and thus to 
ensure that their provision of 
capacity is appropriate to market 
conditions.56 
In the TAA decision, the 
Commission argued that the 
TAA capacity management 
programme was a control 
mechanism aimed at reinforcing 
price discipline among its 
members. It did not regulate the 
supply of carrying capacity by 
conference members, but simply 
restricted the use of available 
capacity on the ships used by 
them. It did not adapt available 
capacity to market conditions, 
56 TAA at para 365. 
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but sought to restrict the sale of 
that capacity in order to drive up 
prices. 
The Commission concluded that 
such a freeze on the use of 
capacity was not a traditional 
liner conference practice and 
was not envisaged when the 
block exemption was granted. 
The Commission also argued in 
the TAA Decision that it must be 
questioned whether a block 
exemption covering capacity 
management in conjunction with 
price fixing would be lawful, 
since control over both prices 
and the volume of supply to 
potential customers would 
enable participating undertakings 
to eliminate competition, 
contrary to the fourth condition 
of Article 85(3)57. 
This is another of the 
outstanding issues before the 
Court of First Instance in the 
TAA case. 
The Commission has reacted 
negatively to applications for 
individual exemption of capacity 
management programmes. The 
Commission refused to grant 
individual exemption in respect 
of the TAA capacity 
management programme in 1994 
and is likely shortly to do the 
same in respect of the EATA. In 
the case of the EATA a meeting 
of the Advisory Committee of 
Member States was held on 27 
January 1999 and a draft 
decision will soon be proposed 
for adoption by the Commission. 
57 TAA at para 367. 
The Commission's view has 
been that the direct effect of an 
artificial reduction in capacity 
utilisation (as opposed to a 
permanent reduction in capacity) 
is to share fixed operating costs 
amongst a smaller number of 
containers and to have no effect 
in reducing fixed operating 
costs. A reduction in capacity 
could benefit shippers if the cost 
of transport were reduced, i.e. if 
capacity was really withdrawn 
by the progressive withdrawal of 
certain vessels or certain 
operators currently present. 
Secondly, there is no evidence 
that capacity management 
programmes help to ensure that 
in the long term the level of 
capacity is better adjusted to 
meet the level of demand and it 
is possible that they encourage 
the unnecessary premature 
introduction of excess capacity. 
Thirdly, capacity management 
programmes have always been 
introduced into trades where 
there has been a functioning 
conference. The combination of 
price fixing and output limitation 
is probably the most potent form 
of anti-competitive behaviour 
which can exist. Moreover, they 
have appealed to non-conference 
members so that, in the case of 
the TSA and EATA, the pre­
existing conferences have been 
able to extend their market 
power in the same way as with a 
tolerated outsider agreement. 
Service Contracts 
A service contract is a contract 
between a shipper and a carrier or 
conference in which the shipper 
makes a commitment to provide a 
certain minimum quantity of 
cargo over a fixed time period and 
the carrier or conference commits 
to a certain rate or rate schedule as 
well as a defined service level -
such as, assured space, transit 
time, port rotation, or similar 
service features. 
One of the questions which arose 
in the TACA case58 was whether 
TACA joint service contracts fell 
within the scope of the group 
exemption. 
The Commission's first 
argument was that the group 
exemption permits conferences 
to agree upon a 'uniform or 
common tariff. Since TACA's 
joint service contracts neither 
appeared in the tariff nor were 
they based on the tariff, it could 
not be said that the group 
exemption covered the 
agreement of the TACA parties 
to enter into such contracts. This 
is a matter under dispute. 
So far as the intention of the 
legislator was concerned, the 
Commission saw no reason to 
assume that the Council must 
have intended such an important 
form of arrangement to be 
exempted. In the Commission's 
view, there is a clear distinction 
to be drawn between tariff 
pricing and contractual 
arrangements. Carriage at tariff 
rates and arrangements relating 
to discounts off tariff rates (such 
as loyalty contracts and time-
volume rates) fall within the 
58 Case T-191/98, ACL ν Commission. 
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former category and service 
contracts fall within the latter. 
This distinction seems to have its 
origins in the notion of common 
carriage and in the TACA 
Decision the Commission stated 
that the distinction between 
common carriage and contract 
carriage predates liner shipping 
conferences. It referred to the 
UK Carriers Act 1830 (11° Geo. 
IV. & Io Gul. IV.), an Act of 
Parliament limiting the liability 
of common carriers, which 
provides that "Provided always, 
and be it further enacted, That 
nothing in this Act contained 
shall extend or be construed to 
annul or in anywise affect any 
special Contract between such 
Mail Contractor, Stage Coach 
Proprietor, or Common Carrier, 
and any other Parties, for the 
Conveyance of Goods and 
Merchandizes. " 59 
Although the distinction between 
contractual arrangements and 
tariff arrangements is not new, 
the conference system was based 
on the latter and not the former. 
So far as service contracts are 
concerned, the Commission has 
considered there to be sufficient 
historical evidence to conclude 
that they were a new breed of 
arrangement only just coming 
into usage at the time of the 
preparations for the adoption of 
Regulation 4056/86. There is 
therefore no reason to assume 
that they were intended to be 
covered by the group exemption. 
Freight Forwarder Commis-
sion 
In the TACA Decision, the 
Commission addressed for the 
first time the practice of 
conferences to agree the level of 
reward which conference 
members pay to freight 
forwarders60. 
Article 3 of Regulation (EEC) No 
4056/86 concerns the fixing of 
rates and conditions of carriage, 
that is to say, the terms on which 
maritime transport services are 
sold to shippers. It does not 
expressly cover an agreement to 
fix the terms on which freight 
forwarders or other intermediaries 
are rewarded for providing 
intermediary services to the 
members of a conference 
although it has been argued that 
such a restriction is ancillary to 
the restrictions of competition 
permitted under the group 
exemption. 
The TACA parties argued that 
conferences operating on the 
Northern Europe/US trades have 
fixed "westbound levels of 
commissions agreed to be paid to 
European [other than UK and 
Irish] forwarders" since the early 
1970s. They have also argued that 
other conferences have fixed such 
prices since the beginning of the 
twentieth century. 
The Commission considered that 
the practice of fixing freight 
forwarder compensation was 
intended to restrict competition 
between the parties to the TACA 
59 TACA at footnote 37. 60 TACA at paras 505 et seq. 
thereby adversely affecting 
competition as regards the 
demand for services supplied by 
freight forwarders to the TACA 
parties. This might deprive 
customers of the benefits which 
would result from competition 
between the TACA parties. 
It might also inhibit competition 
between freight forwarders and be 
a disincentive to improvements in 
the quality of services provided 
by freight forwarders, who may 
be encouraged to concentrate on 
the volume as opposed to the 
quality of business. Thus, 
competition may also be 
adversely affected on the supply 
side. 
The Commission did not consider 
that the removal of maximum 
levels of freight forwarder 
commissions (together with the 
other restrictions described above) 
would lead to higher prices 
overall and so justify this 
restriction of competition. In any 
event, this is an argument which 
could be made for every price-
fixing agreement on the demand 
side. In order to achieve optimal 
allocation, prices should reflect 
the real economic value of 
products and services as 
determined by individual buyers. 
If the cost of using freight 
forwarder services rose too 
sharply for shippers they would 
be likely to switch very quickly to 
dealing direct with the carrier. If, 
however, the freight forwarder is 
perceived as being capable of 
contributing material added value, 
there is no reason why this should 
not be reflected in higher prices. 
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In this respect freight forwarders 
are in the same position as very 
many other intermediaries: if the 
cost of going through the 
intermediary becomes too high, 
the consumer will seek other 
distribution channels such as 
direct purchase from the supplier. 
Accordingly, the Commission did 
not consider that the agreement to 
fix the levels of remuneration paid 
to freight forwarders could qualify 
for individual exemption. This 
approach is very much in line 
with the approach that the 
Commission has adopted both 
with other forms of 
intermediary, such as insurance 
brokers, and with professional 
bodies61. 
CONCLUSION 
Over the course of ten years, 
there has been considerable 
argument as to the scope of the 
group exemption for liner 
conferences. Almost every single 
issue on which the Commission 
has taken a formal position has 
been challenged. The Court of 
First Instance has ruled in the 
CEWAL case but its judgment 
has been appealed and the same 
fate may await the judgments of 
the CFI in the other main cases 
(TAA, FEFC, TACA). 
61 The role of intermediaries, such as 
brokers and agents, may in some 
circumstances give rise to competition 
concerns. The Commission has taken no 
formal decisions in this field, although it 
did in 1987 publish an Article 19(3) 
notice proposing to exempt an agreement 
notified by the Irish Insurance Federation 
fixing maximum rates of commission 
that insurers would pay to 
intermediaries. The insurers wished to 
avoid commission rates rising (which 
ultimately had to be paid by consumers), 
and claimed that consumers would also 
benefit because intermediaries would be 
more likely to give best advice 
uninfluenced by the commission they 
were receiving. No decision was 
subsequently taken, and it seems 
unlikely that the Commission would now 
be persuaded to exempt this type of 
horizontal agreement between insurers 
fixing the rates of commissions to 
intermediaries (See for example UIC -
Distribution of railway tickets by travel 
agents [1992] OJ L 366/47 (infringement 
decision with fines for inter alia a 
standard rate of commission to travel 
agents; decision annulled because 
adopted on the basis of Regulation 17 
rather than Regulation 1017/68: T-14/93 
UIC v. Commission [1995] ECR II-
1503; C-245/95 Ρ Commission v. UIC 
[1997] ECR 1-1287). 
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Changement important dans la 
structure de la DG IV 
Maurice G U ERRI N, DG IV-E-1 
Depuis de nombreuses années 
déjà, la Commission n'a cessé de 
souligner le caractère nocif des 
infractions particulièrement 
graves que constituent les cartels 
ainsi que, selon les propos tenus 
le 3 décembre 1998 par M. le 
Commissaire Van Miert, 
« l'absolue détermination » de la 
Commission à lutter contre cette 
forme d'entente. 
Dans cette même déclaration' du 
3 décembre 1998, M. Van Miert 
a annoncé que dans cet esprit il 
lui était apparu nécessaire de 
créer au sein de la DG IV une 
nouvelle unité El chargée 
spécialement de la détection, de 
la poursuite et de la répression 
des cartels pour l'ensemble des 
activités de produits et services, 
confirmant ainsi de manière 
concrète la priorité que la 
Commission entend donner à la 
lutte contre ces pratiques. 
Par cartels, il convient 
d'entendre les accords, pratiques 
concertées, décisions d'associa-
tions d'entreprises de type 
horizontal ayant pour objet ou 
pour effet de 
- fixer les prix et/ou les 
conditions de vente, 
coordonner les politiques de 
vente ; 
- répartir les marchés, les 
clientèles, cloisonner les 
marchés domestiques ; 
- contrôler ou limiter les 
productions et/ou les 
investissements ; 
- échanger entre entreprises des 
données individuelles 
économiques ou industrielles 
sensibles dans un marché 
oligopolistiques. 
Ces différentes restrictions 
peuvent être décidées ou mises 
en oeuvre de manière cumulative 
ou séparée. 
Selon une terminologie 
communément admise, les 
cartels sont des accords conclus 
entre entreprises indépendantes 
ou des décisions d'associations 
d'entreprises, en vue 
d'influencer la production ou la 
commercialisation par la 
restriction ou l'élimination de la 
concurrence et d'altérer ou de 
modifier de manière artificielle 
les conditions du marché. Ils 
sont l'expression d'une volonté 
de réglementation privée, et le 
plus souvent secrète, du marché 
et des relations économiques par 
des groupes oligopolistiques. 
Les cartels créent au profit des 
entreprises les plus performantes 
des rentes de situation qui les 
dissuadent de faire des efforts 
pour améliorer la qualité des 
produits, accroître leur 
productivité, leur technologie, la 
rationalisation de leurs méthodes 
de production et de vente parce 
que l'entente neutralise le risque 
de la concurrence. 
Les prix cartellisés étant le plus 
souvent fixés en fonction des 
coûts des entreprises les moins 
performantes, les entreprises 
dont les coûts de production sont 
les plus bas disposent ainsi d'une 
garantie de maintien de marge 
bénéficiaire injustifiée dans la 
mesure où l'entente les protège 
de toute tentative des 
concurrents de gagner des parts 
de marché par une politique de 
prix agressive. 
Par ailleurs, les cartels 
maintiennent en survie 
artificielle les entreprises les 
moins efficaces par la garantie 
de prix et de parts de marchés 
convenus collectivement, et fixés 
à des niveaux supérieurs à ceux 
qui résulteraient de la 
concurrence active des plus 
performantes sur le marché. 
Enfin, les cartels agissent au 
détriment du consommateur 
parce que celui-ci doit payer des 
prix supérieurs à ceux qui 
seraient pratiqués dans une 
situation de réelle concurrence et 
qu'il ne peut tirer profit des 
améliorations technologiques qui 
résulteraient des efforts que 
devraient nécessairement fournir 
les producteurs pour accroître 
leur part de marché en l'absence 
de l'accord. 
En définitive, la lutte contre les 
cartels vise en tout premier lieu à 
empêcher la manipulation des 
équilibres économiques et de la 
concurrence par les groupes 
restreints et dominants, car cette 
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manipulation qui n'est autre 
qu'une réglementation privée et 
arbitraire de l'économie, se 
produit au détriment des 
utilisateurs. De tels compor-
tements affaiblissent l'économie 
dans son ensemble par le 
maintien de structures 
inefficaces ou obsolètes et 
l'accumulation de marges et de 
rentes injustifiées et créent, de ce 
fait, un dommage considérable à 
la sauvegarde des emplois dans 
l'Union Européenne. 
Jusqu'à présent, les quatre 
Directions opérationnelles C, D, 
E et F de la DG IV ont instruit 
les procédures relatives aux 
cartels relevant des secteurs de 
leur compétence. 
La mise en place d'un service 
spécialisé dans ce type de 
procédure est apparue 
indispensable parce qu'une telle 
structure permet de concentrer 
les moyens disponibles et de 
mieux préparer les Rapporteurs à 
ces tâches particulières. 
Plus que jamais nécessaire, la 
répression des cartels est 
cependant rendue de plus en plus 
difficile en raison des moyens 
sophistiqués de dissimulation 
des preuves, d'une conception 
toujours plus large et exigeante 
des droits de la défense et du 
niveau plus élevé de standard de 
preuve écrite imposé par le 
Tribunal de Première Instance. 
[Par exemple, à la différence des 
procédures d'autres ordres 
juridiques antitrust, la procédure 
communautaire ne reconnaît pas 
le caractère probatoire des 
témoignages sous serment.] 
Cette nouvelle Unité 
administrative entend cependant 
agir en étroite coopération avec 
les autres unités de la DG IV 
afin d'utiliser au mieux les 
synergies résultant de la 
spécialisation de ses fonction-
naires dans le traitement des 
cartels et des connaissances 
techniques des Directions 
opérationnelles dans les 
différents secteurs d'activité des 
produits et services. 
Dans la même logique de 
recherche d'efficacité, la 
Commission avait publié le 
18 juillet 1996 une Commu-
nication sur la non-imposition 
d'amendes ou la réduction de 
leur montant62 pour les 
entreprises désireuses de fournir 
de leur propre initiative les 
informations et les éléments de 
preuves permettant d'ouvrir ou 
d'instruire plus rapidement les 
procédures anticartels. 
La nouvelle structure ne peut 
manquer de faciliter et de 
renforcer la mise en oeuvre de 
cette communication en incitant 
encore davantage les entreprises 
à offrir leur coopération pour 
mettre fin aux ententes secrètes, 
par la garantie que s'ouvre un 
dialogue efficace avec un 
personnel spécialisé et formé à la 
répression des cartels. 
Cette réorganisation d'une partie 
des services de la DG IV 
constitue un signal politique très 
clair adressé aux entreprises trop 
souvent tentées par la 
commodité apparente de 
6 2 JO C 207/4 du 18.7.96. 
concerter ou coordonner leurs 
comportements avec ceux de 
leurs concurrents au détriment de 
l'ensemble des consommateurs 
européens et de la consolidation 
du marché intérieur. 
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New procedures for anti-trust 
cases: hearings, and notification 
of transport cases 
Tea MÄKELÄ, DG IV-B-2 
Charles WILLIAMS, DG IV-D-2 
Background 
One of the underlying objectives 
of the current legislative 
activities of the Commission is 
to modemise, simplify and make 
more user-friendly the 
procedures under which 
competition cases are examined. 
As part of that process, the 
Commission adopted, on 22 
December 1998, two 
Regulations that simplify the 
legislative framework for 
examining antitrust cases. 
The first of the Regulations is 
Commission Regulation (EC) 
No 2842/98 on the hearing of 
parties in certain proceedings 
under Articles 85 and 86 of the 
EC Treaty63. This Regulation 
modemises and simplifies the 
procedures previously contained 
in Regulation (EEC) No 99/6364, 
which has been a worthy 
instrument in creating a 
framework for hearings when 
Commission Regulation (EC) No 
2842/98 of 22 December 1998 on the 
hearing of parties in certain proceeding 
under Articles 85 and 86 of the EC 
Treaty, OJ L 354,30.12.1998, p. 18. 
Commission Regulation (EEC) No 
99/63 on the hearings provided for in 
Article 19(1) and (2) of Council 
Regulation No 17, OJ 127, 20.8.1963, 
p. 2268/63. 
applying competition rules in 
individual cases. The Regulation 
improves certain aspects of the 
hearing procedure by taking 
account of the relevant 
jurisprudence, the Commission's 
practice and certain 
developments in how the 
Commission protects the 
procedural rights of parties in 
competition cases. In order to 
simplify the legislative 
framework for examining 
competition cases, the 
Regulation applies to all anti-
trust cases including the 
transport sector. 
The second Regulation concerns 
applications and notifications in 
transport cases. Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 2843/98 
applies to all transport sectors65 
(i.e., inland transport, maritime 
transport and air transport) and 
has therefore replaced rules 
previously contained in three 
separate Commission implemen-
ting Regulations. The new 
65 Commission Regulation (EC) No 
2843/98 on the form, content and other 
details of applications and 
notifications provided for in Council 
Regulations (EEC) No 1017/68, (EEC) 
No 4056/86 and (EEC) No 3975/87 
applying the rules on competition to 
the transport sector, OJ L 354, 
30.12.1998, p. 22. 
Regulation aligns the transport 
notification procedures with 
those under Regulation No 1766, 
and by so doing the Commission 
has simplified its procedures for 
the benefit both of notifying 
parties and of the Commission 
itself. The complex legislative 
framework in the transport sector 
has been the result of the 
progressive extension of 
Community competition rules to 
the different transport sectors 
since 1962 when Regulation No 
14167 removed transport from 
the scope of application of 
Regulation No 17. 
The Commission adopted the 
two new Regulations after 
consultation with the Member 
States, interested industry 
associations and the legal 
profession. Drafts of the 
Regulations were also published 
on the DGIV Competition Web 
Site on the Internet. The overall 
reaction to the Commission's 
initiative was positive. Both 
Regulations came into force on 1 
February 1999 and together 
repealed five existing 
Commission Regulations68. The 
final texts are available to the 
public in the Community 
languages not only in the 
Official Journal but also on the 
6 6 OJ 13, 21.2.1962, p. 204/62. 
6 7 Council Regulation No 141 of 26 
November 1962 exempting transport 
from the application of Council 
Regulation No 17 amended by 
Regulations Nos. 165/65/EEC and 
1002/67/EEC, OJ 124, 28.11.1962, p. 
2751. 
° Commission Regulations (EEC) No 
99/63, (EEC) No 1629/69, (EEC) No 
1630/69, (EEC) No 4260/88 and 
(EEC) No 4261/88 were repealed. 
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DGIV Web Site under 
http://europa. eu. int/comm/dg04/. 
Regulation (EC) No 2842/98 
- hearing of parties 
Hearing of the parties is an 
important procedural stage in 
competition cases examined by 
the Commission in accordance 
with the powers conferred to it 
by the EC Treaty to ensure that 
competition is not distorted in 
the common market. Regulation 
(EC) No 2842/98 which has 
replaced Regulation (EEC) No 
99/63 defines the manner in 
which the Commission ensures 
the right to be heard of the 
different parties involved in 
competition cases. 
The parties entitled to submit 
comments under the Regulation 
should do so in writing, both in 
their own interest and in the 
interest of sound administration, 
without prejudice to the 
possibility of an oral hearing 
where appropriate to supplement 
the written procedure. The 
Regulation is divided into 
different chapters according to 
the status of the party69 in order 
to make the rules clearer and 
more user-friendly. 
To facilitate the examination of 
individual cases by the 
Commission services and to 
avoid unnecessary delays, the 
Commission is not obliged to 
Chapter II: Hearing of parties to which 
the Commission has addressed 
objections; Chapter III: Hearing of 
applicants and complainants; and 
Chapter IV: Hearing of other 
interested parties. 
take account of written 
submissions from the addressees 
of a statement of objections 
received after the date set by the 
Commission for making their 
views known on the objections. 
Moreover, the addressees of a 
statement of objections are also 
to indicate by a date, set by the 
Commission, any parts of the 
Commission's objections that in 
their view contain business 
secrets or other confidential 
information. 
Such an obligation also applies 
to any party making known its 
views to the Commission under 
the Regulation. Such parties 
must clearly identify any 
material that they consider to be 
confidential, giving reasons, and 
provide a separate non-
confidential version by the date 
set by the Commission. If the 
parties fail to do so by the set 
date, the Commission may 
assume that the objections by the 
Commission or the submissions 
by the party in question do not 
contain such information. 
The Regulation includes a 
provision whereby the 
applicant70 or complainant71 
shall be provided with a copy of 
the non-confidential version of 
the objections and given a date 
by which it may make its views 
known in writing. This is the 
70 
71 
Applications made under Article 3(2) 
of Regulation No 17. 
Complaints made under Article 10 of 
Council Regulation 5EEC) No 
1017/68, Article 10 of Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86 and 
Article 3(1) of Council Regulation 
(EEC) No 3975/87. 
case where the Commission 
raises objections. This provision 
has codified the existing 
Commission practice. However, 
the Regulation provides for the 
protection of the legitimate 
interest of undertakings in the 
protection of their business 
secrets and other confidential 
information. The Regulation also 
refers to the role of the Hearing 
Officer in the hearing procedure, 
and to the right of access to the 
file without, however, pre-
empting the Commission's 
further intentions in this field. 
With a view to simplifying the 
way in which the time limit for 
submissions by the parties to the 
Commission is calculated, all 
submissions under the 
Regulation are to reach the 
Commission by a certain date set 
by the Commission in its written 
submission to the party 
concerned. In setting such a date, 
the Commission shall have 
regard both to the time required 
for preparation of the submission 
and to the urgency of the case. 
The time allowed is at least two 
weeks. Setting a specific date by 
which the submission must reach 
the Commission is considered 
less likely to result in legal 
uncertainty compared with the 
calculation of the time limit by 
the parties themselves. 
In order to simplify and expedite 
the conclusion of the hearing 
procedure and following the 
Commission practice in the field 
of mergers, statements made by 
each person at the hearing will 
be recorded and the respective 
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tape replaces the written 
minutes. 
Regulation (EC) No 2843/98 
- applications and notifica­
tions in the transport sector 
In 1994, the Commission 
modernised the rules for 
notifying restrictive agreements 
in sectors other than transport by 
adopting Regulation (EC) No 
3385/94 and Form A/B.72 
Commission Regulation (EC) 
No 2843/98 and the new Form 
TR (annexed as Annex I to the 
Regulation) have introduced 
similar rules for companies 
which wish to notify restrictive 
agreements in the transport 
sector. Form TR specifies the 
information that must be 
provided by companies when 
applying for an exemption under 
the three transport Regulations 
and for negative clearance under 
Regulation (EEC) No 3975/87. 
The new Regulation has replaced 
the previous Form II (transport 
by rail, road and inland 
waterway), Form MAR 
(maritime transport) and Form 
AER (air transport). Form TR(B) 
(annexed as Annex II to the 
Regulation) has replaced Form 
III for crises cartels notified 
under Article 14(1) of 
Regulation (EEC) No 1017/68. 
The Regulation introduces to the 
transport sector rules already 
72 Commission Regulation (EC) No 
3385/94 of 21 December 1994 on the 
form, content and other details of 
applications and notifications provided 
for in Council Regulation No 17, 
published in OJ L 377, 31.12.1994, p. 
28. 
applicable to notifications made 
on Form A/B, including the 
following. 
- The language used for an 
application will be the 
language of the proceeding 
for the party or parties 
making the application. 
- The rules on the effective 
date of submission of an 
application are spelt out 
more fully, establishing 
clearly the principle that 
applications must be 
complete in order to be 
deemed valid. 
- Companies are required to 
provide more information 
than was previously the case. 
If, however, some of the 
information requested on 
Form TR is not necessary for 
a particular case, the 
Commission can waive the 
requirement to provide this 
information. This avoids 
unnecessary costs and 
regulatory burdens for 
companies. 
Although the new Regulation 
very closely follows Regulation 
(EEC) No 3385/94, it differs in 
the following ways. 
- References in Regulation 
(EEC) No 3385/94 to 
Regulation No 17 are 
replaced in the new 
Regulation by equivalent 
references to the three 
transport Regulations (EEC) 
No 1017/68, (EEC) No 
4056/86 and (EEC) No 
3975/87. 
- The new Regulation 
provides that where an 
application is wrongly made 
under one of the transport 
Regulations it can be 
examined under another 
Regulation as is applicable. 
Provision is made for the 
notification of awards given 
at arbitration and 
recommendations by 
conciliators when they 
concern the settlement of 
disputes relating to the 
practices of liner 
conferences referred to in 
Article 4 and points 2 and 3 
of Article 5 of Regulation 
(EEC) No 4056/86. 
Applications and 
notifications made under the 
competition rules of the 
EEA Agreement may also be 
made in one of the official 
languages of the EFTA 
States. 
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CARTEL ENFORCEMENT 
Julian JOSHUA, IV-E-1 
The District Heating Pipe 
Cartel 
The formation of a new anti-
cartel unit in DG 4 on 1 
December 1998 was heralded by 
the Commission's recent 
decision imposing fines totalling 
over 90 million ECU on ten 
companies which had operated a 
secret price fixing, market-
sharing and bid-rigging cartel in 
district heating pipes from 1991 
to mid-1996. The best known of 
the companies fined was the 
Swedish-Swiss industrial 
combine ABB which collected a 
penalty of 70 million ECU. 
Announcing the decision, Mr 
Van Miert sent an uncom­
promising warning to companies 
which might still be tempted to 
run the risk of clandestine price 
fixing: 
"Fines have got to be felt. In this 
particular instance, it is difficult 
to imagine a worse cartel. The 
main producers tried to bankrupt 
the only competitor who was 
willing to take them on. They 
deliberately flouted the EU 
public procurement rules. Bid-
rigging is no better than fraud. 
They continued the violation for 
nine months after the 
Commission had caught them 
red-handed. The violation calls 
for condign fines." 
ORIGIN OF THE CASE 
DG 4 had first been alerted to 
the cartel's existence in January 
1995 by Powerpipe, a privately-
owned Swedish producer of 
district heating pipes. Powerpipe 
claimed to have been threatened 
with reprisals by the cartel 
unless it agreed to confine its 
activities to the Swedish home 
market, in which case it would 
get a guaranteed quota. 
Powerpipe's owner - a 
well-known venture business­
man - had even appealed 
personally to senior ABB 
officials to stop the cartel. His 
urgent request for a meeting was 
on one occasion rebuffed on the 
grounds that it "could be viewed 
by competition authorities as an 
attempt to induce ABB into 
illegal arrangements". 
The district heating pipe industry 
is centred on Denmark. The 
basic idea is that hot water is 
circulated from a central heat 
source around a whole district. 
The pipes used have to be 
insulated inside a layer of foam 
and an outer plastic pipe. The 
greatest demand for 
pre-insulated pipes comes from 
the more Northerly Member 
States. Germany is the largest 
single national market and the 
four Danish producers export 
substantial quantities. ABB had 
progressively expanded its 
activities in the sector by a series 
of acquisitions and by 1992 had 
some 40% of the European 
market. It has factories in 
Denmark, Germany and several 
other countries. The other pipe 
producers were mainly private 
companies, two of them located 
in Germany. The market in 
Europe is worth up to €400 
million annually. 
The Commission carried out 
unannounced investigations in 
June 1995 at all the producers 
simultaneously. Unusually 
perhaps in cartel cases, 
"smoking gun" evidence was 
found at virtually all the 
suspected participants. 
THE DANISH MODEL 
The cartel had first been set up 
in the Danish market in late 1990 
between the four domestic 
producers. Under the established 
customer principle, customers 
were directed to their "usual" 
supplier. If the allocated quotas 
were nevertheless exceeded, the 
offender had to compensate its 
aggrieved rivals. Stability of 
market shares made for higher 
price levels in Denmark than in 
neighbouring markets. Soon the 
collusion was extended to export 
markets and the two German 
producers were brought in. 
Regular secret meetings between 
the Managing Directors were 
held, the participants dubbing 
themselves "the Popes"; lower 
level managers who dealt with 
the detail were called "Contact 
Groups". The earlier cartel 
arrangements outside Denmark 
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were relatively fragile and 
fragmented and the major 
players led by ABB were 
looking for a "European 
solution" covering the whole 
market. In Germany a quota 
system was agreed in mid-1993; 
there was to be quarterly 
reporting and auditing by 
accountants. Fines for exceeding 
the allocation were to be paid 
into a Swiss bank account. 
However one of the parties, 
Løgstør, demurred at signing the 
document. The others were 
reportedly unwilling to go ahead 
on the basis of handshakes. After 
bitter mutual recriminations and 
a "price war" in late 1993 peace 
was re-established and a new 
structure of collusion was set up 
in 1994: this time an overall 
Europe-wide cartel was devised 
embracing the Baltic States and 
Eastern Europe as well as the 
EU. 
The cartel allocated sales quotas 
on both a national and a 
European level. ABB's quota 
was 37%, Løgstør had 20% and 
three other producers 10% each. 
Appropriate committees were set 
up to run the cartel, the senior 
executives now calling 
themselves the "Elephants". 
A common price list was 
devised; agreed discounts "off 
list" were to be progressively 
reduced with the declared aim of 
raising prices 30% in two years. 
BID RIGGING 
A disturbing feature of the case 
was the setting up of a bidding 
ring. This is in fact the first 
major case of bid-rigging dealt 
with by the Commission under 
Article 85. The market for 
district heating systems is mostly 
project-based; customers are 
mainly local authorities or other 
public utilities. Contracts are 
usually put up for competitive 
tender, the EU directives on 
public procurement applying to 
any project worth over 
€400.000. 
In Germany in particular, where 
some 1500 projects a year are 
put out to competitive tender, 
sales managers met every two or 
three weeks to deal out contracts. 
For each project, one producer 
was nominated "favourite" to 
win the bid; it informed the 
others what it was going to quote 
and they had to put in higher 
"protection" offers to ensure it 
obtained the business. Any 
temptation to cheat and undercut 
the designated favourite was 
diminished by a reporting 
system; a computer programme 
was devised to monitor all bids, 
and one company even acted as a 
kind of "Chief Whip" to ensure 
cartel discipline. 
BOYCOTT 
Unlike some other smaller 
producers, Powerpipe not only 
rejected pressure to join the club; 
it incurred the wrath of the cartel 
by systematically underbidding 
the favourite and winning a 
series of major projects in 
Germany. The most egregious 
example was the Leipzig-
Lippendorf project, one so big 
that no single cartel member 
could meet it; a "consortium" of 
the three German producers -
including ABB - was therefore 
secretly nominated to "win" the 
tendering procedure. When the 
news broke in March 1995, the 
cartel met in a Düsseldorf hotel 
and decided an immediate 
boycott: a meeting note reads 
succinctly: "No producer to 
supply at all to L-L...; none of 
our subcontractors may work for 
Powerpipe; if they do, further 
co-operation will be stopped. We 
shall try to prevent Powerpipe 
from obtaining supplies of (for 
example) plastic." 
BUSINESS AS USUAL 
The Commission's surprise 
investigations followed just three 
months later. Despite DG 4's 
success in uncovering the 
evidence, the cartel gambled on 
carrying on as if nothing had 
happened. The only concession 
to the Commission's 
investigation was to move 
meetings to Zurich; to avoid 
generating travel records which 
could leave a trace, the Danish 
participants flew to Switzerland 
in a private aircraft. At this stage 
the cartel had defined quotas for 
all markets. Elaborate tables 
were drawn up to check the 
observance of the allocated 
market shares. 
This continued for nine months 
and indeed the cartel only fell 
apart when the Commission 
confronted the participants with 
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detailed Article 11 requests to 
explain their own incriminating 
documents. 
FINES: GUIDELINES AND 
LENIENCY 
The sudden disintegration of the 
cartel may have been accelerated 
by the imminent publication of 
the Commission Notice on the 
non­imposition or reduction of 
fines (OJ C 207/4 of 18 July 
1996). 
Several of the companies 
approached DG 4 via their legal 
advisers offering to co­operate 
with its investigations. Some 
produced hitherto undiscovered 
documents; tables and 
memoranda proving the cartel 
had gone on long after the 
investigations were probably the 
most damning examples. 
The companies could not of 
course bring themselves under 
sections Β or C of the Notice 
providing for most favourable 
treatment as the Commission had 
already abundant proof of the 
infringement. Most of them 
however qualified for a 
significant reduction in the 
otherwise appropriate fine under 
Section D: this allows a discount 
of between 10% and 50% for co­
operation by volunteering 
substantial evidence before a 
statement of objections is sent or 
even for not substantially 
contesting the allegations. 
There is no question of formal 
"plea bargaining" along the lines 
of the American model. Under 
the Notice, the Commission will 
only decide at the end of the 
administrative procedure what 
any co­operation was worth. 
Moreover the "otherwise 
appropriate" fine is fixed at 
decision stage by the full 
Commission itself; DG 4 
officials are neither able nor 
authorised at any stage to 
"negotiate" the fine amount with 
the companies. Undertakings and 
their lawyers should also 
remember that the conditions for 
granting leniency apply 
throughout the administrative 
procedure; backtracking half­
way through the case may well 
mean losing the benefit of the 
Notice. 
The open question is of course 
the amount of the fine that would 
have been appropriate before any 
leniency. 
For "very serious infringe­
ments", the Guidelines on fines 
issued in January 1998 (OJ C9/3 
of 14.1.1998) provide for a 
starting point of at least €20 
million. Cartels invariably fall in 
this category. 
One object of the Guidelines was 
to break the link between fines 
and turnover in the product 
market. They recognise that 
while Regulation No 17 provides 
for an absolute ceiling of 10% of 
the undertaking's total turnover, 
it does not in fact require fines to 
be calculated as any particular 
percentage. Nor is the 
Commission limited to 10%, or 
any other percentage, of the 
turnover of the relevant 
"business" inside a multiproduct 
group. (Earlier practice along 
these lines has given rise on 
occasion to some odd­looking 
figures, and more seriously, to 
disputes before the CFI about 
exactly what should be 
considered the "relevant" 
turnover.) 
The basic principle of the 
Guidelines is one of equal 
punishment for the same 
misconduct. This does not mean 
the same amount for all. It would 
be perverse to impose exactly 
the same fine on great and small 
alike; the Guidelines thus 
expressly allow the Commission 
flexibility to recognize the 
specific weight and real impact 
of the offending conduct in each 
particular case. 
The latter exercise is particularly 
necessary where (as in the pipes 
case) there are both huge 
multinational group and private 
single­product companies in the 
same infringement and a vast 
disparity in the sizes of the firms 
involved. 
Here ­ apart from ABB ­ the 
offenders were mostly single­
product companies; even the 
largest of them ­ Løgstør ­ was 
only half the size of ABB's pre­
insulated pipe business. The 
gravity of the offence meant that 
fines had to be at or near the top 
of the scale; but even a fine on 
ABB of double the amount 
imposed on the second producer 
(Løgstør) would have been a 
mere pinprick to a combine with 
a total turnover of €30 billion. 
The specialist companies would 
be much harder hit in relative 
terms than ABB. On the other 
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hand practical considerations 
alone dictate against a fine of 
10% of ABB's total worldwide 
turnover. How could fairness be 
achieved ? 
The Commission resolved the 
dilemma by dividing the ten 
producers into four broad 
categories according to their 
relative importance in the pipes 
market. The "basic" fine thus 
reflected in general their relative 
sales in district heating pipes in 
the EU; ABB had the highest 
starting point (at ECU 20 
million), but this was subject in 
its case to a further upward 
adjustment to take account of its 
position as one of Europe's 
largest industrial companies. 
ABB had attempted to portray its 
involvement as the aberrant, 
unauthorised and wholly atypical 
actions of a minor Danish 
subsidiary. The documentary 
evidence showed however that in 
fact the cartel had been 
conceived, approved and 
directed at a very high level in 
the Group. 
The upward adjustment served 
the dual purpose of ensuring 
deterrence and reflecting the 
proven involvement in the cartel 
of a most senior level of 
corporate management. 
The Commission considered that 
the minimum fine of ECU 20 
million should in ABB's case be 
weighted by χ 2,5 in order to 
ensure sufficient deterrence. 
The long duration of the cartel 
was reflected by an additional 
weighting of χ 1,4; while 
aggravating factors (such as 
ABB's leadership role and its 
deliberate continuance of the 
cartel after being caught) added a 
further 50%. 
After account was taken in 
mitigation of ABB's payment of 
compensation to Powerpipe, the 
"otherwise appropriate" fine 
stood at exactly ECU 100 
million. 
Under its leniency programme 
the Commission then gave ABB 
a discount under Section D of 
the Notice of 30%. 
This was not of course a case 
where an undertaking had 
informed the Commission about 
a secret cartel before it 
undertook investigations or after 
unsuccessful visits. The 
information provided by ABB -
and others - did however assist 
materially in establishing the 
facts, in particular as to the 
origins of the cartel as early as 
1990. 
With regard to each of the other 
offenders the Commission went 
through a similar exercise. 
A special nuance should be 
noted in the fixing of the "basic" 
amount. Although the fine 
Guidelines would normally have 
called for a minimum starting 
point of ECU 20 million, this 
would in some cases have come 
close to the entire sales of the 
company; The starting point for 
the first of the "single product" 
companies, Løgstør, was 
therefore fixed at ECU 10 
million and proportionately less 
for the others. 
WHERE DO WE GO FROM 
NOW? 
This was only the latest in a long 
series of hard-core cartel 
violations uncovered by the 
Commission. Fines reckoned in 
millions and now tens of 
millions do not even seem to 
have acted as a brake on illegal 
price fixing. Companies still 
seem to make the cynical 
calculation whether the risk is 
one worth taking. This no doubt 
keeps cartel investigators 
employed but that is not the 
main objective of our policy. 
Perhaps only the certainty of 
being caught in the end will 
make violators think again. The 
establishment of a special cartel 
unit will sharpen the focus on 
enforcement. In this context the 
Commission's Leniency notice 
could also play a crucial role. 
The programme is designed to 
enhance the Commission's 
effectiveness as an antitrust 
enforcement authority. The 
Commission may not have 
available to it weapons like the 
Grand Jury and compelled 
testimony under Court-ordered 
immunity, still less the full 
weight of the Federal criminal 
law, but the Leniency Policy 
clearly signals to violators that 
timely co-operation pays. 
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SICASOV - La Commission exempte 
des accords types de production et de 
vente de semences protégées par des 
droits d'obtention végétale en France 
Claudio MENIS DG IV-F-3 
1. Le 14 décembre 1998, la 
Commission a adopté une 
décision qui exempte, au titre 
de l'article 85, troisième 
paragraphe, du traité CE, des 
accords types pour la 
production et la vente de 
semences protégées par des 
droits d'obtention végétale en 
France. Ces accords sont 
conclus entre, d'une part, la 
SICASOV (Société 
Coopérative d'Intérêt Collectif 
Agricole Anonyme à Capital 
Variable, Paris) et, d'autre 
part, les établissements 
multiplicateurs. La SICASOV 
regroupe les obtenteurs de 
variétés végétales protégées en 
France et a pour tâche de gérer 
les variétés végétales qui lui 
ont été confiées par lesdits 
obtenteurs (ou par leurs ayant-
droits). Cette gestion 
comporte notamment la 
conclusion de contrats de 
production avec des 
établissements multiplicateurs 
qui sont les entreprises qui 
assurent la multiplication des 
semences en vue de satisfaire 
aux besoins des agriculteurs. 
2. Les produits en cause sont les 
semences protégées par des 
droits d'obtention végétale (au 
titre du droit français ou du 
règlement communautaire 
applicable en la matière). 
Les réglementations commu-
nautaires et nationales 
établissent des règles détaillées 
concernant la production et la 
vente des semences. Sur la 
base desdites réglementations, 
les semences peuvent être 
subdivisées en: 
-semences de base: ce sont des 
semences qui ne sont pas 
destinées à être vendues aux 
agriculteurs pour leurs 
semailles mais qui sont 
exclusivement destinées à 
produire d'autres semences. 
Elles peuvent donc être en 
quelque sorte comparées à un 
matériel industriel 
intermédiaire; 
-semences certifiées: ce sont 
des semences qui générale-
ment sont destinées à être 
vendues aux agriculteurs pour 
leurs semailles. Elles sont 
donc, en quelque sorte, 
comparables à des produits 
industriels finis protégés par 
un brevet; 
- semences techniques: ce sont 
des semences certifiées qui, 
dans certains Etats, peuvent 
licitement être utilisées pour 
produire d'autres semences 
certifiées (et remplissent donc 
la fonction de semences de 
base) tandis que, dans d'autres 
Etats, peuvent être uniquement 
être vendues aux agriculteurs 
(et remplissent donc la 
fonction de semences 
certifiées). 
Pour pouvoir être licitement 
commercialisées, les semences 
doivent appartenir à une 
variété qui a été préalablement 
inscrite dans un des catalogues 
nationaux, selon les règles 
applicables dans les différentes 
Etats membres. Après une 
certaine période d'inscription 
au catalogue national, la 
variété est inscrite au 
catalogue commun, ce qui 
permet aux semences de ladite 
variété de circuler librement à 
l'intérieur de la Communauté 
européenne sans être soumises 
à aucune restriction. 
3. La SICASOV a notifié à la 
Commission des accords types 
en vertu desquels elle concède 
aux établissements multipli-
cateurs (ci-après: les 
"licenciés") une licence non-
exclusive de production et de 
vente de semences sur le 
territoire français (ou, s'il 
s'agit de semences protégées 
par un droit d'obtention 
communautaire, sur l'ensem-
ble de la Communauté 
européenne). 
4. En premier lieu, les accords 
types prévoient un ensemble 
de clauses qui soumettent au 
contrôle de la SICASOV les 
semences de base et les 
semences techniques. Ainsi, 
les accords interdisent aux 
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licenciés les exportations 
(directes et indirectes) des 
semences de base et leur 
imposent l'obligation de 
"déclasser"73 les semences 
techniques avant leur 
exportation. La décision 
indique que ces clauses 
relèvent de l'existence même 
du droit d'obtention végétale et 
que, de ce fait, elles ne sont 
pas visées par l'article 85, par. 
1, du traité CE (en ce sens, 
voir l'arrêt de la Cour de 
justice Erauw Jacquery/La 
Hesbignonne, 19.4.1988, aff. 
27/87, Ree. 1988, p.1919). 
5. En deuxième lieu, les accords 
types prévoient des clauses qui 
interdisent l'exportation de 
semences certifiées vers des 
Etats non membres de la 
Communauté européenne ou 
vers des Etats qui ne prévoient 
pas de protection légale pour 
les obtentions végétales. La 
décision considère que cette 
obligation échappe à 
l'interdiction prévue par 
l'article 85, paragraphe 1er, du 
traité CE. 
6. Enfin, les accords types 
prévoient une clause selon 
laquelle le licencié ne peut pas 
exporter directement les 
semences certifiées vers des 
Etats membres autres que la 
France lorsque la variété à 
laquelle lesdites semences 
appartiennent est inscrite au 
catalogue commun depuis 
73 
Le déclassement a pour effet d'empêcher 
que les semences exportées puissent faire 
l'objet d'actes de reproduction (en 
dehors du contrôle de l'obtenteur) dans 
le pays de destination 
moins de quatre ans. La 
décision considère que cette 
obligation a pour objet de 
restreindre la concurrence et 
qu'elle tombe donc dans le 
domaine d'application de 
l'article 85, paragraphe 1er, du 
traité CE. En outre, la 
décision estime que les 
accords ne font pas partie 
intégrante d'une organisation 
nationale de marché ni ne sont 
nécessaires à la réalisation des 
objectifs énoncés à l'article 39 
du traité CE. Par conséquent, 
la décision indique que 
l'exception prévue par l'article 
2 du règlement n. 26/62 doit 
être écartée et que, de ce fait, 
l'article 85, paragraphe 1, du 
traité CE est applicable à ladite 
obligation. 
Toutefois, d'après la décision, 
l'obligation en cause peut être 
exemptée au titre du 
paragraphe 3 de l'article 85 du 
traité CE puisqu'elle favorise 
la diffusion de nouvelles 
variétés dans les Etats 
membres autres que la France. 
En effet, les entreprises situées 
dans ces Etats seront incitées à 
conclure des accords de 
licence et de distribution 
relatifs aux nouvelles variétés 
puisqu'elles auront la certitude 
de ne pas être soumises aux 
exportations directes des 
licenciés français pendant 
quatre ans. Par conséquent, 
même si une telle obligation 
limite les exportations, elle 
doit néanmoins être exemptée 
puisqu'elle contribue à 
promouvoir le progrès 
technique et la diffusion de 
nouveaux produits au bénéfice 
des utilisateurs. 
7. Sur la base des considérations 
développées ci-dessus, la 
Commission a décidé d'adop-
ter une décision d'exemption, 
au titre de l'article 85, 
troisième paragraphe, du traité 
CE, valable jusqu'au 26 
octobre 2004. 
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The Commission fines a cartel of 
British sugar producers and 
merchants 
Rüdiger DOHMS, DG IV-A-2 
Matthijs VISSER, DG IV-F-3 
On 14 October 1998, the 
Commission adopted a Decision 
by which fines have been 
imposed on the sugar producers 
British Sugar and Tate & Lyle, 
as well as the sugar merchants 
Napier Brown and James 
Budgett for violation of Article 
85(1) of the EC Treaty. The 
Commission found that the 
companies have pursued the 
object of restricting competition 
through a co-ordination of their 
pricing policy on the white 
granulated sugar market in Great 
Britain. The Commission 
therefore imposed fines of 39.6 
million ECU on British Sugar, 7 
million ECU on Tate & Lyle, 1.8 
million ECU on Napier Brown 
and 1.8 million ECU on James 
Budgett. 
The Decision concerns the 
collaborative strategy of higher 
pricing by British Sugar, Tate & 
Lyle, Napier Brown and James 
Budgett on the industrial white 
granulated sugar market in Great 
Britain, as well as a similar kind 
of strategy pursued only by 
British Sugar and Tate & Lyle on 
the retail white granulated sugar 
market in Great Britain. 
The relevant period during which 
these infringements took place 
was between 20 June 1986 and 2 
July 1990 with respect to British 
Sugar and Tate & Lyle, and 
between late 1986 and 2 July 
1990 with respect to Napier 
Brown and James Budgett. 
During this period the four 
companies represented around 
90% of the entire white 
granulated sugar market in Great 
Britain. 
The Commission found evidence 
of numerous meetings between 
the parties, which took place in 
regular intervals throughout the 
relevant period. In the initial 
meeting between British Sugar 
and Tate & Lyle on 20 June 
1986, the principles of the future 
anti-competitive conduct were 
set. The merchants Napier Brown 
and James Budgett joined this 
conduct before the end of 1986. 
18 further meetings about 
industrial white granulated sugar 
took place between all four 
parties. During these meetings 
British Sugar informed Tate & 
Lyle, Napier Brown and James 
Budgett of target prices it 
intended to obtain with respect to 
industrial sugar. Concerning retail 
sugar, there were 8 further 
meetings between British Sugar 
and Tate & Lyle in which British 
Sugar revealed to Tate & Lyle its 
pricing policy and in which the 
two companies discussed their 
respective discount policies 
towards large retail customers. 
Whilst the Commission did not 
have sufficient evidence that 
prices charged to individual 
buyers of industrial or retail sugar 
were jointly fixed, the systematic 
participation of all four parties in 
regular meetings concerning 
industrial sugar, and of British 
Sugar and Tate & Lyle 
concerning retail sugar, lead to an 
atmosphere of mutual certainty as 
to the participants' intentions 
concerning their future pricing 
behaviour. Each of them could 
rely, if not on the precise price 
levels of the other participants, at 
least on their intentional pursuit 
of the collaborative strategy of 
higher pricing. 
For all the participants this 
mutual assurance was of interest, 
particularly, - though not 
exclusively - in the price range 
above the break-even point, in 
which range price competition 
was possible while still 
profitable. 
The Decision rejects in detail all 
the parties' arguments for why 
there should not have been a 
violation of Article 85. In 
particular, the Decision disproves 
all the parties' alternative 
explanations for why their 
meetings took place. Moreover, 
the Decision shows that British 
Sugar's price leadership on the 
market for industrial and retail 
sugar in Great Britain during the 
relevant period left scope for 
competition by the other three 
companies in particular by 
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undercutting British Sugar's price 
increases. In addition, the fact 
that the market in the present case 
was oligopolistic so that 
competition for structural reasons 
tended to be limited to a certain 
extent, did not allow the 
companies to go further and ex 
ante actively co­ordinate their 
future pricing policy. 
The fines imposed by the 
Decision have been calculated on 
the basis of the Commission's 
published Guidelines on the 
imposition of fines74. The 
Commission has taken into 
account that the infringements 
were serious and of medium 
duration. Considerable 
differentiation between the 
individual contributions of the 
four parties to the infringement 
has been made: 
­ The participation of British 
Sugar, on account of its high 
share on the relevant markets 
for industrial and retail sugar, 
and due to its position as price 
leader on these markets, was 
essential to the operation of 
the cartel. 
­ Tate & Lyle, on account of its 
share on the relevant markets 
was the second most 
important member of the 
cartel. 
­ The merchants Napier Brown 
and James Budgett did not 
participate in the key meeting 
of 20 June 1986. They joined 
the cartel only several months 
later and from then onwards 
only participated in the 
infringements concerning 
industrial sugar. Moreover, 
7 4 14 January 1998, OJ 1998 C 9/03. 
due to the fact that they were 
dependent on the supplies 
from the two domestic sugar 
producers ­ British Sugar and 
Tate & Lyle ­ for a significant 
part of the sugar they sold in 
their function as merchants, 
their influence on the relevant 
market and their possibility of 
exercising power on that 
market, was limited. 
Moreover, with regard to British 
Sugar, several aggravating factors 
have been found: 
­ British Sugar was the 
instigator of the infringements 
and throughout the relevant 
period remained the driving 
force. In fact, after having 
waged a price war against its 
competitors, it took the 
initiative, by arranging the 
meeting of 20 June 1986, to 
replace this price war by a 
collaborative strategy of 
higher pricing with its 
competitors. 
­ British Sugar acted in a 
manner contrary to the clear 
wording contained in its full 
comprising compliance 
programme, which it 
presented to the Commission 
in October 1986 in the course 
of the Napier Brown 
procedure, and which the 
Commission took into account 
as a mitigating factor when 
setting the fine in the Napier 
Brown­decision75. 
­ Already in July 1988, in its 
Napier Brown decision, the 
Commission fined British 
7 5 Commission Decision No 88/518/EEC 
of 18 July 1988, Napier Brown - British 
Sugar, OiL 284/41. 
Sugar for having attempted to 
force a merchant out of the 
retail market on the white 
granulated sugar market in 
Great Britain. This means that 
British Sugar practiced the 
collaborative ■ strategy of 
higher pricing, which is at 
issue in the present Decision, 
for two years in parallel with 
the Commission­procedure 
leading up to the Napier 
Brown decision. 
As to Tate & Lyle, the 
Commission substantially 
reduced the fine under the Notice 
on the non­imposition or 
reduction of fines in cartel cases 
("Leniency Notice")76, in order to 
take account of the fact that Tate 
& Lyle co­operated with the 
Commission, in particular by 
submitting two self­incriminating 
letters to it. Indeed, these two 
letters adduced decisive evidence 
of the cartel's existence and 
allowed the Commission to 
intervene in this case. 
At the end of 1998, British Sugar 
(T­204/98), Tate & Lyle (T­
202/98) and Napier Brown (T­
207/98) have lodged appeals 
with the Court of First Instance 
against the Commission 
Decision. 
76 18 July 1997, OJ 1997 C 207/04. 
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Greene King / Roberts 
Nils VON HINTEN-REED, IV-F-3 
Mr and Mrs Roberts operate a 
pub owned by Greene King. 
They complained in May 
1997 to the European 
Commission asking the 
Commission to conclude that 
the beer tie (the obligation to 
buy most beer they sell only 
from Greene King, their 
landlord-brewer) in their lease 
infringes Article 85. Such a 
conclusion might have 
allowed the Roberts to buy 
their beer from the suppliers 
of their own choice, thereby 
benefiting from the 
substantial discounts these 
suppliers offer. 
The assessment in this case is an 
application of two tests set out in 
the Delimitis judgement for 
deciding whether the cumulative 
network of agreements of an 
individual brewer falls within the 
scope of EC competition rules. 
The first test is whether the 
market concerned is foreclosed. 
The Commission considers that, 
given the current data, the UK 
on-trade beer market continues to 
be foreclosed. In 1997, between 
50 and 58 per cent of the 
throughput on the UK on-trade 
beer market was covered by 
restrictive agreements. 
The second test is whether the 
network of agreements of an 
individual brewer contributes 
significantly to that foreclosure. 
Here, the Commission concludes 
that Greene King is too small to 
contribute significantly to the 
foreclosure of the UK on-trade 
beer market as Greene King's 
sales in its managed, tenanted and 
loan-tied estate account for only 
1.3% of the UK on-trade market. 
This is considerably less than the 
5% (or more) that each of the big 
UK brewers (Scottish & 
Newcastle, Bass, Whitbread and 
Carlsberg-Tetley) realises in their 
tied network (including the 
restrictive agreements with non-
brewing pub companies). 
The reasoning applied to Greene 
King is also valid for the leases of 
the other small and regional UK 
brewers and for the leases of non-
brewing pub companies, which 
are supplied by more than one 
brewer. The decision can 
therefore be considered as a clear 
precedent for these companies, 
and the pubs they tie. 
Info-Lab/Ricoh 
compete with Ricoh in the sale 
of filled toner cartridges. 
Elke FISCHER, DGIV-E-2 
On 7 January 1999 the 
Commission rejected a 
complaint of Info-Lab, a 
manufacturer of toner for 
photocopiers, against Ricoh, a 
photocopier manufacturer. Info-
Lab alleged that Ricoh abused its 
dominant position on the market 
for toner cartridges compatible 
with certain Ricoh photocopiers 
and protected by Ricoh 
intellectual property rights by 
refusing to supply Info-Lab with 
empty toner cartridges, which 
would enable Info-Lab to 
Info-Lab claimed that it is not 
possible to design a toner 
cartridge which would fit into 
the Ricoh machines and at the 
same time would not violate 
Ricoh's intellectual property 
rights. It would therefore like to 
purchase empty toner cartridges 
from Ricoh, fill them with toner 
which it already manufactures 
and then sell the filled toner 
cartridges in competition with 
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Ricoh. Ricoh, however, which 
has so far not licensed its design 
rights or sold empty cartridges to 
anyone, refused to do this. 
According to Info-Lab the 
relevant product market would 
be the market for empty toner 
cartridges compatible with Ricoh 
copiers which are supposed to be 
filled with toner powder and sold 
to end-users. Such a market 
however does not exist. No 
producer or dealer sells empty 
toner cartridges compatible with 
Ricoh copiers. Aside from 
Ricoh, no company can produce 
these toner cartridges, since they 
are protected by intellectual 
property rights held by Ricoh, 
which so far has not licensed its 
design rights. Nor does Ricoh 
sell empty toner cartridges to 
other companies or end-users. At 
the retail level there is no 
demand for empty cartridges 
either. Cartridge and powder are 
sold together as a single product. 
Other copier manufacturers and 
independent toner cartridge 
manufacturers, such as Info-Lab 
itself, sell filled cartridges to 
end-users. This satisfies a 
recognised consumer need, 
reduces costs, and means that the 
components have to be used 
together. Powder and cartridge 
have therefore to be considered 
as a single product. 
Since a market for empty toner 
cartridges compatible with Ricoh 
copiers does not exist, the 
question is whether Ricoh, 
which has neither licensed its 
design rights nor sold empty 
cartridges, could be forced to 
start selling them so as to allow 
Info-Lab to enter the market. 
Since there is no consumer-
demand for empty toner 
cartridges, because the 
components cartridge and 
powder are used together by end 
customers, the sole purpose of 
selling empty cartridges would 
be to enable Info-Lab to compete 
with Ricoh in the market for 
filled toner cartridges. The 
Commission is of the opinion 
that a company cannot be 
obliged to such forced co-
operation with prospective 
market-players or that such 
forced co-operation could only 
be envisaged under exceptional 
circumstances (see restrictive 
approach of Court of Justice to 
doctrine of "essential facilities" 
in the recent Oscar Bronner case; 
26 November 1998, Case C-
7/97). 
The application of Article 86 in a 
case like the present one could at 
most be envisaged were Ricoh to 
have a dominant position on the 
consumables market, which 
would allow it to act 
independently of possible 
competitors and especially to be 
free in setting prices. Ricoh is 
the only undertaking which sells 
filled toner cartridges compatible 
with Ricoh photocopiers. 
According to the Commission's 
investigation, however, Ricoh 
has no dominant position in the 
photocopiers market. This raises 
the issue whether a company 
could be considered as dominant 
on the consumables market 
where there is no dominance in 
the upstream market, i.e. the 
photocopier market. Central to 
this issue is the existence of a 
close link between these two 
markets. 
In the Pelikan/Kyocera case77 
the Commission took the view 
that Kyocera could not be 
considered to have a dominant 
position in the market for toner 
and other consumables which 
were compatible with its 
proprietary system in the market 
for printers, since Kyocera's 
market share in the market for 
printers was relatively low and 
there was considerable 
competition on this market. The 
Commission found that the 
printer market and the 
consumables market were 
interrelated in such a way that 
the horizontal competition on the 
printer market constituted 
effective discipline in the 
vertical market. 
For assessing whether there was 
sufficient interrelation between 
the primary and the secondary 
market the Commission used 
four criteria, which should also 
be applied in the present case. 
a) The consumer can make an 
informed choice including 
lifecvcle pricing 
According to a number of 
photocopier manufacturers, the 
producers also offer service 
support agreements or all-
inclusive rental and leasing 
contracts to photocopier 
machines customers at an annual 
fee, where the toner for a fixed 
number of copies is included. 
77 See XXVth Report on Competition 
Policy 1995, p. 140. 
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When purchasing a photocopier 
machine the customer can 
choose between such an 
"inclusive contract" or an 
"exclusive contract", where he 
purchases the toner cartridges 
separately. The consumer 
therefore gets a general idea of 
' the average costs for 
consumables during the lifetime 
of the photocopier machines and 
is able to compare prices. 
b) The consumer is likely to 
make an informed choice 
Since the consumer can calculate 
the price per copy by simply 
comparing the various inclusive 
and exclusive contracts offered 
by the different photocopier 
manufacturers, it is very likely 
that this factor is taken into 
account when a purchase 
decision is made. 
c) In case of an apparent policy 
of exploitation being pursued in 
one specific aftermarket a 
sufficient number of customers 
would adapt their purchasing 
behaviour at the level of the 
primary market 
In cases where there is sufficient 
potential for new customers, the 
existing customer base appears 
to be protected from exploitative 
behaviour by the attentive eye of 
the new customer. Regarding the 
low market share of Ricoh in the 
relevant photocopier market and 
the normal life of a photocopier 
of about 3 years it follows that 
there is a large number of 
customers that qualify as 
potential new customers of 
Ricoh machines. 
d) Adaptation within a 
reasonable period of time 
In Pelikan/Kyocera the 
Commission considered it to be 
decisive whether, should 
Kyocera start raising prices for 
its consumables today, such 
behaviour would trigger an 
adaptation in the purchasing 
pattern of new customers. The 
Commission held that such an 
adaptation would take place on 
the printer market. There are no 
indications that the situation 
would be any different if Ricoh 
began to raise its prices for 
photocopier consumables. 
While Ricoh is the only supplier 
of toner cartridges for certain 
Ricoh photocopier machines, 
there is no indication that Ricoh 
has a dominant position in the 
market for the photocopier 
machines in question. The 
former market is, however, 
closely linked to the latter. 
Under the approach adopted by 
the Commission in 
Pelikan/Kyocera, Ricoh cannot 
be considered to have a 
dominant position. 
Even if Ricoh had a dominant 
position it is doubtful whether 
this would be sufficient to justify 
imposing an obligation on Ricoh 
to sell empty toner cartridges to 
Info-Lab. In the present case, 
however, any circumstances 
which might at most justify such 
forced co-operation with 
prospective market-players do 
not exist. 
Decision of the Commission dated 
9/12/98 in case IV/34.466-Greek Ferries 
Panayotis ADAMOPOULOS, DG IV-D-3 
The facts 
Following receipt of a complaint 
from a member of the public, the 
Commission carried out 
investigations without prior 
warning at the offices of ferry 
operators, in Greece and in Italy 
in July 1994. Strong evidence of 
an infringement of Article 85 
was discovered. The Commission 
concluded that ferry companies 
operating in Ancona, Bari, 
Brindisi - Greece routes 
participated in a price fixing cartel 
for several years and it identified 
seven companies that participated 
therein, i.e. six companies based 
in Greece Minoan, Karageorgis, 
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Marlines, Strintzis, Anek, 
Ventouris Ferries and one Italian 
company, namely Adriatica. 
The legal assessment 
It was clear from the evidence in 
the this case that the parties 
engaged in regular, direct 
consultations aimed at fixing 
passenger fares and freight rates 
between Greece and Italy. 
Regular, detailed discussions took 
place each year to decide the tariff 
levels for the following year, and 
ad hoc consultations took place to 
decide how the parties should 
react to issues that arose during 
the year, such as currency 
devaluation or new categories of 
vehicles. It is also clear that these 
discussions took place at senior 
levels between the parties. There 
can be no doubt that this 
arrangement amounted to an 
agreement, the object of which 
was to fix selling prices and other 
trading conditions by the parties 
thereto. 
The arguments of the parties 
The arguments of the parties 
related to the Greek legal 
framework as well as to the 
situation in the relevant market 
during the years of the 
infringement. According to the 
parties, the Greek law which 
gives the Ministry of Mercantile 
Marine the right to intervene in 
cases of price wars between ferry 
operators, induced the companies 
to agree on tariffs in order to 
avoid such intervention. 
Furthermore, the war in Ex-
Yugoslavia created a state of 
emergency. 
For the Commission, there is no 
evidence of the Greek authorities' 
imposing or encouraging price-
fixing collusion in the Adriatic 
routes. Moreover, no crisis or 
emergency is recorded in the 
parties' correspondence. 
The relevant market 
The relevant market is limited 
both in geographical scope and 
size. It concerns three out of five 
routes in Adriatica (there are still 
Venice-Patras and Trieste-
Patras). Moreover, even if all 
Greece-Italy routes are taken 
into account, the market is still 
small compared to other markets 
within the EU. 
As regards the impact of the 
cartel, the prices in the market 
were relatively low compared to 
other routes within the common 
market, since the Ministry 
encouraged, during that period, 
the parties to keep them at that 
level in order to protect Greek 
exports to the rest of the EU. The 
number of the companies 
operating in the market is 
relatively high. In 1993, last full 
year of the infringement there 
were 18 operators in Greece-
Italy routes. New competitors 
entered the market since 1994. 
Fines 
A price-fixing cartel is by its 
nature a very serious 
infringement. However, taking 
into account the limited size of 
the relevant market as well as the 
limited impact of the 
infringement in this market, the 
Commission concluded that the 
infringement was a serious and 
not a very serious one. 
The Commission also concluded 
that the administrative practice 
of the Greek authorities created 
some degree of confusion to the 
companies as to whether their 
contact constituted an 
infringement. The reason for this 
was that the Ministry, which 
according to the Greek law 
decides the level of tariffs for the 
domestic part of the Greece -
Italy route, required the 
companies to arrive to a 
common proposal prior to the 
Ministry's decision. 
The co-operation of the 
undertakings with the 
Commission has been also taken 
into consideration. Providing 
incriminating documents and 
non-contesting the facts as 
described in the Commission's 
Statement of Objections lead to 
significant reductions of fines. 
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EUDIM : Complément 
d'information 
Le comité de rédaction estime 
utile d'apporter à l'article sur 
l'affaire EUDIM figurant à la 
page 26 du numéro précédent de 
«Compétition Policy 
Newsletter » les précisions 
suivantes : 
Le 5 février 1991, Van Marcke 
NV a introduit une demande 
visant les accords au sein 
d'EUDIM auprès de la 
Commission en vertu de l'article 
3 du règlement 17/62 CE du 
Conseil. 
Parmi d'autres mesures 
d'instruction, la Commission a 
demandé des renseignements 
aux entreprises concernées et 
effectué des vérifications en 
vertu des articles 11 et 14 dudit 
règlement. 
Le 7 février 1995, la 
Commission a décidé d'ouvrir la 
procédure en vertu de l'article 9 
paragraphe 3 dudit règlement et 
d'envoyer une communication de 
ses griefs à EUDIM dans cette 
affaire, conformément à l'article 
2 paragraphe 1 du règlement 
99/63 CE de la Commission. La 
communication des griefs de la 
Commission exposait son point 
de vue provisoire que, tel que 
pratiqués, les accords d'EUDIM 
constituaient une infraction à 
l'article 85. 
EUDIM a exprimé par écrit son 
point de vue à l'égard des griefs, 
conformément à l'article 3 
paragraphe 1 du règlement de la 
Commission précité, selon lequel 
ses accords ne constituaient pas 
une infraction, tout en renonçant 
à l'auditionprévue à l'article 19 
paragraphe 1 du règlement du 
Conseil précité. 
Le 28 novembre 1995, EUDIM a 
notifié des accords en vertu des 
articles 2 et 4 du règlement du 
Conseil précité. Les accords 
notifiés incluaient des 
dispositions qui complétaient ou 
clarifiaient certaines disposi-
tions visées par les griefs de la 
Commission. 
Le 17 avril 1996, la Commission 
a publié l'essentiel du contenu 
de la notification en vertu de 
l'article 19 paragraphe 3 du 
règlement du Conseil précité et 
annoncé son intention de 
prendre une position favorable, 
sur les accords, tels que modifiés 
et notifiés. 
Le 6 août 1998, la Commission a 
adopté une décision rejetant la 
plainte de Van Marcke 
susmentionnée. Le 17 septembre 
1998, les services de la 
Commission ont envoyé une 
lettre à EUDIM l'informant que 
les observations reçues à l'égard 
de la publication susdite 
n'étaient pas de nature à 
modifier l'évaluation de l'affaire 
et que, par conséquent, le 
dossier allait être classé. 
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Application of Council regulation 4064/89 
Recent Developments and 
Important Decisions 
John KEMP, DG IV-B-4 
Introduction & Statistical 
Overview 
The final four months of 1998 saw 
no reduction in the continuing 
upward trend in activity under the 
Merger Regulation78 that 
characterised the year as a whole 
(see also previous issues of the 
Newsletter). A further 80 
operations were notified, bringing 
the total for the year to 235, an 
increase of over a third (36%) on 
the already-record level for 1997, 
nearly 25% on the previous four 
month period. There were 60 
Decisions on cases under the 
Regulation's main provisions 
(Articles 6, 8 and 9) -bringing the 
total for the year to 238, an 
increase of over 40% on the figure 
for the whole of 1997 (itself a 
record). 
The potential for adverse effects 
on competition which such a 
caseload implies is also largely 
unaltered from previous years, 
notwithstanding the erosive effect 
of inflation on the Regulation's 
thresholds for notification. There 
was one further decision in the 
period to open a full, second phase 
investigation (Article 6(1 )(c)), 
bringing the total for the year to a 
record 12. Equally significant, 
however, there were another two 
cases in which commitments were 
accepted in Phase I under the 
newly-introduced provisions (see 
Newsletter 1998/2), bringing the 
year's total (in fact, only 10 
months, since the provision's 
effective date was 1 March) to 
nine. There were also two 
Decisions on cases following a 
second phase investigation 
(Article 8), bringing the total for 
the year to 10: both were cleared, 
one subject to formal 
commitments from the parties to 
remedy the competition problems 
that the Commission had 
identified. 
Phase II Decisions 
In {Skanska/Scancem1^) the 
Commission's investigation 
focussed on the markets for 
cement and concrete (both dry and 
ready-mixed) and concrete 
products in Sweden, Finland and 
Norway. The combined market 
shares produced by the merger 
were in some instances very high 
- as much as 90% in cement. The 
merger also produced substantial 
vertical effects, since both parties 
also had significant activities at all 
three main levels of the 
construction industry - raw 
materials (cement and aggregates), 
construction materials (concrete, 
concrete products) and 
construction itself. Most 
competitors were not vertically 
integrated, further reducing their 
ability to compete effectively after 
the merger. Skanska undertook to 
divest the whole of its 
shareholding in Scancem and to 
dispose of Scancem's cement 
business in Finland to an 
independent purchaser. The first 
part of the remedy is designed to 
end the vertical links ; the second, 
to ensure an independent source of 
supply. 
The other Phase II case, 
Enso/Stora80, was cleared. The 
Commission's initial analysis 
suggested that oligopoly issues 
were likely to arise. The merging 
parties - Enso of Finland and 
Stora of Sweden, would together 
make the largest integrated paper 
and board group in the world. In 
the EEA, there were only six 
significant suppliers of newsprint, 
and the combined group would 
become the largest. The 
Commission's detailed 
investigation found that these 
markets displayed many of the 
characteristics of an anti-
competitive oligopoly - low 
demand growth, concentrated 
supply-side, homogeneous 
products, mature technology, high 
entry barriers, similar cost 
structures. The merger would 
significantly increase the level of 
concentration. However, the 
Commission also found that other 
key oligopoly characteristics were 
not present: in particular, there 
was no market transparency -
information on prices and 
quantities supplied was not readily 
available to . competitors, and 
indeed there were secret discounts. 
Moreover there was evidence that 
7 8 Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89. 7 9 Case No. IV/M 1157. 80 Case No. IV/M 1225. 
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customers - principally, large 
publishing groups - could exercise 
a measure of countervailing 
power. 
'Buyer power' was also 
considered in this case in respect 
of the market for liquid packaging 
board (used, eg, for milk and fruit 
juice cartons). The merger would 
reduce the number of suppliers in 
this specialised market in the EEA 
to three, with the merged entity 
becoming the largest. Technical 
and commercial entry barriers 
were found to be high and total 
demand growth modest, making 
new entry unlikely. However, the 
market was also heavily 
concentrated on the demand side, 
with one firm in particular - Tetra 
Pak - accounting for a very 
substantial share. The two other 
main buyers (Elopak and SIG 
Combibloc) did not purchase such 
large quantities as Tetra Pak. 
However they too appeared to 
possess a measure of 
countervailing power, since they 
imported 'strategic' quantities 
from the USA. Overall, the 
Commission's investigation 
suggested that these circumstances 
produced, exceptionally, a 
situation of mutual dependence 
between buyers and sellers, which 
the merger was unlikely to disturb. 
In clearing the operation, the 
Commission also took account of 
certain undertakings which had 
been offered by the parties (some 
of them in the course of the first 
phase of the investigation) in order 
to address concerns about the 
position of Elopak and Combibloc 
after the merger. Enso would 
divest its shareholding in a joint 
conversion operation with Elopak, 
since this vertical link could 
weaken Elopak's countervailing 
power. The merged company 
would offer Elopak and 
Combibloc an arrangement 
designed to ensure that they were 
not subject to unjustified price 
discrimination in comparison with 
Tetra Pak. Finally, the parties 
undertook not to oppose an 
application for a duty-free quota 
for liquid packaging board from 
outside the Community. The 
adoption of such a quota would 
make imports more competitive 
and thus encourage other 
suppliers. 
Phase I Decisions 
The popularity and effectiveness 
of the new power to accept formal 
undertakings to remedy 
competition problems at Phase I 
was confirmed by the addition of 
two cases81 in this category during 
the period. In many ways typical 
of this process was ABB/Elsag 
Bailey Process Automation NV82. 
This concerned the acquisition by 
the ABB engineering and 
technology group of Elsag 
Bailey's process control business. 
The Commission's investigation 
found that, although in general the 
overlaps (where any existed) 
between the parties' activities 
were not significant, there was one 
product area in which the 
operation raised doubts about its 
compatibility with the common 
market. The parties' combined 
market shares in gas 
Chromatograph analysers - a 
u the second case - No. IV/M 1286 
Johnson & Johnson/Dupuy - the 
undertaking concerned the divestment of 
an overlapping business in the 
manufacture of replacement hip and knee 
joints. 
8 2 Case No. IV/M 1339. 
specialised instrument used 
mainly in the petrochemical 
industry, would have been high 
enough to give rise to competition 
concerns. However, ABB 
proposed a modification to the 
operation by which it agreed to 
divest the key elements of Elsag 
Bailey's business in this area 
(Applied Automation Inc -
'AAI'). The activities to be 
divested comprise Elsag Bailey's 
interest in gas chromatographs and 
in the development of a related 
product, a mass spectrometer. 
After testing this proposal in the 
market, the Commission 
concluded that the divestment 
would remove the doubts about 
compatibility, and declared the 
operation compatible on that basis. 
This case demonstrates many of 
the essential elements of a 
successful use of the 'Phase I 
undertakings' procedure: 
• clearly identified product and 
geographic market(s) in which 
a competition problem is found 
to exist at an early stage of the 
examination (some parties 
have even drawn such potential 
problems to the Commission's 
attention themselves, in order 
to hasten the process); 
• the notifying party's ability to 
divest an overlapping business 
that clearly covers the area(s) 
of concern, and can be easily 
identified and readily severed 
from the remainder; 
• readiness on the part of the 
notifying party to acknowledge 
the competition problem 
rapidly and to cooperate with 
the Commission in seeking 
mutually acceptable ways of 
resolving it. 
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It is also worthwhile recalling the 
constraints which the Regulation's 
very short timescales place on the 
Commission and on the parties 
under this procedure, and in 
particular the need for the 
Commission to 'market test' a 
proposed remedy with customers, 
competitors etc and to liaise with 
Member States. Popular and 
economical as it is proving, the 
Commission is not obliged to 
accept a remedy at Phase I, and if 
the above elements are not all 
present, then a full investigation 
under the Phase II procedures can 
be expected. 
Joint Ventures 
Another change to the Merger 
Regulation whose effects can now 
be seen more clearly is the 
inclusion within its scope of 
operations known as 'full function 
co-operative joint ventores' 
(FFCJVs). The aim of the change 
is, broadly, to increase clarity and 
consistency. Now, all joint 
ventures involving long-term 
change in the structure of the 
enterprises concerned are - like 
other 'concentrations' - dealt with 
under the Merger Regulation 
(provided they have a Community 
dimension) rather than under the 
rules for agreements between 
underta-kings83. The change also 
means that these cases can benefit 
from the 'one stop shop' and fixed 
timescales that apply to the 
assessment of other concentrative 
operations. 
Article 2(4) brings within the 
Regulation's scope ah joint 
ventures constituting a 
concentration as defined in Article 
83 Regulation (EEC) No. 17/62. 
3. It provides that they will be 
appraised under Article 85, EC 
Treaty 'to the extent that [the joint 
venture] has as its object or effect 
the co-ordination of the 
competitive behaviour of 
undertakings that remain 
independent'84. Thus, the 
operation's concentrative effects 
are assessed under the Merger 
Regulation's 'dominance test'85 as 
with .other concentrations; any 
effects on competition resulting 
from the coordination of the 
parents' activities other than 
through the joint venture (known 
as 'spillover effects') are assessed 
under Articles 85(1) and 85(3). 
Article 2(4) requires the 
Commission to take account in 
particular, in its appraisal of 
'spillover', of whether two or 
more parent companies retain 
significant activities in upstream, 
downstream or neighbouring 
markets to those of the joint 
venture; and whether the 
coordination which is the direct 
consequence of the joint venture's 
creation affords the undertakings 
concerned the possibility of 
eliminating competition in respect 
of a substantial part of the 
products or services in question. 
Previously, the likelihood of 
spillover effects being found in a 
notified merger case could raise 
doubts over whether it should be 
examined under the Merger 
Regulation or under Regulation 
17/62, leading to additional delay 
and uncertainty, and the prospect 
of having to engage a different 
procedure. 
84 
For further details see also Commission 
Notice on the concept of full-function 
joint ventures, OJ 98 C 66/01, 2.3.1998. 
8 5 Merger Regulation, Article 2( 1 ) - 2(3). 
In the 10 months of 1998 since the 
amendments to the Merger 
Regulation took effect, 26 of the 
76 joint venture-cases decided 
under the Regulation necessi-tated 
some analysis under Article 2(4). 
The most detailed analyses have 
been made in cases within the 
telecommunications and the 
Internet areas. Remedies to settle 
Article 2(4) concerns have been 
adopted in one case decided so far 
(Canal+/ CDPQ/ BankAmerica86) 
in one other case (BT/AT & J87) 
the Commission decided to open a 
second phase investigation. 
In Canal+/CDPQ/BankAmerica, 
the spill-over effects were found 
on a market upstream from the 
joint venture. The joint venture 
itself concerned pay-TV in 
France; but competition problems 
were found to result in the market 
for the wholesaling of TV rights in 
Spain. In Spain, Canal+ had 
strong or dominant positions on 
the pay-TV market as well as on 
the upstream market for content. 
The notified transaction was 
found, through the balance of 
power in the joint venture, to give 
Canal+ a strong incentive to 
favour Cableuropa (controlled by 
CDPQ and BankAmerica) in the 
sale of Spanish pay-TV rights. 
The remedies adopted are 
designed to eliminate the 
possibility of discrimination 
against other competitors on the 
Spanish pay-TV market. 
The case shows the potential use 
of Article 2(4). Firstly, the 
notified transaction did not create 
or strengthen the dominant 
position of CanaB- as such. 
86 Case No. IV/M. 1327. 
8 7 Case No. JV. 15. 
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Rather, it gave rise to a situation 
where the company's commercial 
incentives would change so that 
there would be an increased risk 
of discrimination against other 
pay-TV operators in Spain. It 
created a direct link between 
Canal+ and the notified 
transaction which provided 
incentives to behave in a 
potentially anti-competitive way. 
Secondly, the remedy sets a 
benchmark for the future conduct 
of Canal+ on the Spanish market 
for pay-TV content, but leaves the 
notified transaction structurally 
unchan-ged. In the absence of 
Article 2(4), this remedy would 
have been difficult to accept under 
the Merger Regulation. 
The Commission decided to open 
detailed enquiry into a proposed 
joint venture between British 
Telecom and the US firm AT&T, 
two of the world's largest 
telecommunications operators. 
The joint venture will provide a 
broad range of telecommu-
nications services to multinational 
corporate custo-mers as well as 
international carrier services to 
other carriers. The Commission 
decided to carry out a second-
phase inquiry into the effects of 
the venture on several global 
telecommuni-cations markets and 
also some in the UK. Subsequent 
to its preliminary inquiry, the 
Commission expressed concerns 
in the following areas: the parties' 
combined market position on the 
markets for the provision of global 
telecommunications services to 
large multinational companies and 
for international carrier services, 
the effect of the creation of the 
joint venture leading to the 
possible creation or strengthening 
of a dominant position for certain 
telecommunications services in 
the UK and the possible co-
ordination effects of the proposed 
joint ventare in the UK between 
ACC, a wholly-owned subsidiary 
of AT&T, and between BT and 
Telewest, in which AT&T through 
TCI will have a jointly controlling 
stake. The final decision is 
expected in April 1999. 
The Commission's first cases 
which have included an 
examination of Article 2(4) effects 
have already demonstrated some 
common themes. The relative size 
of the Article 2(4) market and the 
joint venture's market, which is 
assessed for dominance purposes, 
has been important in assessing 
the likelihood of co-ordination. 
Normally, the commercial 
incentives, and, thus, the risk of 
co-ordination, is smaller if the 
joint venture's market is 
significantly smaller than the 
Article 2(4) market. However, it 
cannot be considered as a 
sufficient condition for the 
absence of co-ordination between 
the parent companies. The nature 
of the markets themselves will 
also play a part in the 
Commission's assessment. The 
nature of existing links between 
the parent companies is also 
relevant for the determination of 
causality between the notified 
operation and the Article 2(4) 
effects, though their existence 
does not automatically imply that 
there is no effect. Again, other 
factors would have to be taken 
into account before that analysis 
could be made. 
Other Changes to the 
Regulation 
Another important change to the 
Regulation concerned the 
suspension period within which a 
notified transaction cannot be 
implemented without special 
dispensation from the Commission 
(Article 7)88. Initial experience 
confirms the desirability of 
allowing the Commission more 
flexibility. The suspension now 
automatically applies throughout 
the period of examination, but can 
be lifted in a slightly wider range 
of circumstances than before. 
Previously, the test was whether 
maintaining the suspension would 
be likely to cause 'serious 
damage' to one or more of the 
undertakings concerned. The 
Regulation now provides for the 
Commission to make a balanced 
assessment of all relevant factors, 
including effects on third parties 
and the threat to competition. A 
derogation of the new type was 
granted, in some instances subject 
to conditions and limitations, in 
five cases. Details are 
confidential, but the effect of 
certain provisions of national law 
as regards public bids, and the 
clear absence of risk of any 
significant anti-competitive effect 
arising from the merger, were 
material factors. In a number of 
other cases, the parties decided not 
to proceed with a formal request 
for derogation after discussions 
with the Task Force. 
The supplementary turnover 
thresholds- designed to address 
the problem of multiple 
notifications of the same 
For details, see previous Competition 
Policy Newsletter, page 62. 
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transaction to several national 
authorities - also appear to be 
having the expected effect; the 
number of cases notified by the 
end of the period (14) being 
broadly in line with the 
Commission's estimates of the 
likely impact. 
Other Developments 
Incomplete Notifications 
The total number of notifications 
concerning merger cases which 
have been declared incomplete by 
the Commission (according to 
Article 4 of the Implementing 
Regulation) remains small, but has 
undergone a certain increase in 
recent years. The Commission is 
keen to find ways of reducing the 
number of incomplete 
notifications. Accordingly it was 
pleased to enter into discussions 
on this matter with representatives 
of the legal community, as a result 
of which some Best Practice 
Guidelines have been drafted and 
published on the Directorate-
General IV website on the 
Internet89. 
The Commission found that in 
many cases where a notification 
was declared incomplete, the 
parties had made little or no prior 
contact with the Commission 
before submitting it. This clearly 
increased the risk. Otherwise, the 
main causes of incompleteness 
were as follows. Formal issues -
for example, not all the relevant 
parties had been included, or the 
notification was made before 
sufficiently clear agreements to 
89 
See 'Mergers - Other Documents' on 
the DGIV website -
http://europa.eu/int/comm/dg04 
bring about the concentration were 
in existence - accounted for some 
cases. Possibly the largest single 
category, however, was where the 
supporting information provided 
was inadequate or unclear - for 
example, as regards the markets 
considered to be affected by the 
merger and the parties' and 
competitors' shares in them. 
Because the time allowed for the 
Commission to reach a decision is 
short, clarity is especially 
important in cases where the 
documentation is extensive and 
the possible markets numerous or 
complex. The third category 
comprised cases where the 
Commission's investigation 
revealed, sometimes only at a late 
stage, potential affected markets 
not identified by the notifying 
party - although, in some instances 
at least, they arguably could, and 
therefore should, have been. 
The guidelines cover 
prenotification (including the 
desirability, in appropriate cases, 
of giving the Commission the 
opportunity to see the notification 
in draft form for comment), 
timing, information on market 
definition and shares (eg, where 
there is scope for debate over 
geographic market definition, 
providing market data on a 
national basis as well as a wider 
one such as the EU as a whole) 
and the value of meetings with 
representatives of the undertakings 
concerned who know well the 
activities and markets involved. 
The Commis-sion of course 
remains free to make declarations 
of incompleteness where 
appropriate. But if followed, the 
guidelines should minimise the 
risk of a notification being 
declared incomplete and also 
reduce the need for the 
Commission to request further 
information after notification. 
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Main developments between 1st October 1998 and 31st January 1999 
Unanimous agreement in the Council 
on the procedural regulation 
Adinda SINNAEVE, DG IV-G-1 
I. Introduction 
The agreement reached in the 
Industry Council on a procedural 
regulation for State aid marks a 
new era of State aid policy. After 
more than 40 years, the 
Community control of State aid 
will finally be endowed with a 
basic act, integrating for the first 
time all the rules of procedure in 
a single and coherent text. The 
regulation also widens the 
instruments at the disposal of the 
Commission to act against 
unlawful aid and to monitor the 
respect of State aid decisions. By 
its contribution to increase the 
transparency and efficiency of 
State aid policy, the regulation 
can thus be regarded as one of 
the main pillars of the 
modernisation initiative which 
the Commission is carrying out 
in the field of State aid. 
Despite the expected difficulties 
of reconciling the different and 
opposed interests, which are 
involved in State aid procedures, 
the Commission's proposal 
made its way through the 
Council in a relatively short 
time. On 18 February 1998, the 
Commission had adopted its 
proposal for a regulation on 
State aid procedures on the basis 
of Article 94 EC-Treaty90. It was 
submitted to the Council on 27 
February and discussed under 
the British and Austrian 
presidencies. After a first debate 
on 7 May 1998, the Industry 
Council reached on 16 
November 1998 a political 
agreement on the regulation. 
Meanwhile the European 
Parliament has given its opinion, 
so that the regulation is now 
ready for formal adoption. 
A comparison between the 
original proposal of the 
Commission and the final text 
agreed upon by the Council 
shows that the structure and 
main contents of the proposal 
generally remained. The 
following text gives an overview 
of the most important points of 
the agreement reached by the 
Industry Council, focusing 
especially on the changes with 
regard to present practice. 
II. The question of time-
limits for the different 
steps of the procedure 
According to a long established 
practice based on the Lorenz 
judgement of the Court91, the 
regulation confirms that the 
preliminary examination of a 
notified aid should be concluded 
within two months from a 
complete notification. Where the 
Commission has not taken a 
decision within this period, the 
Member State concerned may 
put the measures concerned into 
effect, after giving the 
Commission prior notice thereof, 
unless the Commission reacts 
within 15 days from the receipt 
of the notice. From the wording 
of the Lorenz case, it had not 
been clear whether the 
Commission could still have 
such an additional period at its 
disposal, when receiving notice 
that the Member State intended 
to implement the proposed 
measure. In the Commission's 
view, an additional period to 
rectify the situation is needed in 
order to avoid seriously 
distortive aid inadvertently 
becoming authorised, without 
any possibility to rectify the 
situation. The fact that a formal 
Commission decision within the 
15 days gives more legal 
certainty to the beneficiary than 
an implicit approval, played a 
role in the acceptance by the 
Council of the Commission's 
proposal. 
Article 5 concerning information 
requests on incomplete 
notifications introduces a change 
to the preliminary examination 
phase as it is currently practised. 
It states that a notification will 
be considered to be withdrawn if 
90 OJ C 116/13, 16.4.1998. See also 
Competition Policy Newsletter, 1998, 
nr. 2, p. 79. 
91 Case 120/73 Lorenz ν Germany [1973] 
ECR 1471. 
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a Member State does not provide 
the requested additional 
information within the 
established time limit. This 
provision should be a 
disincentive for Member States 
to drag the procedure by delayed 
and incomplete replies and can 
thus be useful in order to speed 
up decisions. The consequence 
of implicit withdrawal is 
mitigated by the ability of the 
Commission to extend the 
deadline and by the right of the 
Member State to answer in a 
duly reasoned statement that the 
requested information is not 
available or has already been 
provided, so that the notification 
should be considered to be 
complete. The latter possibility 
constitutes a procedural 
innovation. By arguing that the 
requested information is not 
available, the Member State can 
ask for a decision and make the 
two months period definitely 
run. This possibility could come 
close to letting the Member State 
in exceptional cases decide itself 
that a notification is complete, 
while current practice and the 
Commission's proposal left this 
decision entirely with the 
Commission. Where the 
Commission considers that it 
nevertheless lacks information to 
reach a decision, it will open the 
formal investigation procedure. 
The Commission's original 
proposal did not contain a time 
limit for the formal examination 
procedure. This choice was not 
only based on the practical 
problems such a time-limit 
would bring for its services, but 
also on the difficulty of 
establishing a time-limit which is 
appropriate for all cases, taking 
account of factors such as 
differences in the complexity of 
cases, new questions which may 
arise following the comments 
from third parties and require 
additional information, etc. 
However, since it was one of the 
main demands from Member 
States to accelerate proceedings 
and to establish at least a 
maximum duration for the 
formal examination procedure, a 
solution acceptable to all parties 
had to be found. An agreement 
was reached on a time limit of 
18 months from the opening of 
the procedure. Once this time 
limit has expired, and should the 
Member State so request, the 
Commission must take a 
decision within two months. 
Although the time limit for the 
formal examination procedure 
might still seem to be very long, 
it should be reminded that it is 
not meant to become the rule, 
but only to establish a maximum 
duration. 
Finally, it should be noted that 
time limits are not applicable to 
unlawful aid. Member States 
which do not respect the basic 
principles of State aid law -
notification obligation and 
standstill clause - should not be 
put on an equal footing with 
those who do so. It seems 
therefore justified that the 
benefit from binding deadlines is 
reserved for the examination of 
notified aid. Nevertheless, even 
in the absence of the constraint 
of deadlines, it is the 
Commission's objective and task 
to put an end to the possibly 
incompatible distortions of 
competition caused by unlawful 
aid as quickly as possible. 
III. Unlawful aid: provisional 
and definite recovery 
Where aid has been awarded 
without authorisation, the 
Commission should be provided 
with the necessary instruments to 
rectify the procedural and 
material infringement of the 
Treaty. As a consequence, the 
procedure for the examination of 
unlawful aid differs in some 
regards from the "normal" 
procedure. 
First of all, the Commission has 
different kinds of injunctions at 
its disposal during the procedure 
on unlawful aid. The regulation 
codifies these injunctions: 
information injunction (Art. 10 
(3)), suspension injunction (Art. 
11 (1)) and provisional recovery 
injunction (Art. 11 (2)). With 
regard to the latter injunction, 
the regulation will bring an end 
to the academic debate on the 
legal competence of the 
Commission to order an interim 
recovery, as the Council, though 
adding three conditions, 
accepted the principle of a 
recovery injunction. According 
to the final text of Art. 11 (2), 
the Commission may order a 
Member State provisionally to 
recover aid provided that (1) 
there are no doubts that the 
measure constitutes a State aid, 
(2) there is an urgency to act and 
(3) there is a serious risk of 
substantial and irreparable 
damage to a competitor. These 
criteria in practice limit the 
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scope of the recovery injunction 
to the most serious cases, where 
immediate action for the 
protection of competitors is 
needed. If the recovery 
injunction has been complied 
with, the regulation provides that 
the Commission will take a 
decision within the time limits 
for notified aid. The exceptional 
application of time limits to 
unlawful aid is justified by the 
fact that the effective 
reimbursement of the aid 
establishes a situation which is, 
from a competition point of 
view, similar to the one 
prevailing in case of notified aid. 
Where unlawful aid is 
incompatible with the common 
market, an effective State aid 
control should ensure its definite 
recovery from the beneficiary. 
Art. 14 of the regulation 
introduces, in accordance with 
the Commission's proposal, an 
obligation for the Commission to 
order recovery of all unlawful 
aid that is incompatible with the 
common market. It also confirms 
the Commission's proposal that, 
for the implementation of a 
recovery decision, national 
procedures shall only apply as 
far as they allow the immediate 
and effective execution of the 
decision. However, the 
controversial sentence 
concerning the exclusion of 
suspensive effect of national 
remedies against a recovery 
order from the Member State, 
has been deleted from the final 
text of the regulation. It was 
considered by the Council to be 
a harmonisation provision, for 
which Art. 94 would not 
constitute a sufficient legal basis. 
In the Commission's view, this 
argumentation does not seem 
convincing, since the non-
application of suspensive effect 
is only a concrete consequence 
of the previous sentence of the 
article, which states that national 
law should not prevent the 
immediate execution of the 
Commission's decision. Since 
provisions granting suspensive 
effect precisely prevent this 
immediate execution, they 
should in any case be 
disregarded, for their application 
would infringe the regulation. 
The Council has also added a 
new sentence to Art. 14 (3) 
which obliges Member States, in 
case of proceedings before 
national courts, to take all 
necessary measures, even 
provisional measures, in order to 
obtain immediate reimburse-
ment. 
Taking account of the fact that 
the regulation introduces an 
obligation for the Commission to 
ask recovery whenever it takes a 
negative decision on unlawful 
aid, the question arose whether, 
for reasons of legal certainty and 
proportionality, some kind of 
restriction should not be built 
into the system. During the 
negotiations in the Council an 
agreement could be reached on a 
limitation period for the recovery 
of aid. According to the new 
Article 15, after a period of ten 
years starting from the award of 
the aid, the Commission cannot 
ask recovery anymore. Although 
at first sight, this provision could 
be seen as reducing the 
Commission's powers, its 
practical effect should not be 
overestimated. Cases of unlawful 
aid which remained unknown to 
the Commission for more than 
10 years, are not only rare, but 
can hardly be very distortive. 
Moreover, any action of the 
Commission with regard to the 
measure (e.g. a request for 
information) makes the 10 years 
period start running afresh. On 
the whole, it seems that for the 
few cases where the limitation 
period might apply in future, this 
is justified. 
IV. Third party rights 
With regard to the issue of third 
party rights, neither the 
Commission nor the Council 
intended to modify the present 
situation. It was considered that 
the rights of interested parties 
are sufficiently protected under 
the current system and that, even 
presuming that it would be 
practically possible to enlarge 
these rights, no substantial 
increase of the efficiency of 
State aid control could be 
expected therefrom. 
Nevertheless, it appeared useful, 
for the sake of transparency, to 
define in a separate chapter of 
the regulation all the possibilities 
which third parties have to 
defend their interests: the right to 
inform the Commission about 
alleged unlawful aid or misuse 
of aid and to be informed of 
possible Commission decisions 
on the matter concerned; the 
right to submit comments where 
the Commission has initiated a 
formal investigation procedure 
and to be sent a copy of the final 
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decision in that case; the right to 
receive on request a copy of 
decisions which are not 
published or not published in 
full. In the Commission's 
proposal these rights were spread 
over different articles or only 
implicitly expressed since they 
are to be seen within the context 
of a bilateral procedure between 
the Commission and the Member 
State concerned. As to the 
substance, the new chapter VI of 
the regulation does not change 
the means of action third parties 
currently have but, by bringing 
them together in one chapter, 
makes them more visible. 
V. On-site monitoring 
The Commission's proposal 
contained three instruments that 
should reinforce its powers to 
monitor compliance with its 
decisions. Two of these were 
agreed to by the Council. 
First of all, a general reporting 
obligation with regard to all 
existing aid schemes should 
allow the Commission to obtain 
all necessary information to 
monitor existing aid schemes in 
accordance with Art. 93 (1). If 
Member States do not comply 
with the obligation to submit 
annual reports, the Commission 
might propose appropriate 
measures with regard to the 
scheme concerned, going as far 
as the abolishment of the 
scheme. 
Secondly, the regulation gives 
the Commission the right to 
undertake on-site monitoring 
visits to the beneficiary of an 
aid, where serious doubts about 
compliance with certain 
decisions exist. Whereas the 
original Commission proposal 
had only foreseen on-the-spot 
visits for checking the respect of 
conditional decisions, the scope 
of this article was widened 
during the Council negotiations 
to all decisions authorising aid. 
This new power of the 
Commission is certainly one of 
the main innovations of the 
regulation in strengthening State 
aid control. 
The third instrument, a 
cooperation procedure with 
national independent supervisory 
bodies, was not retained in the 
final text of the regulation. 
However, the considerably 
enlarged on-site monitoring 
powers of the Commission seem 
largely to compensate for this 
deletion. 
VI. Publication 
Publication of decisions is an 
area where the potential conflict 
between transparency and 
efficiency is most striking. It 
goes without saying that full 
publication of all decisions in all 
languages would provide a 
perfect transparency, but - aside 
from the paradox that too much 
transparency might have the 
effect of reducing it - this would 
jeopardise the goal of increasing 
efficiency by speeding up the 
decision making process, 
especially as far as decisions to 
open a formal investigation are 
concerned. Therefore, the 
regulation now provides that the 
latter decisions will only be 
published in the authentic 
language together with a 
summary in the other languages. 
In practice this means, that e.g. 
for a decision on a French aid, 
the Official Journal published in 
Finnish will contain the 
authentic French text together 
with a summary in Finnish. This 
system should give sufficient 
information to allow third parties 
to submit their comments on the 
case. At the same time, it should 
reduce the delay in publishing 
openings of a procedure and 
thereby have a direct positive 
effect on the total duration of the 
proceedings. 
However, with regard to final 
decisions, where the objective 
was to speed up the publication -
and thereby the legal certainty of 
the beneficiary - rather than the 
decision making, the transpa-
rency arguments prevailed and 
the present system of publishing 
the full text in all languages will 
be retained. It should be noticed, 
however, that the possible gain 
of resources with regard to the 
publication of openings of a 
procedure might also help to 
reduce the delay in publication 
of final decisions. 
VII. Conclusion 
The significance and impact of 
the procedural regulation might 
be compared to that of regulation 
17 for the application of Art. 85-
86. Its main importance lies not 
so much in the new instruments 
it introduces to improve the 
effective enforcement of state 
aid control, but rather in the 
value of a codification itself. A 
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streamlined and binding legal 
text setting out the different state 
aid procedures will finally put an 
end to the mixture of case law 
and soft law which is at present 
dominating the State aid field. It 
will provide the required legal 
certainty which state aid is 
missing. Finally, it will increase 
the transparency and visibility of 
state aid rules and is a 
prerequisite for administrations, 
enterprises and academics 
increasing their knowledge of 
this area. Since a better respect 
of the rules presupposes a better 
knowledge of them by Member 
States and by the legal and 
business world as a whole, the 
regulation has an important role 
to play in this regard. For all 
these reasons, its final impact 
can be expected to far exceed its 
contents. 
Principaux développements du 
1er octobre au 31 décembre 1998 
Madeleine TILMANS, DG IV-G-1 
Communication de la 
Commission sur l'application 
des règles relatives aux aides 
d'Etat aux mesures relevant de 
la fiscalité directe des 
entreprises. 
Le 11 novembre 1998, la 
Commission a adopté une 
communication sur l'application 
des règles relatives aux aides 
d'Etat dans le domaine de la 
fiscalité directe des entreprises. Le 
but principal de celle-ci est de 
clarifier le champ d'application 
des règles en matière d'aides 
d'Etat et de préciser les 
procédures appliquées. C'est ainsi 
qu'un avantage fiscal tombe sous 
l'application des dispositions en 
matière d'aides d'Etat lorsqu'il est 
spécifique à certaines entreprises 
ou certaines productions et qu'il 
n'est pas justifié par la nature ou 
l'économie du système fiscal 
concerné, c'est-à-dire que sa 
nécessité pour le fonctionnement 
et l'efficacité dudit système n'est 
pas démontrée par un 
raisonnement économique. Par 
contre, les mesures de pure 
technique fiscale et les incitations 
fiscales poursuivant un objectif de 
politique économique générale 
peuvent, quand elles s'appliquent 
indifféremment à toutes les 
entreprises, être considérées 
comme des mesures générales qui 
ne tombent pas sous l'application 
des dispositions en matière d'aides 
d'Etat. La Commission évaluera 
ou réévaluera les aspects aides 
d'Etat des régimes fiscaux des 
Etats membres en se fondant sur 
cette communication. 
Extension of the validity of the 
Code on aid to the synthetic 
fibres industry until 31 August 
2001. 
On 16 December 1998 the 
Commission decided to extend the 
validity of the Code on aid to the 
synthetic fibres industry (OJ C 94, 
30.03.1996) beyond its scheduled 
expiry date of 31 March 1999, 
until 31 August 2001. This 
decision followed a discussion of 
the issue at a multilateral meeting 
of State aid experts on 18 
November 1998. 
The award of aid to the synthetic 
fibres industry has been subject to 
strict control since 1977 when, 
because of the low rate of capacity 
utilisation for the production of 
synthetic fibres within the 
Community and the consequent 
loss of jobs as well as the risk that 
aid to the industry would 
exacerbate the situation and distort 
competition, the Commission 
decided to introduce a sector-
specific Code for the control of 
aid to the sector. Capacity 
utilisation rates generally continue 
to lag well behind optimal levels 
for such a capital-intensive 
industry. In the Commission's 
view there was insufficient 
evidence to suggest that the 
development of capacity 
utilisation for any of the fibres and 
yams covered by the Code had 
improved to such an extent as to 
justify its immediate abolition 
without engendering future 
problems. 
The question of whether sector-
specific rules for this industry 
remain appropriate beyond August 
2001 will depend on the planned 
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evaluation of the effectiveness of 
the «multisectoral framework on 
regional aid for large investment 
projects», which entered into force 
on 1 September 1998 for a trial 
period of three years. 
Détermination des plafonds 
nationaux de couverture des 
aides régionales. 
En adoptant, le 16 décembre 1997, 
les lignes directrices concernant 
les aides d'Etat à finalité régionale 
(JOCE C 74 du 10.3.1998), la 
Commission s'est dotée d'une 
nouvelle méthode de 
détermination des régions éligibles 
aux dérogations prévues aux 
articles 92§3.a) et c) du Traité. En 
application des dispositions 
établies par ces lignes directrices, 
la Commission a également fixé le 
plafond global de couverture des 
aides régionales à 42,7% de la 
population de l'Union pour la 
période 2000-2006, ce qui 
représente une réduction en 4 
points de pourcentage de la 
couverture actuelle. 
Le 16 décembre 1998, la 
Commission a arrêté 
définitivement les plafonds 
nationaux de couverture des aides 
régionales (JOCE C 16 du 
21.1.1999) sur base des statistiques 
les plus récentes (1994-1996 pour 
le PIB par habitant et 1995-1997 
pour le chômage). En application 
de la méthode établie par les lignes 
directrices, ces plafonds nationaux 
sont fixés, dans le respect du 
plafond global de 42,7%, sur la 
base de critères socio-économiques 
objectifs et transparents, rappelés 
ci-après. 
En premier lieu, et comme dans le 
passé, peuvent bénéficier de la 
dérogation de l'article 92 § 3 a) 
les régions, correspondant à une 
unité géographique de niveau II de 
la NUTS, qui ont un produit 
intérieur brut (PIB) par habitant, 
mesuré en standard de pouvoir 
d'achat (SPA) sur la base de la 
moyenne des trois dernières 
années pour lesquelles des 
statistiques sont disponibles, ne 
dépassant pas le seuil de 75 % de 
la moyenne communautaire. Une 
répartition de la couverture 
communautaire qui reste 
disponible pour l'article 92 § 3 c) 
entre les différents Etats membres 
est ensuite effectuée en utilisant 
une clé de répartition qui tient 
compte des disparités régionales, 
en terme de PIB/SPA par habitant 
et/ou de chômage, dans le 
contexte national et 
communautaire. Si nécessaire, les 
résultats ainsi obtenus sont alors 
corrigés de façon à garantir: 
- que, dans chaque Etat membre, 
la population eligible au titre de 
la dérogation 92§3.c) soit au 
moins égale à 15% et ne 
dépasse pas 50% de la 
population non couverte au titre 
de la dérogation 92§3.a); 
- que, dans chaque Etat membre, 
la couverture de population 
eligible au titre de la dérogation 
92§3.c) soit fixée à un niveau 
suffisant pour inclure 
l'ensemble des régions venant 
de perdre le statut 92§3.a), ainsi 
que les régions à faible densité 
de population; 
- que la réduction de la 
couverture totale des aides 
régionales d'un Etat membre ne 
dépasse pas 25% de sa 
couverture actuelle; 
- que la somme des différentes 
couvertures nationales de 
l'article 92§3.c) égale celle 
disponible pour l'Union 
européenne (par le biais d'un 
ajustement proportionnel des 
résultats obtenus pour les Etats 
membres non concernés 
directement par les corrections 
précédentes). 
Ainsi, les plafonds nationaux de 
population assistée au titre des 
dérogations des articles 92§3.a) et 
92§3.c) que la Commission 
considère comme compatibles 
avec le marché commun sont, 
pour la période 2000 à 2006 et par 
Etat membre: 
Belgique: 
Danemark: 
Allemagne: 
Grèce: 
Espagne: 
France: 
Irlande: 
Italie: 
Luxembourg: 
Pays-Bas: 
Autriche: 
Portugal: 
Finlande: 
Suède: 
Royaume-Uni: 
30,9 % 
17,1 % 
34,9 % 
100% 
79,2 % 
36,7 % 
100% 
43,6 % 
32,0 % 
15,0% 
27,5 % 
100% 
42,2 % 
15,9% 
28,7 % 
Tel qu'établi par la décision de la 
Commission du 16.12.1997, les 
données statistiques utilisées se 
réfèrent au découpage 
géographique de niveaux II et III 
de la NUTS en vigueur au 15 
octobre 1997. Dans la mesure où 
des changements de nomenclature 
NUTS auraient eu lieu entre-
temps, la Commission appréciera 
l'éligibilité des régions proposées 
par les Etats membres aux 
dérogations régionales prévues 
aux articles 92§3.a) et c) du Traité 
sur la base de la nomenclature en 
vigueur au moment de la 
notification des cartes des aides 
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régionales, dans le respect des 
plafonds nationaux. 
La Commission a communiqué 
officiellement ces plafonds à tous 
les Etats membres le 30 décembre 
1998. Les Etats membres sont dès 
lors en possession de tous les 
éléments pour procéder à la 
notification de leurs cartes des 
aides régionales, qui seront 
valables pour la période 2000-
2006. Ils ont été invités à procéder 
à cette notification avant le 31 
mars 1999, pour permettre que 
l'exercice de sélection des régions 
assistées se termine à temps, faute 
de quoi aucune aide à finalité 
régionale ne pourra être octroyée 
après le 31 décembre 1999. 
Report on "services of general 
economic interest in the banking 
sector" 
At its meeting in June 1997 in 
Amsterdam the European Council 
adopted a Declaration on "Public 
credit institutions in Germany" 
mentioning the possibility that 
"services of general economic 
interest" might exist also in the 
banking sector. This Declaration 
notes the Commission's opinion 
that the Community's existing 
competition rules would allow to 
take such services and possible 
necessary compensation measures 
into account in full. 
Following the adoption of the 
Declaration the Council asked the 
Commission to examine whether 
similar cases exist in the other 
Member States and to inform the 
ECOFIN Council about the fin-
dings. In order to gather the 
necessary information the Com-
mission sent a questionnaire to all 
Member States, asking which 
particular kind of tasks of their 
credit institutions they considered 
to be such services of general 
economic interest. 
Based on the answers to this 
inquiry the Commission drew up 
the report which was presented to 
the ECOFIN Council at its 
meeting on 23.11.1998. In 
summary, the answers suggest a 
distinction between three types of 
activities which are consequently 
discussed in the report: 
1. the provision of a basic 
financial infrastructure which 
covers in full a certain 
territory, 
2. the fulfilment of certain 
specific tasks by credit 
institutions on behalf of a 
Member State and 
3. the raising of funds exclusively 
for the public authorities. 
1. A vast majority of the Member 
States do not consider the 
provision of a comprehensive 
and efficient financial 
infrastructure covering the 
entirety of a certain territory as 
service of general economic 
interest within the meaning of 
Art. 90(2) EC Treaty. (Only 
two Member States, Germany 
and Austria, entrust credit 
institutions with the task to 
provide a basic financial 
infrastructure covering a 
certain territory.) Furthermore, 
all Member States agree that 
such infrastructure can be and 
is provided by the credit 
institutions under market 
economy conditions. (Only 
Sweden compensates the 
Postbank for the extra costs of 
operating certain particular 
branches in remote areas.) 
Therefore, no exemptions from 
the competition rules seem 
necessary to ensure a 
comprehensive financial 
infrastructure within the 
Community. 
2. Special tasks performed by 
certain credit institutions on 
behalf of the state, e.g. social 
housing loans, might fall under 
Art. 90 (2). 
3. Fund raising activities of 
special institutions exclusively 
for non-commercial, non-
competitive public purposes 
should not pose problems 
under the competition rules of 
the Treaty if all repercussions 
on commercial activities are 
avoided. 
Based on the findings of the report 
the Commission will examine the 
compatibility of individual cases 
and systems under Art. 90 (2) on a 
case to case basis. 
Sweden - Measures in favour of 
employment and in favour of 
training. 
On December 16, the Commission 
has authorised two measures 
proposed by the Swedish 
government in favour of 
professional training and 
employment, considering that 
such measures do not constitute 
state aid. 
The aim of the approved measures 
is to provide an incentive for 
companies to take-on long-term 
unemployed persons. 
The first measure is a scheme in 
favour of employment which 
allows companies to receive 
support of up to 50% of the gross 
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salary of every long-term 
unemployed person they recruit. 
Long-term unemployed people are 
defined as people who have been 
unemployed for more than 12 
months and registered as 
unemployed by the public 
employment service. People who 
are less than 25 year old and who 
have been unemployed for more 
than 3 months are considered as 
"long-tem unemployed" as well. 
Support under the scheme is 
granted for a maximum period of 
6 months. If the duration of the 
employment contract is less than 
six months, support will only be 
provided for the duration of the 
contract. Companies have an 
obligation to provide training to 
these new personals, so that they 
gain professionally useful skills 
and become fully employable in 
the longer term. The subsidy will 
correspond to 50% gross of the 
salary which may not exceed SEK 
350 (€37.3) per day. 
This scheme also includes a 
provision to support employment 
of long-term unemployed people 
for up to 12 months when they are 
recruited for public investments or 
investments of social nature. 
When a public authority (fór 
instance a territorial 
administration) planning to make 
such an investment wishes to 
benefit from the scheme, it must 
first obtain the agreement of the 
County Employment Board, a 
central government agency in 
charge of administrating the 
scheme. Once the public authority 
in charge of the investment project 
has obtained this agreement, it 
will proceed with a call for tenders 
from companies wishing to carry 
out the investment project. This 
call for tender will indicate that 
companies winning the tender and 
thus obtaining a contract in 
connection with the public or 
social investment project will 
automatically receive employment 
subsidies for up to 12 months if 
they recruit long-term unemployed 
persons. This transparent 
procedure ensures that the only 
beneficiary of the employment aid 
for public investments or 
investments of social nature 
(besides the recruited persons 
themselves) is the promoter of the 
project, which is a public 
authority. 
In addition to the above described 
scheme in favour of 
unemployment, the Swedish 
government will implement a 
measure aimed at stimulating 
professional training of 
companies' staff. Companies may 
benefit from public support up to 
approximately €2130 for the 
training costs of each staff 
member, provided that they take-
on a long-term unemployed 
person as a substitute for every 
staff member sent for training. 
Neither the measure for 
employment nor the measure for 
training favours any specific 
sector. These measures do not 
contain any discrimination with 
regard to free movement of 
workers, services or free right of 
establishment. Both measures are 
unlimited in time, and would still 
be applied even if the actual 
expenses exceeded the foreseen 
budget. Furthermore, provided 
that the criteria set for the 
application of these measures are 
fulfilled, companies will be 
automatically eligible for public 
support. Therefore, the European 
Commission reached the 
conclusion that these measures are 
general in nature, and do not 
constitute state aid within the 
meaning of the EC Treaty. 
The Netherlands. - The 
Commission considered aid 
compensating for damage 
caused by extreme heavy rain in 
The Netherlands compatible 
with the common market. 
On December 9th the European 
Commission decided to consider 
the aid measure compensating for 
the damage caused by extreme 
heavy rain on September 13th and 
14th 1998 compatible with the 
common market. Purpose of the 
aid is to make partially good the 
damage caused by this natural 
disaster. 
The weather conditions on 13 and 
14 September 1998 in the damage 
area concerned have been 
exceptionally harsh: at least 100 
millimetre of rain has fallen in 
these two days, an event which 
according to the Dutch Royal 
Meteorological Institute occurs 
only once every 125 years. The 
water led to a disruption of the 
society in the areas hit by the 
water (parts of the Provinces Zuid-
Holland, Zeeland, Noord-Brabant 
en Zuid-Limburg). In Zuid-
Limburg several rivers overflowed 
their banks. In the remaining 
damage area, a "polder" area 
(below sea level), a strong wind 
coming from the sea made it 
impossible to drain the water to 
the sea - on the contrary, water 
was pushed inwards towards the 
land. The water management 
systems in the region failed, with 
the result that the level of the 
water table rose and the land 
52 Competition Policy Newsletter 1999 Number 1 February 
STATE AID 
became saturated from below. The 
consequences of this chain of 
events were therefore very similar 
to those which would have 
occurred had the land been 
flooded in the traditional sense. 
Therefore, the Commission 
considered this very unusual 
combination of geographical and 
climatic circumstances as a natural 
disaster. According to the Dutch 
authorities, thousands of 
households and over 5000 
companies have suffered losses 
because of this unexpected natural 
phenomenon. 
The aid scheme fixes the area that 
is hit by the flooding and settles 
the modalities, which determine 
the amount of the compensation to 
the victims. It concerns an one 
time only direct grant that 
compensates partially for the 
damage. This scheme applies to 
anybody or any institute (private 
households, lower government 
bodies, churches, companies, etc) 
that suffered damage. The amount 
of the loss will be valued by an 
independent expert and will be 
specified in a damage report. 
The Commission notes that the aid 
does not result in overcom-
pensation of damage. The Dutch 
authorities have confirmed that the 
calculation of the losses will be 
undertaken individually for each 
beneficiary, who will be expected 
to bear a proportion of the losses 
(own risk) themselves. The own 
risk for companies in relation to 
the amount of the loss is limited to 
NLG 10.000 (€ 4560). Only 
compensation will take place for 
costs, which are in principle not 
insurable, are not or could not 
have been compensated on 
another account and are not 
caused by own guilt or because 
the victim didn't take sufficient 
measures to prevent or to limit the 
damage. Furthermore, it is noted 
that no compensation will be 
granted if the amount of the loss is 
under the threshold of NLG 2000 
(€ 907.56) 
The costs of the aid measure are 
estimated between NLG 300 
million (€ 135 million) and NLG 
400 million (€ 180 million). The 
Commission considered the aid in 
line with Article 92 (2) b of the 
EC Treaty. According to Article 
92 (2) (b) of the Treaty Member 
States can grant State aid in order 
to make good the damage caused 
by natural disasters. 
Germany - Opening of the 
Article 93(2) procedure in 
respect of the shipyard 
Kvaerner Warnow Werft 
GmbH 
On 25 November the European 
Commission decided to open the 
Article 93(2) procedure in respect 
of the Eastern German shipyard 
Kvaerner Wamow Werft GmbH 
in order to examine the company's 
exceeding of an annual new ship-
building capacity limitation. 
Restructuring aid of DM 1 247 
million (€ 638 million) had been 
granted to this former GDR 
shipyard by means of several 
Commission decisions in 1993-
1995. The approval of the aid had 
been made subject to an annual 
new-building capacity limitation 
of 85 000 cgt. However the 
regular monitoring report of the 
yard (of 30.6.1998) indicated that 
production would be considerably 
in excess of this limit for 1998 and 
1999. Accordingly, as the 
conditions of the decisions had 
been breached, the aid could no 
longer be considered compatible 
with the common market pursuant 
to provisions of Directives 
92/68/EEC and 90/684/EEC on 
aid to shipbuilding. 
At Germany's request this matter 
was discussed at the Industry 
Council of 16 November 1998. 
Germany tried to get the Council 
to ask the Commission to review 
the interpretation of the capacity 
limit set in the Council Directive 
92/68/EEC. The Council's overall 
opinion was that the State aid 
rules and the Commission's 
decisions must be respected in 
full. 
Italie - Décision d'injonction 
dans le cadre de la procédure 
ouverte au titre de l'article 
93 § 2 du traité CE à l'égard de 
la société Seleco S.p.a. 
Le 2 décembre 1998, La 
Commission a pris une décision 
d'injonction imposant au 
Gouvernement italien de lui 
fournir toutes les informations 
nécessaires pour lui permettre de 
clore la procédure ouverte à 
l'égard des aides octroyées à 
plusieurs reprises à la société 
Seleco S.p.a. Celle-ci appartient 
au secteur de l'électronique 
(téléviseurs couleurs, décodeurs 
de programmes cryptés, 
projecteurs et moniteurs). 
La Commission s'apprêtait à clore 
par une décision partiellement 
négative la procédure qu'elle avait 
ouverte en 1994 à l'égard d'aides 
octroyées à Seleco lorsqu'elle 
apprit l'existence d'aides 
supplémentaires en faveur de cette 
dernière. Elle décida dès lors, en 
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janvier 1998, d'étendre la procé-
dure ouverte afin d'examiner 
l'intégralité des aides octroyées 
dans une même procédure. 
En septembre 1998, les autorités 
italiennes communiquèrent que la 
faillite de Seleco S.p.a avait été 
déclarée en avril 1997, c'est-à-dire 
10 mois avant l'extension de la 
procédure. Après avoir vainement 
tenté d'obtenir de la part des 
autorités italiennes les 
informations complémentaires, 
notamment concernant la 
procédure de liquidation en cours, 
qui lui sont nécessaires pour clore 
la procédure par une décision 
finale sur l'ensemble des aides en 
cause, la Commission a décidé de 
prendre la décision d'injonction 
précitée à l'égard du gouver-
nement italien. 
Allemagne - La Commission 
conclut que les dotations 
financières en faveur de la 
société Infraleuna Infra-
struktur und Service GmbH ne 
constituent pas des aides d'Etat 
tombant sous l'application de 
l'article 92 du traité CE 
La Commission, le 25 novembre, 
a clos la procédure au titre de 
l'article 93 §2 du traité CE qu'elle 
avait ouverte à l'égard de 
l'assistance financière que les 
autorités allemandes projettent 
d'octroyer à la société Infraleuna 
Infrastruktur und Service GmbH 
nouvellement créée, dans le Land 
de Sachsen Anhalt, sur le site du 
complexe chimique de Leuna dont 
les installations de production ont 
été privatisées et vendues à une 
centaine d'investisseurs différents. 
Infraleuna, dont la majorité des 
parts appartient au secteur public, 
a pour objet la réalisation et la 
gestion de l'ensemble des 
infrastructures du site au profit des 
entreprises qui s'y sont installées. 
Elle a également été chargée de 
l'assainissement du site dont 
l'exécution incombait aux 
autorités publiques, ces dernières 
ayant réalisé les terrains au prix du 
marché pour un site assaini. 
La Commission a constaté 
qu'étant donné l'impossibilité de 
trouver un investisseur privé pour 
les infrastructures, la création de 
Infraleuna constituait l'unique 
alternative à l'accomplissement de 
ces diverses tâches par les 
autorités publiques et que, dès 
lors, la dotation initiale en capital 
de cette dernière pour un montant 
de 1.018 millions de DEM (520,50 
millions d'€) ne constituait pas 
une aide d'Etat tombant sous 
l'application de l'article 92 § 1 du 
traité CE. Quoiqu'une partie, non 
quantifiable, de la subvention de 
150 millions de DEM (76,69 
millions d'€) en faveur de 
l'environnement constitue une 
aide d'Etat, celle-ci est néanmoins 
compatible avec les dispositions 
de l'encadrement des aides en 
faveur de l'environnement. La 
Commission a constaté également 
l'inexistence d'aides dans le chef 
des entreprises nouvellement 
installées sur le site, celles-ci 
rémunérant à un prix normal les 
services rendus par Infraleuna, 
rémunération qui assurera le 
financement ultérieur de cette 
dernière. 
La Commission a cependant 
imposé certaines conditions au 
gouvernement allemand, notam-
ment, quant à l'assurance que les 
services d'Infraleuna seront offerts 
à toutes les entreprises du site sans 
discrimination, quant à l'obliga-
tion d'exclure des subventions 
projetées celle d'un montant de 50 
millions de DEM (25,57 millions 
d'€) prévue au titre de 
compensation des pertes et quant 
au contrôle de l'utilisation des 
différentes subventions. 
France - La Commission prend 
une décision partiellement 
négative sur les aides octroyées 
illégalement depuis 1996 à la 
société Nouvelle Filature 
Lainière de Roubaix et en 
impose le remboursement à 
concurrence de plus de 15 
millions de FRF. 
La Commission a clos la procédure 
au titre de l'article 93 § 2 du traité 
CE qu'eue avait ouverte en 1997 et 
a décidé que les aides octroyées 
illégalement en 1996 pour la reprise 
des activités de l'ancien groupe 
Lainière de Roubaix par la 
l'entreprise nouvellement créée 
Nouvelle Filature Lainière de 
Roubaix, située dans la région du 
Nord-Pas-de-Calais, constituent en 
partie des aides incompatibles avec 
le marché commun. Ces aides ont 
été octroyées sans approbation par 
la Commission sous la forme d'une 
prime à l'investissement de 22 
millions de FRF (3,35 millions 
d'€) et d'un prêt participatif de 18 
millions de FRF (2,74 millions 
d'€). 
En ce qui concerne la subvention 
de 22 millions de FRF, octroyée 
pour la réalisation d'investis-
sements d'un coût de 22,2 millions 
de FRF, la Commission a conclu 
que seul pouvait se justifier, au 
titre d'aide régionale à 
l'investissement, un montant de 
7,77 millions de FRF (1,18 
millions d'€) correspondant au 
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plafond régional de 35 % pour les 
PME. 
Quant au prêt participatif de 18 
millions de FRF, la Commission a 
constaté que cette aide ne pouvait 
pas être approuvée en tant qu'aide 
au sauvetage ou à la restructuration 
d'une entreprise en difficulté, le 
gouvernement français n'ayant pas 
présenté à la Commission un plan 
de restructuration permettant de 
s'assurer de la viabilité à long terme 
de l'activité. D'autre part, étant 
donné qu'il couvre des coûts 
continus, le prêt comporte des 
aides au fonctionnement s'élevant 
au total à 1,46 million de FRF 
(0,22 million d'€), soit la 
différence entre le taux appliqué et 
le taux de référence applicable au 
moment du prêt. Ces aides ne 
peuvent pas être approuvées dans 
le cas présent étant donné que la 
Lainière de Roubaix est située 
dans une région assistée au titre de 
l'article 92(3)(c) alors que ce n'est 
que dans les régions assistées au 
titre de l'article 93 § 3 a) que de 
telles aides peuvent éventuel-
lement être autorisées. 
La Commission a dès lors décidé 
d'autoriser la partie de la 
subvention s'élevant à 7,77 
millions de FRF et d'imposer la 
suppression des autres aides par le 
remboursement de la somme de 
14,23 millions de FRF (2,74 
millions d'€) augmentée des 
intérêts et par l'application au prêt 
participatif d'un taux s'élevant au 
minimum au taux de référence de 
8,28 % applicable au moment de 
l'octroi de ce demier. 
Allemagne - La Commission 
interdit l'octroi de plusieurs 
aides nouvelles en faveur de la 
société Addinol Mineralöl 
GmbH i.GV (Addinol Old) et de 
la nouvelle société Addinol Lube 
Oil GmbH & Co. KG., tout en 
confirmant la compatibilité avec 
le marché commun d'aides 
antérieures. 
Le 25 novembre, la Commission a 
décidé de clore la procédure au titre 
de l'article 93 § 2 du traité CE 
qu'elle avait ouverte à l'égard de 
nouvelles aides en faveur de la 
société Addinol Mineralöl GmbH 
i.GV (Addinol Old) et de la 
nouvelle société Addinol Lube Oil 
GmbH & Co. KG., créée après 
l'ouverture d'une procédure en 
faillite à l'égard d'Addinol Old 
pour reprendre les activités de 
distribution de lubrifiants de cette 
dernière. Il s'agit d'aides déjà 
octroyées à concurrence de 7 
millions de DEM (3,58 millions 
d'€) et prévues pour un montant 
de 40,05 millions de DEM (20,48 
millions d'€). La Commission a 
constaté que ces aides ne 
respectent pas les prescriptions 
des lignes directrices pour les 
aides aux entreprises en difficulté, 
notamment en ce qui concerne la 
viabilité à long terme des 
bénéficiaires et la contribution des 
actionnaires privés qui, dans le cas 
présent, est notoirement 
insuffisante par rapport à celle de 
l'Etat. La Commission a dès lors 
imposé la récupération de l'aide 
de 7 millions de DEM, augmentée 
des intérêts compensatoires, et a 
interdit l'octroi des 40,05 millions 
de DEM projetés. 
Etant donné l'existence de ces 
nouvelles aides, la Commission 
avait également décidé de 
réexaminer la compatibilité des 
aides au sauvetage qu'elle avait 
précédemment approuvées en 
faveur de Addinol Old. Elle a 
conclu que la compatibilité de ces 
dernières ne devait pas être remise 
en cause. 
Germany - Commission does not 
approve illegal aid to the firm of 
the chemical sector Riedel-de 
Hacn and asks for repayment. 
The European Commission has 
not authorised state aid measures 
already granted by Germany to 
Riedel-de Haën on its investment 
in a residue processing plant. 
Germany provided grants of in 
total DEM 8 million (€ 4,09 
million). The Commission decided 
that the grants are not consistent 
with the current Community 
guidelines on State aid for 
environmental protection and are 
therefore incompatible with the 
common market. Consequently, 
the State aid must be abolished 
and repaid. 
Riedel-de Haën pursues its 
activities in the chemical sector 
and forms part of the US group 
AlliedSignal Inc. The production 
of the company causes a number 
of tonnes of liquid waste per year, 
which contains halogen 
hydrocarbon compounds 
(halogenhaltige Kohlenwasser-
stoffverbindungen). Up to date, 
the company has sold its liquid 
waste to waste disposal 
companies, which incinerated the 
waste in special waste incineration 
plants. In 1994, the company 
began to invest in a residue 
processing plant to dispose this 
liquid waste at the company's site. 
This plant is still not in service. 
Germany maintained that the aid 
was given to improve on 
mandatory standards and to 
provide a significant improvement 
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of the environment in the area 
where mandatory standards do not 
exist. However, Germany did not 
define the part of the investment, 
which was required to achieve a 
significant improvement of the 
environment. Accordingly, the 
Commission could not approve 
the grants as environmental aid 
since Germany has not 
demonstrated the existence of 
eligible costs. The grants are 
therefore not consistent with the 
current Community guidelines on 
State aid for environmental 
protection and are, consequently, 
pursuant to the environmental 
criteria, incompatible with the 
Common market. 
The Commission also assessed the 
project in accordance with the 
rules for a general investment. 
Riedel-de Haën is located outside 
the assisted areas and is a large 
undertaking. The Commission 
does not consider a general 
investment aid to a large 
undertaking to be compatible with 
the Common market. 
As there is no justification for this 
aid, it has to be regarded as 
adversely affecting trading 
conditions to art' extent contrary to 
the common interest. The aid 
would give Riedel-de Haën an 
unjustified advantage over its 
competitors on the market, which 
do not receive such aid. 
Consequently, the State aid must 
be abolished and repaid. 
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Organisation Mondiale du 
Commerce 
Pierre ARHEL, DG IV-A-3 
S'inspirant d'une proposition 
communautaire, (communication 
de la Commission au Conseil du 
18 juin 1996 "Vers l'établissement 
d'un cadre international de règles 
de concurrence", COM (96)284 ; 
comm. P. Arhel Rev. du Marché 
Commun n° 410, juil.-août 
1997), la première Conférence 
ministérielle de l'Organisation 
Mondiale du Commerce, qui 
s'est tenue à Singapour en 
décembre 1996, a chargé un 
groupe de travail d'"étudier les 
problèmes relatifs aux liens entre 
les échanges et la politique de la 
concurrence, y compris les 
pratiques anticoncurrentielles, 
afin d'identifier tous domaines qui 
mériteraient d'être examinés au 
sein de l'OMC". 
Après deux ans de discussions (la 
liste des contributions écrites 
produites par la Communauté et 
ses Etats membres a été publiée 
dans le précédent numéro de 
Competition Policy Newsletter), 
et conformément au mandat de 
Singapour, le groupe de travail a 
rendu un rapport comprenant 
deux parties : 
1) Une partie factuelle, reflétant la 
richesse des débats, notamment 
sur les liens entre la concurrence, 
les échanges et le développement. 
Cette partie fait notamment 
apparaître les éléments suivants : 
- Importance de la contribution 
qu'une politique active de 
concurrence peut apporter aux 
objectifs de promotion du 
commerce international 
poursuivis par l'OMC ; 
- Importance de la politique de 
concurrence pour le 
développement économique ; 
- Importance de la coopération 
entre autorités de contrôle. 
2) Une recommandation : 
"The Working Group shall 
continue the educative work that 
it has been undertaking pursuant 
to paragraph 20 of the Singapore 
Ministerial Declaration. In the 
light of the limited number of 
meetings that the Group will be 
able to hold in 1999, the Working 
Group while continuing at each 
meeting to base its work on the 
study of issues raised by Members 
relating to the interaction between 
trade and competition policy, 
including anti-competitive 
practices, would benefit from a 
focused discussion on: (i) the 
relevance of fundamental WTO 
principles of national treatment, 
transparency, and most-favoured-
nation treatment to competition 
policy and vice-versa (ii) 
approaches to promoting 
cooperation and communication 
among Members including in the 
field of technical cooperation; and 
(iii) the contribution of 
competition policy to achieving 
the objectives of the WTO, 
including the promotion of 
international trade. The Working 
Group will continue to ensure that 
the development dimension and 
the relationship with investment 
are fully taken into account. It is 
understood that this decision is 
without prejudice to any future 
decisions that might be taken by 
the General Council including in 
the context of its existing work 
programme." 
Le texte de cette recommandation 
est tout à fait satisfaisant pour la 
plupart des pays membres. D'une 
manière générale, la rédaction 
est bien équilibrée. A la grande 
satisfaction des USA, de la 
Communauté, du Brésil, du 
Canada, e tc . , un programme de 
travail, portant sur des questions 
de concurrence, a été établi. 
Cependant, le programme n'est 
pas exclusif, ce qui répond en 
grande partie aux préoccupations 
de pays tels que l'Inde, l'Egypte, 
le Mexique et le Pakistan : à 
chaque réunion n'importe quel 
pays membre pourra soulever 
des questions qui ne sont pas 
expressément prévues dans la 
liste, dès lors qu'elles relèvent du 
mandat de Singapour. 
Par ailleurs, conformément aux 
souhaits de la Communauté, la 
recommandation comprend une 
indication de calendrier ("In the 
light of the number of meetings 
(...) in 1999 ..."). Afin d'éviter 
toute interférence avec la 
préparation de la troisième 
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Conférence ministérielle, qui 
doit se tenir cette année aux 
USA (le Conseil Général de 
l'OMC devra notamment 
déterminer si les négociations du 
cycle du millénium pourront, 
comme le souhaite la 
Commission, être étendues au 
domaine de la concurrence), la 
Commission estime que le 
groupe devrait terminer ses 
travaux à la fin du mois de juillet 
au plus tard. 
Le 11 décembre, cette 
recommandation a été approuvée 
par le Conseil Général de l'OMC. 
Enlargement 
Maria BLÄSSAR and Joos STRAGI ER, DG IV-A-3 
Accession negotiations 
At the end of March 1998 
accession negotiations were 
opened with six candidate 
countries, i.e. Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Poland, 
Slovenia and Cyprus. These 
negotiations are part of a wider 
accession process comprising the 
ten Central and Eastern 
European applicant States 
(CEECs) and Cyprus. In April 
1998 the Commission started the 
analytical examination 
("screening") of the acquis 
communautaire simultaneously 
with the first six countries and 
with five countries (i.e. Bulgaria, 
Romania, Slovak Republic, 
Latvia and Lithuania) with 
which the opening of 
negotiations will take place at a 
later stage. 
On 9-19 October, the first six 
candidate countries participated 
in the screening of the 
competition chapter92. The 
objective of the exercise was to 
inform - during a day of 
multilateral screening (the 
explanatory section) - the 
applicants about the Community 
acquis and - at subsequent 
bilateral meetings (the 
exploratory sections) - to 
identify, within each applicant 
country, possible substantive 
problems that could arise during 
the accession negotiations 
proper. 
The Commission transmitted its 
screening reports to the Council 
at the end of last year. The six 
candidate countries have 
announced that they will submit 
their negotiation positions on 
competition in January of this 
year. In line with the intentions 
of the German Presidency, draft 
common positions on 
competition policy will be 
97 
Following a multilateral screening 
meeting on competition in May 1998, 
the five other CEECs will participate in 
bilateral screening meetings on 
competition in March-April 1999. 
prepared and presented by the 
Commission in March. 
If the screening results are 
confirmed, candidate countries 
will be asking for only a few 
transitional periods and it is 
expected that most of them will 
confirm that their legislation and 
implementation capacity will be 
ready at the date of accession. 
However, in the field of 
competition, it will be necessary 
for the Commission to conduct a 
general assessment of the ability 
of the candidates to withstand 
the competitive pressures of the 
internal market resulting from 
the full and direct application of 
the competition acquis upon 
accession. An essential factor of 
this assessment is whether the 
respective countries respect their 
obligations under the 
competition rules of the Europe 
Agreement, and in particular 
whether they have sufficiently 
aligned their legislation to the 
Community competition regime 
and have set up adequate 
enforcement structures. This 
again underlines the need to 
properly prepare for accession 
and to adapt progressively but 
decisively to the situation 
prevailing in the Community 
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well in advance of actual 
membership. 
Progress in alignment of 
competition rules 
The Commission agreed to 
report regularly to the European 
Council on progress made by 
each of the candidate countries 
towards accession. The first 
progress reports for the ten 
CEECs, Cyprus and Turkey 
were submitted at the end of 
1998. The reports take into 
consideration progress since the 
delivery of the Commission 
Opinions in 199793. 
In 1998, most of the CEECs took 
decisive steps to adopt or 
prepare new legislation, or 
amendments to existing 
legislation, in order to further 
align their legislation with 
Community law. This was 
certainly the case in the field of 
anti-trust. For example, new 
competition acts came into force 
in Hungary, Bulgaria, Estonia 
and Latvia. The competition 
authorities of the CEECs have 
further gained experience in the 
enforcement of the law. 
However, in general, there is still 
need to strengthen the 
competition authorities, in 
particular with regard to their 
investigative and fining powers, 
independence and resources. 
In contrast to anti-trust policy, 
the introduction of State aid 
control in the CEECs has proven 
to be much more controversial 
9 3 Competition Report 1997, paragraph 
323. 
and difficult to bring about. 
While a number of countries 
have started introducing or 
preparing rules on the control of 
State aid, all the countries still 
lag clearly behind the level that 
is required in the run-up for 
accession. The most urgent 
priority is to create transparency 
in the granting of State aid by 
establishing a State aid inventory 
of all existing direct and indirect 
aid. While during 1998 some 
CEECs provided reports to the 
Commission on the distribution 
and volume of aid to industry, 
the Commission has generally 
been critical of the lack of a 
comprehensive picture of the 
State aid situation in most 
CEECs. 
A second priority is the setting-
up or strengthening of an 
independent State aid monitoring 
authority, and of a system for 
implementing this monitoring. 
Most of the CEECs have now 
established such a monitoring 
authority. However, legal 
procedures and the necessary 
powers to ensure genuine control 
of new and existing State aid in 
these countries are still lacking. 
Finally, substantial progress is 
still needed with respect to 
approximation of substantive 
and procedural rules in this field 
in most of the countries. 
Joint training sessions on 
competition 
In view of these remaining 
shortcomings, technical 
assistance in the field of 
competition remains an essential 
tool to prepare the candidate 
countries for accession. While it 
is for the candidate countries 
themselves to devote the 
necessary resources to focused 
and cost-efficient 
implementation of competition 
law, Community assistance 
serves as a catalyst. 
The annual DG IV training for 
officials of the candidate 
countries, i.e. the Joint Training 
Sessions, was organised in 1998 
for the fourth time. The first 
session (16-20 November 1998) 
targeted the junior competition 
officials whereas during the 
second session (14-18 December 
1998) lectures were given to 
experienced officials. 
As to the themes raised during 
the Joint Training Sessions, it 
was relevant to focus on the 
obligations of the candidate 
countries both during the pre-
accession phase (i.e. under the 
Europe Agreements) as well as 
on those arising upon accession. 
The important link between pre-
accession and accession is now 
all the more apparent following 
the opening of the membership 
negotiations with five Central 
and Eastern European Countries 
(Estonia, Czech Republic, 
Hungary, Poland and Slovenia) 
and Cyprus in 1998 (see infra). 
Basically the substantive rules in 
the competition field under the 
Europe Agreements follow the 
criteria arising from Articles 85, 
86 and 92 of the EC Treaty. 
Despite the differences between 
procedural rules and institutional 
set-up during pre-accession and 
accession, it is becoming 
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increasingly important to 
underline the current obligations 
of the candidate countries. The 
more they comply with the 
Europe Agreements, the better 
they will prepare themselves for 
full membership. 
It was against this background 
that the training programmes 
were drafted. Since the gravest 
problems facing the candidate 
countries in the field of 
competition are those relating to 
State aid, the topics for the State 
aid sessions were chosen in an 
ambitious and careful manner. A 
lot of emphasis was put on issues 
that are of particular interest 
and/or relevance to the CEECs 
such as the notion of aid, State 
aid control mechanism under the 
Europe Agreement, set up of an 
inventory on existing aid and the 
preparation of the annual State 
aid report, regional aid, steel aid, 
restructuring and privatisation. 
Specific problems such as 
Special Economic Zones and 
fiscal aids were also discussed. 
The topics which were chosen 
for the anti-trust sessions 
included, among other things, 
merger control, abuse of 
dominant position, horizontal 
and vertical agreements, and 
competition in some specific 
sectors such as transport, 
financial services and 
telecommunications. 
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At the Competition Conference of the CEECs and the EC Commission in Bratislava on 26 May 1998 it was agreed, in 
order to strengthen awareness of competition enforcement in the CEECs, to create a special section in this Newsletter 
for contributions on competition issues from the CEECs. This is the first contribution of this kind. The articles in this 
section are delivered under the sole responsibility of the authors and the views expressed in these articles do not 
necessarily reflect those of the Commission or DG IV. 
HUNGARY : MATÁV / JÁSZ-TEL 
Concentration 
Gizella GYORKI, Senior Counsellor 
International Section, Hungarian Competition Office 
The Hungarian Telecommu-
nication joint stock company 
(hereinafter: MATÁV) notified 
to the Competition Office its 
intention of acquiring control 
over JÁSZ-TEL Telecommu-
nications Developing and 
Servicing joint stock company 
(hereinafter: JASZ-TEL) by 
buying 95 per cent of its shares. 
Activities of the Parties 
The main activity of MATÁV is 
operating public wired telephone 
services, and it has controlling 
right over 11 further 
undertakings (10 of them 
supporting MATÁV's operation 
and another one is a mobile 
phone operator). Its net turnover 
of the previous business year 
was more than HUF 200 billion. 
The majority shares of MATÁV 
is owned by MagyarCom that is 
controlled jointly by Ameritech 
and Deutsche Telecom. 
JÁSZ-TEL is a local operator of 
public wired phone service. Its 
net turnover of the previous 
business year was HUF 1.2 
billion. 
The Market 
Under concession contracts 
MATÁV acquired right of 
operating long distance domestic 
and international service as well 
as operating 36, out of 54, 
primer local public telephone 
services. The duration of the 
concession period is 25 years 
starting from December 1993, 
during the first 8 years of which 
MATÁV has an exclusive right. 
During this period the primer 
areas could connect exclusively 
through MATÁV's trunk 
network for the purpose of 
domestic long distance- and 
international calls. For the use of 
the trunk network primer areas 
pay charges set by law. 
JÁSZ-TEL also operates under 
concession contract in a local 
area for 25 years and, similarly 
to MATÁV, has an exclusive 
right for 8 years. 
In the year under review 76.7 per 
cent of the end users, linked to 
wired network, subscribed to 
MATÁV and only 0.8 per cent 
of them prescribed to JÁSZ-TEL 
and the market shares counted 
on the bases of incomes are also 
similar. 
From the date of expire of 
exclusivity several undertakings 
are expected to enter the market 
of service on linkage on trunk 
network. 
The Planned Transaction 
JÁSZ-TEL is jointly owned (50-
50 per cent) by Swisscom AG 
and KPN Telecom BV and they 
intended to sell their shares, 
altogether 95 per cent 47,5 per 
cent of each, to MATÁV which 
was the highest bidder. 
The Notification 
The undertakings concerned had 
obligation to notify the planned 
transaction as their aggregate 
net annual turnover exceeded the 
HUF 10 billion and the 
undertaking becoming integrated 
exceeded the HUF 500 million 
net turnover threshold in the 
previous business year, as it is 
defined in the Competition Act. 
Arguments of the Parties 
The parties concerned referred to 
the fact that they were not 
competitors as they were acting 
on different geographic markets 
therefore the concentration 
would not have any effect on the 
structure of the relevant market. 
They explained the advantages 
of the concentration in the 
following way: 
• considering the possibility of 
purchasing larger quantities 
after the transaction more 
efficient economic activities 
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would be performed by the 
parties, 
• in the present area of JÁSZ-
TEL operation the offered 
service would reach the level 
of MATÁV, both in quality 
and quantity, 
• after the transaction a more 
modern management and 
office system would be 
available, 
• JÁSZ-TEL would take over 
the present lower tariffs of 
MATÁV, 
• JÁSZ-TEL would introduce a 
registration of the actual time 
of telephone conversation on 
the bill one year before the 
legal obligation would be 
alive, 
• the deadline of exclusivity of 
JÁSZ-TEL would be 
advanced six months, equally 
to MATÁV's. 
■4 
Furthermore MATÁV argued 
that, after the expire of its 
exclusivity, its market share as 
well as its dominance 
prospectively will be reduced 
due to appearance of alternative 
networks and technical progress. 
Opinion of Third Parties 
According to the opinions of 
third parties, received by the 
Competition Office on its 
announcement, the concentration 
would strengthen the dominant 
position of MATÁV therefore 
limitation of competition and 
hindering the market entrance 
would be expected. In the view 
of these arguments the 
concomitant advantages of the 
transaction do not exceed the 
concomitant disadvantages. 
The Decision of the Competition 
Council 
Considering the present legal 
and market situation the 
Competition Council stated that 
the planned transaction does not 
have significant effect on the 
existing competition since, on 
the one hand the parties are 
operating on different 
geographic markets of wired 
telephone service, and the 
vertical link between JÁSZ-TEL 
and MATÁV (the trunk network 
used by JÁSZ-TEL is operated 
by MATÁV) does not harm 
competition either, on the other. 
The Competition Council, 
however, made a thorough 
examination of the liberalised 
market period after 2002 when 
MATÁV will not have exclusive 
rights and any undertakings 
which will own trunk network 
will be able to operate 
connection services. In the case 
of expiration of the exclusivity 
of the 54 undertakings operating 
in the country, in theory, several 
undertakings would be able to 
operate services for subscribers 
on the given territory. 
At present 80 per cent of the end 
users are clients of MATÁV on 
the wired telephone service 
which situation will not change 
considerably in the early period 
of the liberalised market. Due to 
the high cost of building up new 
networks and the difficulties of 
establishing new range of clients 
considerable problems for new 
market entrants are expected. 
On the market of local networks 
the dominant position of 
MATÁV is strengthened by the 
fact that it is acting not only on 
the market of service for end-
users but on the market of trunk 
network as well. 
The Competition Council 
emphasised that, similarly to EU 
Member States, in the liberalised 
period the Hungarian 
telecommunications will be 
governed by sectoral rules which 
protect against abusive market 
conducts. In its view, however, it 
is a substantial interest that 
MATÁV be dominant only to 
the slightest possible extant in 
the liberalised period, since it is 
more difficult to treat a dominant 
position ex post than hindering 
an increase of the market power 
ex ante. The Minister, 
supervising telecommunications, 
has not impeded the 
concentration but also expressed 
his concerns 
The Competition Council 
considered that the planned 
concentration strengthens the 
market power of MATÁV 
therefore it examined its 
concomitant advantages as well: 
• It pointed out that in the case 
of authorisation advantages 
are verifiable only on the 
local area of JÁSZ-TEL 
while disadvantages 
(strengthening of dominant 
position) appear on the whole 
territory of the country. 
• Cost savings resulting from 
the economies of scale. 
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followed by price reduction is 
advantageous for the end 
users of JÁSZ-TEL only, 
permanent advantages, 
however, could be assured 
only by the pressure of 
competition. 
Similarly, the improvement 
of the level of service must be 
the question of market 
pressure instead of an 
intention of undertakings. 
It did not consider as 
significant argument of the 
parties that the exclusivity of 
JÁSZ-TEL would expire 6 
month earlier. 
The Competition Council did 
not consider as very 
important the argument that 
JÁSZ-TEL, because of its 
poor economic efficiency, 
needs the concentration with 
MATÁV. There would be a 
more acceptable argument for 
the Competition Council if 
JÁSZ-TEL, indeed, would 
not be able to stay on the 
market anymore or if no other 
bids had been received. 
The Competition Council did not 
clear the planned transaction as 
it considered that the argued 
advantages did not outweigh the 
disadvantages of the increasing 
dominance. 
The parties did not appeal 
against the decision therefore it 
take effect. 
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DG IV staff list 
Directeur général 
Directeur général adjoint 
plus particulièrement chargé des Directions C et D 
Directeur général adjoint 
plus particulièrement chargé des Directions E et F 
Directeur général adjoint 
plus particulièrement chargé des Directions G et H 
Conseiller pour les réformes 
Conseiller auditeur 
Conseiller auditeur 
Assistants du Directeur général 
directement rattachés au Directeur général : 
1. Personnel, Budget, Administration, Information 
2. Questions informatiques 
DIRECTION A 
Politique de concurrence, Coordination, Affaires 
Internationales et relations avec les autres Institutions 
Conseiller 
Conseiller 
1. Politique générale de la concurrence, 
aspects économiques et juridiques 
Chef adjoint d'unité 
2. Projets législatifs et réglementaires ; 
relations avec les Etats membres 
Chef adjoint d'unité 
3. Affaires internationales 
Chef adjoint d'unité 
DIRECTION Β 
Task Force "Contrôle des opérations 
de concentration entre entreprises" 
Télécopieur central : 295 01 28 
Alexander SCHAU Β 
Jean-François PONS 
Gianfranco ROCCA 
Asger PETERSEN 
Helmut SCHRÖTER 
Roger D AOÛT 
Henrik MØRCH 
Irène SOUKA 
Guido VERV AET 
Jonathan FA ULL 
Juan RIVIÈRE MARTI 
Georges ROUNIS 
Kirtikumar MEHTA 
Emil PAULIS 
Paolo CESARINI 
Yves DEVELENNES 
GòtzDRAUZ 
1. Unité opérationnelle I 
2. Unité opérationnelle II 
3. Unité opérationnelle III 
4. Unité opérationnelle IV 
Télécopieur du Greffe Concentrations 
Claude RAKOVSKY 
Wolfgang MEDERER 
Paul MALRIC SMITH 
DIRECTION C 
Information, communication, multimédias 
1. Télécommunications et Postes 
Coordination Société d'information 
­ Cas relevant de l'Article 85/86 
­ Directives de libéralisation, cas article 90 
2. Médias, éditions musicales 
Chef adjoint d'unité 
3. Industries de l'information, électronique de divertissement Fin LOMHOLT 
John TEMPLE LANG 
Herbert UNGERER 
Suzette SCHIFF 
Christian HOCEPIED 
Anne-Margrete WACHTMEISTER 
Eric VAN GINDERACHTER 
2952387/2954576 
2994423/2962284 
2951152/2951139 
2955569/2958566 
2951196/2960246 
2965383 
2950766/2967532 
2957206/2995988 
1959224/2951305 
2958658/2957689 
2951146/2960699 
2953404 
2957389/2995470 
2965033/2955894 
2951590/2966861 
2958681/2952965 
2964301/2967244 
2955389/2962368 
2953584 
2955571/2954512 
2968623/2968622 
2957657/2995365 
2960427 
2953895/2963904 
2954427 
2955619/2951150 
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DIRECTION D 
Services 
1. Services financiers (banques, assurances) 
2. Transports et infrastructures des transports 
3. Commerce et autres services 
Humbert DRABBE 
Luc GYSELEN 
Serge DURANDE 
Jorma PIHLATIE 
2950060/2952701 
2961523/2959987 
2957243/2954623 
2953607/2960256 
DIRECTION E 
Industries de base et énergie 
1. Acier, métaux non ferreux, produits minéraux non 
métalliques, bâtiment, bois, papier, verre 
Produits chimiques de base et transformés, 
caoutchouc 
Energie et eau 
Cartels et Inspections 
Chef adjoint d'unité notamment chargé des Cartels 
Angel TRADACETE 
Maurice GUERRIN 
Wouter PIEKE 
Julian JOSHUA 
2952462/2953596 
2951817/2951816 
2959824/2956422 
2955519 
DIRECTION F 
Industries des biens d'équipement 
et de consommation 
1. Industries mécaniques et électriques et industries diverses 
2. Automobiles, autres moyens de transport 
et construction mécanique connexe 
3. Produits agricoles, alimentaires, pharmaceutiques, 
textiles et autres biens de consommation 
Sven NORBERG 
Franco GIUFFRIDA 
Dieter SCHWARZ 
Jürgen MENSCHING 
2952178/2965550 
2956084/2950663 
2951880/2950479 
2952224/2995276 
DIRECTION G 
Aides d'Etat I 
Conseiller 
1. Politique des aides d'Etat 
Chef adjoint d'unité 
2. Aides horizontales 
3. Aides à finalité régionale 
Chef adjoint d'unité 
4. Analyses, inventaires et rapports 
DIRECTION H 
Aides d'Etat II 
1. Acier, métaux non ferreux, mines, construction 
navale, automobiles et fibres synthétiques 
Chef adjoint d'unité 
2. Textiles, papier, industrie chimique, pharmaceutique, 
électronique, construction mécanique et autres 
secteurs manufacturiers 
Chef adjoint d'unité 
3. Entreprises publiques et services 
Task Force 'Aides dans les nouveaux Länder' 
Michel PETITE 
Anne HOUTMAN 
Jean-Louis COLSON 
Loretta DORMAL-MARINO 
Klaus-Otto JUNGINGER-DITTEL 
Reinhard WALTHER 
Martin POWER 
Cecilio MADERO VILLAREJO 
Ronald FELTKAMP 
Conrado TROMP 
2965052 
2959628/2960562 
2960995/2962526 
2958603/2952521 
2960376/2965071 
2958434 
2955436 
2960949/2955900 
2954283/2967987 
2960286 
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Documentation... 
This section contains details of recent speeches or articles given 
by Community Officials that may be of interest. Copies of these 
are available from DG IV's home page on the World Wide Web. 
Future issues of the newsletter will contain details of conferences 
on competition policy which have been brought to our attention. 
Organisers of conferences that wish to make use of this facility 
should refer to page 1 for the address of DG IV's Information 
Officer. 
SPEECHES AND ARTICLES 
La politique européenne de 
concurrence et l'audiovisuel : 
ententes, alliances et concentrations 
­ PONS ­ LEGAL EUROPE ­ Paris 
­21/01/99 
Some views on pricing and EC 
competition policy ­ MARTINEZ 
LOPEZ ­ Conférence "Legal 
Challenges of Pricing" ­ Norton 
Rose­7/12/98 
L'application du droit 
communautaire de la concurrence et 
le contrôle des concentrations et des 
alliances dans l'audiovisuel ­
AUBEL ANTOINE ­ Centre 
Français du Commerce Extérieur ­
1/12/98 
Der wettbewerbliche Binnenmarkt 
für Strom und Gas Zur Rolle von 
Art.90 Abs.2 EGV ­ SCHAUB 
/DOHMS ­ Die Aktiengesellschaft 
(AG)­issue 12/1998­1/12/98 
Ensuring efficient access to 
bottleneck network facilities. The 
case of telecommunica­tions in the 
european Union ­ UNGERER ­
Competition Workshop ­ Florence ­
13/11/98 
Extension of EU air transport 
competition rules to air transport to 
and from the EU ­ DRABBE ­
European Air Law Association 
annual conference 
6/11/98 
Vienna 
After Taca? Towards a more 
Competitive and Innovative Liner 
Shipping Market ­ PONS ­
European Shippers' Council 
Barcelona­29/10/98 
Universal postal service in Europe 
and the future of the social dialogue 
­ UNGERER ­ European Union 
Joint Postal Committee ­ Brussels ­
29/10/98 
EC Competition System ­ Proposals 
for Reform ­ SCHAUB ­
FORDHAM CORPORATE LAW 
INSTITUTE ­ New York ­ 22/10/98 
Antitrust and Trade Policy ­ Round 
Table: Proposed answers to 
Professor Jenny's questions 
FAULL ­ Fordham Corporate Law 
Institute ­ New York ­ 22/10/98 
Comisión de libre competencia y 
asuntos del Consumidor ­ RIVIERE 
MARTÍ ­ Congreso Internado 
Sobre Competencia ­ Panama ­
6/10/98 
La politique européenne de 
concurrence : tendances récentes et 
nouveaux défis ­ PONS ­ 7ø 
Encontro Nacional de Economia 
Industrial ­ Vila Real ­ 2/10/98 
Intervention de M. Karel Van Miert, 
commissaire en charge de la 
politique de concurrence, devant la 
commission écnomique et 
monétaire du Parlement européen ­
VAN MIERT ­ European Parlament 
­ Bruxelles ­ 24/09/98 
COMMUNITY PUBLICATIONS ON 
COMPETITION 
LEGISLATION 
Competition law in the European 
Communities-Volume IA-Rules 
applicable to undertakings 
Situation at 30 june 1994; this 
publication contains the text of all 
legislative acts relevant to Articles 
85, 86 and 90. 
Cat. No: CM­29­93­A01­xx­C 
(xx=language code: ES, DA, DE, 
GR, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT). 
Competition law in the European 
Communities-Addendum to Volume 
ΙΑ-Rules applicable to undertakings 
Situation at 1 March 1995. 
Cat. No: CM­88­95­436­xx­C 
(xx=language code: ES, DA, DE, 
GR, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT). 
Competition law in the European 
Communities- Volume IIA-Rules 
applicable to State aid 
Situation at 31 December 1994; this 
publication contains the text of all 
legislative acts relevant to Articles 
42, 77, 90, 92 to 94. 
Cat. No: CM­29­93­A02­xx­C 
(xx=language code: ES, DA, DE, 
GR, EN, FR, IT, NL, PT). 
Competition law in the EC-Volume 
II B-Explanation of rules applicable 
to state aid 
Situation at December 1996 
Cat. No: CM­03­97­296­xx­C 
(xx=language code= FR; les autres 
versions suivront) 
Competition law in the European 
Communities-Volume IIIA-Rules in 
the international field- Situation at 
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31 December 1996 (Edition 1997) 
Cat. No: CM-89-95-858-xx-C xx= 
language code: ES, DA, DE, GR, 
EN, FR, IT, NL, PT, SV, FI) 
Merger control in the European 
t/m'o«-Situation in March 1998 
Cat. No: CV-15-98-899-xx-C 
(xx=language code: EN, FR; the 
other versions will be available 
later). 
Brochure concerning the 
competition rules applicable to 
undertakings as contained in the 
EEA agreement and their 
implementation by the EC 
Commission and the EFTA 
surveillance authority. 
Cat. No: CV-77-92-118-EN-C 
OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS 
Dealing with the Commission 
(Edition 1997)-Notifications, 
complaints, inspections and fact-
finding, powers under Articles 85 
and 86 of the EEC Treaty 
Cat. No: CV-95-96-552-xx-C (xx= 
FR, ES, EN, DE, NL, IT, PT, SV, 
DA, FI) 
Green paper on vertical restraints 
in EC competition policy -COM 
(96) 721-(Ed. 1997) 
Cat. No: CB-CO-96-742-xx-C (xx= 
ES DA DE GR EN FR IT NL PT 
SV FI) 
Final report of the multimodal 
group - Presented to Commissioner 
Van Miert by Sir Bryan Carsberg, 
Chairman of the Group (Ed. 1997). 
Cat. No: CV-11-98-803-EN-C 
The institutional framework for the 
regulation of telecommunications 
and the application of EC 
competition rules 
Final Report (Forrester Norall & 
Sutton). 
Cat. No: CM-94-96-590-EN-C 
Competition aspects of access 
pricing-Report to the European 
Commission 
December 1995 (M. Cave, P. 
Crowther, L. Hancher). 
Cat. No: CM-94-96-582-EN-C 
Community Competition Policy in 
the Telecommunications Sector 
(Vol. I: July 1995; Vol. II: March 
1997)-volumeIIB 
a compedium prepared by DG IV-
C-l; it contains Directives under art 
90, Decisions under Regulation 17 
and under the Merger Regulation as 
well as relevant Judgements of the 
Court of Justice. - Copies available 
through DG IV-C-1 (tel. +322-
2968623, 2968622, fax +322-
2969819). 
Brochure explicative sur les 
modalités d'application du 
Règlement (CE) Nø 1475/95 de la 
Commission concernant certaines 
catégories d'accords de distribution 
et de service de vente et d'après 
vente de véhicules automobiles -
Copies available through DG IV-F-
2 (tel. +322-2951880, 2950479, fax. 
+322-2969800) EN, FR, DE 
COMPETITION REPORTS 
XXVII Report on Competition 
Policy 1997 
Cat. No: CM-12-98-506-xx-C 
European Community on 
Competition Policy 1997 
Cat. No: Cv-12-98-263-XX-C (xx= 
FR, ES, EN, DE, NL, IT, PT, SV, 
DA, FI) 
XXVI Report on Competition Policy 
1996 
Cat. No: CM-04-97-242-xx-C 
European Community Competition 
Policy 1996 
Cat. No: CM-03-97-967-xx-C (xx= 
ES*, DA*, DE*, GR*, EN*, FR*, 
IT*, NL*, PT*, FI*, SV*) 
XXV Report on Competition Policy 
1995 
Cat. No: CM-94-96-429-xx-C 
(xx=ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT, 
NL, PT) 
European Community Competition 
Policy 1995 
Cat. No: CM-94-96-421-xx-C (xx= 
ES*, DA*, DE*, GR*, EN*, FR*, 
IT*, NL*, PT*, FI*, SV*) 
XXIV Report on competition policy 
1994 
Cat. No: CM-90-95-283-xx-C 
(xx=ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT, 
NL, PT, SV, FI) 
European Community competition 
policy 1994 
Cat. No.: CV-88-95-202-xx-C 
(xx=ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT, 
NL, PT, SV, FI ). Copies available 
through Cellule Information DG IV 
XXIIIe Report on competition policy 
1993 
Cat. No: CM-82-94-650-xx-C 
(xx=ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT, 
NL, PT) 
XXIIe Report on competition policy 
1992 
Cat. No: CM-76-93-689-xx-C 
(xx=ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT, 
NL, PT) 
XXIe Report on competition policy 
1991 
Cat. No: CM-73-92-247-xx-C (xx= 
ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT, NL, 
PT) 
Sixth survey on State aid in the 
European Union in the 
manufacturing and certain other 
sectors (Edition 1998) 
Cat. No: CV-18-98-704-xx-C (xx= 
ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT, NL, 
PT, SV, FI ) 
Fifth survey on State aid in the 
European Union in the 
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manufacturing and certain other 
sectors (Edition 1997) 
Cat. No: CV-06-97-901-xx-C (xx= 
ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT, NL, 
PT, SV, FI ) 
4ième rapport sur les aides dEtat 
dans l'Union Européenne dans le 
secteur des produits manufacturés 
et certains autres secteurs 
Cat. No: CM-92-95-368-xx-C 
(xx=ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT, 
NL, PT, SV, FI) 
OTHER DOCUMENTS and 
STUDIES 
The application of articles 85 & 86 
of the EC Treaty by national courts 
in the Member States 
Cat. No: CV-06-97-812-xx-C (xx= 
FR, DE, EN, NL, IT, ES, PT) 
Examination of current and future 
excess capacity in the European 
automobyle industry - Ed. 1997 
Cat. No: CV-06-97-036-EN-C 
Video : Fair Competition in 
Europe-Examination of current 
Cat. No: CV-ZV-97-002-xx-V (xx= 
ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT, NL, 
PT, FI, SV) 
Communication de la Commission: 
Les services d'intérêt général en 
Europe {Ed. 1996) 
Cat. No: CM-98-96-897-xx-C xx= 
DE, NL, GR, SV 
Study of exchange of confidential 
information agreements and treaties 
between the US and Member States 
of EU in areas of securities, 
criminal, tax and customs (Ed. 
1996) 
Cat. No: CM-98-96-865-EN-C 
Survey of the Member State 
National Laws governing vertical 
distribution agreements (Ed. 1996) 
Cat. No: CM-95-96-996-EN-C 
Services de télécomunication en 
Europe: statistiques en bref, 
Commerce, services et transports, 
1/1996 
Cat. No: CA-NP-96-OOl-xx-C 
xx=EN, FR, DE 
Report by the group of experts on 
competition policy in the new trade 
order [COM(96)284 fin.] 
Cat. No: CM-92-95-853-EN-C 
New industrial economics and 
experiences from European merger 
control: New lessons about 
collective dominance ? (Ed. 1995) 
Cat. No: CM-89-95-737-EN-C 
Proceedings of the European 
Competition Forum (coédition with 
J. Wiley)-Ed. 1996 
Cat. No: CV-88-95-985-EN-C 
Competition Aspects of 
Interconnection Agreements in the 
Telecommunications Sector (Ed. 
1995) 
Cat. No: CM-90-95-801-EN-C 
Proceedings of the 2nd EU/Japan 
Seminar on competition (Ed. 1995) 
Cat. No: CV-87-95-321- EN-C. 
Bierlieferungsverträge in den neuen 
EU-Mitgliedstaaten Österreich, 
Schweden und Finnland - Ed. 1996 
Cat. No: CV-01-96-074-DE-C DE 
Surveys of the Member States' 
powers to investigate and sanction 
violations of national competition 
laws{Eà. 1995) 
Cat. No: CM-90- 95-089-EN-C 
Statistiques audiovisuelles: rapport 
1995 
Cat. No: CA-99-56-948-EN-C 
Information exchanges among firms 
and their impact on competition 
(Ed. 1995) 
Cat. No: CV-89-95-026-EN-C 
Impact of EC funded R&D 
programmes on human resource 
development and long term 
competitiveness (Ed. 1995) 
Cat. No: CG-NA-15-920-EN-C 
Competition policy in the new trade 
order: strengthening international 
cooperation and rules (Ed. 1995) 
Cat. No: CM-91-95-124-EN-C 
Forum consultatif de la 
comptabilité: subventions publiques 
(Ed. 1995) 
Cat. No: C 184 94 735FRC 
Les investissements dans les 
industries du charbon et de l'acier 
de la Communauté: Rapport sur 
l'enquête 1993 (Ed. 1995) 
Cat. No: CM 83 94 2963 A C 
Study on the impact of liberalization 
of inward cross border mail on the 
provision of the universal postal 
service and the options for 
progressive liberalization (Ed. 
1995) Final report, 
Cat. No: CV-89-95-018-EN-C 
Meeting universal service 
obligations in a competitive 
telecommunications sector (Ed. 
1994) 
Cat. No: CV-83-94-757-EN-C 
Competition and integration: 
Community merger control policy 
(Ed. 1994) 
Cat. No: CM-AR-94-057-EN-C 
Growth, competitiveness, employ-
ment: The challenges and ways 
forward into the 21st century: White 
paper(Ed. 1994) 
Cat. No: CM 82 94 529 xx C 
(xx=ES, DA, DE, GR, EN, FR, IT, 
NL, PT) 
Growth, competitiveness, employ-
ment: The challenges and ways 
forward into the 21st century: White 
paper (Ed. 1993)-Volume 2 Part C 
68 Competition Policy Newsletter ***** 
* * ** ** *** c ^ 1999 Number 1 February 
INFORMATION SECTION 
Cat. No: CM-NF-93-0629 A C 
The geographical dimension of 
competition in the European single 
market (Ed. 1993) 
Cat. No: CV-78-93-136-EN-C 
International transport by air, 1993 
Cat. No: CA-28-96-001-xx-C 
xx=EN, FR, DE 
Les investissements dans les 
industries du charbon et de l'acier 
de la Communauté: Enquête 1992 
(Ed. 1993) 
9 languages 
Cat. No: CM 76 93 6733 A C 
EG Wettbewerbsrecht und 
Zulieferbeziehungen der 
Automobilindustrie (Ed. 1992) 
Cat. No: CV-73-92-788-DE-C 
Green Paper on the development of 
the single market for postal 
services, 9 languages 
Cat. No: CD-NA-14- 858-EN-C 
IN THE OFFICIAL PUBLISHED 
JOURNAL 
1st October 98 to 
31st January 99 
ARTICLES 85, 86 (RESTRICTIONS 
AND DISTORTIONS OF COMPETITIO 
BY UNDERTAKINGS) 
30/01/99 
L 24 1999/L 024-001 Commission 
Decision of 21 October 1998 
relating to a proceeding under 
Article 85 of the EC Treaty (Case 
No IV/35.691/E-4: - Pre-Insulated 
Pipe Cartel) (Notified under number 
C(1998)3117)... 
29/01/99 
C 24 1999/C 024/10 Application for 
negative clearance and notification 
for exemption (Case No IV/36.551 -
Financial Times Information Ltg, 
Dow Jones Information Publishing 
Inc. and Knight Ridder Business 
Information Inc. (now Dialog 
Corporation pic))... 
28/01/99 
C 23 1999/C 023/05 Notification of 
a cooperation agreement (Case No 
IV/F-2/37.145 - MTU/Volvo Aero) 
23/01/99 
C 20 1999/C 020/12 Judgment of 
the Court (Sixth Chamber) of 26 
November 1998 in Case C-7/97 
(reference for a preliminary ruling 
from the Oberlandesgericht Wien): 
Oscar Bronner GmbH & Co. KG v. 
Mediaprint Zeitungs- und 
Zeitschriftenverlag GmbH & Co. 
KG, Mediapri... 
C 19 1999/C 019/04 Commission 
notice pursuant to Article 19(3) of 
Council Regulation No 17 
concerning case No IV/37.123 -
MetroHoldings Limited... 
12/01/99 
C 8 1999/C 008/04 Notification of a 
cooperation agreement (Case 
IV/37.310-Lorelei)... 
9/01/99 
C 6 1999/C 006/07 Case No 
IV/37.214 - DFB - Central 
marketing of TV and radio 
broadcasting rights for certain 
football competitions in Germany ... 
C 6 1999/C 006/06 Commission 
notice pursuant to Article 19(3) of 
Council Regulation No 17 
concerning track access agreements 
for the Channel Tunnel rail link 
(CTRL) (Case No IV/D2/37.289) 
8/01/99 
L 4 1999/L 004-027 Commission 
Decision of 14 December 1998 
relating to a proceeding under 
Article 85 of the EC Treaty 
(IV/35.280 - Sicasov) (notified 
under document number C(1998) 
3452) 
30/12/98 
L 354 98/L 354-022 Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 2843/98 of 22 
December 1998 on the form, 
content and other details of 
applications and notifications 
provided for in Council Regulations 
(EEC) No 1017/68, (EEC) No 
4056/86 and (EEC) No 3975/87 
applying the rules on competition 
L 354 98/L 354-018 Commission 
Regulation (EC) No 2842/98 of 22 
December 1998 on the hearing of 
parties in certain proceedings under 
Articles 85 and 86 of the EC Treaty 
19/12/98 
C 396 98/C 396/06 Commission 
notice pursuant to Article 12(2) of 
Council Regulation (EEC) No 
4056/86 concerning Case No 
IV/36.844 - POLFIN ... 
15/12/98 
C 390 98/C 390/07 Initiation of 
proceedings (Case No IV/JV.15 -
BT/AT& T) ... 
9/12/98 
C 382 98/C 382/06 Notice 
published pursuant to Article 19(3) 
of Council Regulation No 17 
concerning case F.1/36.718.CECED 
5/12/98 
C 378 98/C 378/01 Judgment of the 
Court (Fifth Chamber) of 1 October 
1998 in Case C-279/95 P: 
Langnese-Iglo GmbH v. 
Commission of the European 
Communities, supported by Mars 
GmbH (Competition - Article85(l) 
of the EC Treaty - Exclusive 
purchasing agreements for ice-cr ... 
1/12/98 
C 371 98/C 371/05 Notification of 
an agreement on terminal dues 
between postal operators (Case No 
IV/36.748)... 
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28/11/98 
C 369 98/C 369/02 Communication 
pursuant to Article 5 of Council 
Regulation (EEC) No 3976/87 of 14 
December 1987 on the application 
of Article 85(3) of the Treaty to 
certain categories of agreements and 
concerted practices in the transport 
sector... 
26/11/98 
C 365 98/C 365/07 Proposal for a 
Council Regulation (EC) amending 
Regulation No 17: First Regulation 
implementing Articles 85 and 86 of 
the Treaty ... 
C 365 98/C 365/04 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/JV.12 - Motorola/Ericsson/ 
Nokia/Psion)... 
C 365 98/C 365/03 Communication 
from the Commission on the 
application of the Community 
competition rules to vertical 
restraints (Follow-up to the Green 
Paper on Vertical Restraints)... 
21/11/98 
C 358 98/C 358/08 Judgment of the 
Court (Second Chamber) of 1 
October 1998 in Case C-38/97 
(reference for a preliminary ruling 
from the Giudice di Pace di 
Genova): Autotrasporti Librandi 
Sne di Librandi F. & C. v. Cuttica 
Spedizioni e Servizi Internazionali 
Sri (C ... 
17/11/98 
C 348 98/C 348/05 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/JV.13 - Wintershall/ 
EnBW/MW/WV/DEO) 
10/11/98 
C 342 98/C 342/04 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
N0IV/JV.I5-BT/AT&T) 
7/11/98 
C 340 98/C 340/26 Judgment of the 
Court of First Instance of 15 
September 1998 in Joined Cases T-
374/94, T-375/94, T-384/94 and T-
388/94: European Night Services 
Ltd (ENS) and Others v. 
Commission of the European 
Communities (Competition 
Transport by rail - Agreements on 
C 339 98/C 339/03 Notice pursuant 
to Article 19(3) of Council 
Regulation No 17 concerning case 
IV/36.213/F-2 - General Electric 
Aircraft 
4/11/98 
C 336 Notification of licensing 
arrangements (Case No IV/37.156 -
Draxis/Pfizer) 
31/10/98 
C 334 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/JV.14 -
PanAgora/DG Bank) 
27/10/98 
C 329 Application for negative 
clearance and notification for 
exemption (Case No IV/37.161 
Financial Times/Goldman Sachs) 
24/10/98 
C 327 Judgment of the Court of 
First Instance of 16 September 1998 
in Joined Cases T-133/95 and T-
204/95: International Express 
Carriers Conference (IECC) v 
Commission of the European 
Communities 
C 327 Judgment of the Court of 
First Instance of 16 September 1998 
in Case T-110/95 international 
Express Carriers Conference (IECC) 
v Commission of the European 
Communities (Competition Remail 
- Action for annulment - Partial 
rejection of a complaint) 
C 327 Judgment of the Court of 
First Instance of 16 September 1998 
in Case T-28/95: International 
Express Carriers Conference (IECC) 
v Commission of the European 
Communitie (Competition Remail -
Action for annulment - Partial 
rejection of a complaint) 
23/10/98 
C 325 Commission notice 
concerning the alliance agreements 
between Air France and Continental 
Airlines (Case IV/36.314) and Air 
France and Delta Airlines (Case 
IV/36.315) 
21/10/98 
C 322 Notice pursuant to Article 
19(3) of Council Regulation No 17 -
Case IV/30.373/D-1 - P& I clubs -
International Group Agreement 
C 322 Notice published under 
Article 19(3) of Council Reg. No 17 
concerning an application for 
negative clearance or an individual 
decision to grant an exemption 
pursuant to Article 85(3) of the EC 
Treaty (Case No IV/36.539 - BiB) 
C 322 Notification of agreements 
concerning joint research and 
development (Case No IV/37.239 -
Ballard Power Systems Inc., 
Daimler Benz AG and Ford Motor 
Company) 
10/10/98 
C 311 Notification of agreements 
(Case No IV/37.207/F3 - Searle + 
Pfizer) 
CONTROL OF CONCENTRATIONS / 
MERGER PROCEDURE 
30/01/99 
C 25 1999/C 025/05 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/M. 1410 - Deutsche 
Post/Danzas)... 
C 25 1999/C 025/04 Non-opposition 
to a notified concentration (Case No 
IV/M. 1387 
Lufthansa/Menzies/Sigma AT 
Manchester)... 
C 25 1999/C 025/03 Non-opposition 
to a notified concentration (Case No 
IV/M. 1335 - Dana/Glacier 
Vandervell)... 
29/01/99 
C 24 1999/C 024/11 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
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No IV/M. 1419 - Groupe 
Cofinoga/BNP)... 
C 24 1999/C 024/09 Non-opposition 
to a notified concentration (Case No 
IV/M. 1334 - Volvo 
Aero/ABB/TurboGen)... 
27/01/99 
C 22 1999/C 022/04 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/M. 1365 - Vivendi/FCC)... 
C 22 1999/C 022/03 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/M. 1397 - Sanofi/Synthelabo) 
23/01/99 
C 19 1999/C 019/06 Non-opposition 
to a notified concentration (Case No 
IV/M. 1325 - Bayer/Chiron 
Diagnostics)... 
C 19 1999/C 019/05 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/M. 1403 - Astra/Zeneca)... 
22/01/99 
C 17 1999/C 017/04 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/M. 1405 - TNT Post 
Group/Jet Services)... 
C 17 1999/C 017/03 Non-opposition 
to a notified concentration (Case No 
IV/M. 1298 - Kodak/Imation)... 
C 17 1999/C 017/02 Non-opposition 
to a notified concentration (Case No 
IV/M. 1256 - OK Ekonomisk 
Förening/Kuwait Petroleum Sverige 
AB)... 
21/01/99 
C 16 1999/C 016/08 Non-opposition 
to a notified concentration (Case No 
IV/M. 1135 - ELF/Texaco/Antifreze 
JV)... 
C 16 1999/C 016/07 Non-opposition 
to a notified concentration (Case No 
IV/M. 1200 - Arco/Union Texas)... 
C 16 1999/C 016/09 Renotification 
of a previously notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M. 1377 
- Bertelsmann/Wissenschaftsverlag 
Springer)... 
20/01/99 
C 15 1999/C 015/02 Re-notification 
of a previously notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M. 1347 
- Deutsche Post/Securicor)... 
19/01/99 
C 14 1999/C 014/06 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/M. 1367 - Inchcape Holdings 
Hellas/EFG Eurobank)... 
16/01/99 
C 12 1999/C 012/04 Re-notification 
of a previously notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M. 1418 
- SCA Packaging/Rexam)... 
C 12 1999/C 012/03 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/M. 1357 
Nordic/Capital/Hilding Anders)... 
C 12 1999/C 012/02 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/M. 1379 - Valmet/Rauma)... 
15/01/99 
C 11 1999/C 011/04 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/M. 1398 - Deutsche 
Bank/Crédit Lyonnais Belgium)... 
C 11 1999/C 011/03 Non-opposition 
to a notified concentration (Case No 
IV/M. 1361 - Rast- und Tankstätten 
AG)... 
12/01/99 
C 8 1999/C 008/07 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/M. 1411 - Deutsche 
Bank/Coral)... 
C 8 1999/C 008/06 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/M. 1382 - Tyco/AMP)... 
C 8 1999/C 008/05 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/M. 1391 - International 
Paper/Union Camp)... 
9/01/99 
C 6 1999/C 006/05 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/M. 1418 - SCA 
Packaging/Rexam)... 
C 6 1999/C 006/02 Notice pursuant 
to Article 19(3) of Council 
Regulation No 17 concerning Case 
IV/F-1/36.160 - International Dental 
Exhibition... 
C 6 1999/C 006/04 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/M. 1377 - Bertelsmann/ 
Wissenschaftsverlag Springer)... 
C 6 1999/C 006/03 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/M. 1363 
DuPont/Hoechst/Herberts)... 
30/12/98 
C 409 98/C 409/04 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/M. 13 75 
Volkswagen/Ford/Autoeuropa)... 
29/12/98 
C 408 98/C 408/07 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/M. 1400 - Rexam/PLM)... 
C 408 98/C 408/06 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/M. 1388 - Total/PetroFina)... 
C 408 98/C 408/05 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/M. 1376 - Cargill/Continental 
Grain)... 
C 408 98/C 408/04 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/M. 1328 - KLM/Martinair)... 
24/12/98 
C 405 98/C 405/10 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/ECSC.1268 
Usinor/Cockerill Sambre)... 
C 405 98/C 405/09 Non-opposition 
to a notified concentration (Case No 
IV/M. 1287 - Elenac/Hoechst)... 
23/12/98 
C 403 98/C 403/03 Non-opposition 
to a notified concentration (Case No 
IV/M. 1248 - Kingfisher/BUT)... 
C 403 98/C 403/06 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/M. 1330 - Pechiney/ 
Samancor)... 
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C 403 98/C 403/05 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/M. 1329 - Usinor/Cockerill 
Sambre)... 
C 403 98/C 403/04 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/M. 1394 - ALBA/OTTO)... 
22/12/98 
C 400 98/C 400/04 Non-opposition 
to a notified concentration (Case No 
IV/M. 1337 - Koch Industries/Saba 
Hoechst)... 
19/12/98 
C 397 98/C 397/13 Judgment of the 
Court (Sixth Chamber) of 27 
October 1998 in Case C-152/97 
(reference for a preliminary ruling 
from the Commissione Tributaria 
Provinciale di Milano): Abruzzi Gas 
SpA (Agas) v. Amministrazione 
Tributaria di Milano (Directive 
69/335/EEC ... 
C 396 98/C 396/05 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/M.1402 - Gaz de 
France/BEWAG/GASAG)... 
17/12/98 
C 394 98/C 394/06 Non-opposition 
to a notified concentration (Case No 
WMA 184 - Travelers/Citicorp)... 
C 394 98/C 394/05 Non-opposition 
to a notified concentration (Case No 
IV/M. 1259 - Voest Alpine 
Stahl Vosslofa/VAE)... 
16/12/98 
C 392 98/C 39207 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/M. 1347 - Deutsche 
Post/Securicor)... 
C 392 98/C 392/08 Non-opposition 
to a notified concentration (Case No 
IV/M. 1244 - Bank America/ 
Nationsbank) ... 
15/12/98 
C 390 98/C 390/07 Initiation of 
proceedings (Case No IV/JV.15 -
BT/AT& T)... 
12/12/98 
C 387 98/C 387/07 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/M. 1360 - Akzo 
Nobel/Glaverfin/Eijkelkamp)... 
C 387 98/C 387/08 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/M. 1387 
Lufthansa/Menzies/Sigma at 
Manchester)... 
C 387 98/C 387/10 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/M. 1355 - Newell/ 
Rubbermaid)... 
C 387 98/C 387/09 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/M. 1346 - EDF/London 
Electricity)... 
11/12/98 
C 385 98/C 385/07 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/M. 1380 - Siebe/BTR)... 
C 385 98/C 385/03 Non-opposition 
to a notified concentration (Case No 
IV/M. 1280 - KKR/Willis Corroon) 
C 385 98/C 385/04 Non-opposition 
to a notified concentration (Case No 
IV/M. 1292 - Continental/ITT)... 
C 385 98/C 385/06 Non-opposition 
to a notified concentration (Case No 
IV/M. 1318 - Constructor/Dexion)... 
C 385 98/C 385/05 Non-opposition 
to a notified concentration (Case No 
IV/M. 1303 - ADEG/EDEKA)... 
10/12/98 
C 384 98/C 384/06 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/M. 1370 - Peugeot/Credipar) 
C 384 98/C 384/05 Withdrawal of 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/M. 1246 - LHZ/Carl Zeiss)... 
C 384 98/C 384/04 Non-opposition 
to a notified concentration (Case No 
IV/M. 1202 - Renault/Iveco)... 
9/12/98 
C 382 98/C 382/03 Withdrawal of 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/M. 1321 - Verbund/Kelag/ 
Porr/OMV Proterra/Siemens/KRV) 
8/12/98 
C 381 98/C 381/05 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/M. 1358 - Philips/Lucent 
Technologies (II))... 
3/12/98 
C 374 98/C 374/03 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/M. 1256 - OK Ekonomisk 
Förening/Kuwait Petroleum Sverige 
AB)... 
2/12/98 
C 372 98/C 372/06 Non-opposition 
to a notified concentration (Case No 
IV/M. 1307 - Marsh&McLennan/ 
Sedgwick)... 
28/11/98 
C 369 98/C 369/05 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/M. 1340 - BNP/Dresdner 
Bank - Austrian JV)... 
C 369 98/C 369/07 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/M.1354 - SAirGroup/LTU) 
C 369 98/C 369/04 Non-opposition 
to a notified concentration (Case No 
IV/M. 1260 - Edon/Rova/Reco)... 
C 369 98/C 369/06 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
NoIV/M.1368-Ford/ZF)... 
27/11/98 
C 367 98/C 367/07 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/M. 1235 - New 
Holland/Orenstein&Koppel)... 
C 367 98/C 367/08 Re-notification 
of a previously notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M. 1332 
- Thomson/Lucas) 
C 367 98/C 367/06 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/M. 1372 - Hugh 
Baird/Scottish&Newcastle)... 
26/11/98 
C 365 98/C 365/04 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/JV.12 - Motorola/Ericsson/ 
Nokia/Psion)... 
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25/11/98 
L 316 Commission Decision of 6 
May 1998 concerning the extension 
of eligibility for regional aid for the 
acquisition costs of intangible 
property for large firms provided for 
in the 25th outline plan for the joint 
Federal Government/Länder 
programme for improving regional 
economic structures (notified under 
document number C(1998) 1942) 
(Only the German text is authentic) 
(Text with EEA relevance) 
L 316 Commission Decision of 26 
June 1997 declaring a concentration 
to be incompatible with the 
common market (Case No 
IV/M.890 -Blokker/Toys 'R Us) 
(notified under document number 
CÍ1997) 1884) (Only the English 
text is authentic) (Text with EEA 
relevance) 
C 363 98/C 363/06 Opinion of the 
Advisory Committee on 
Concentrations given at the 53rd 
meeting on 21 April 1998 
concerning a preliminary draft 
decision relating to Case IV/M.970 -
TKS/ITW Signode/Titan... 
C 363 98/C 363/05 Opinion of the 
Advisory Committee on 
Concentrations given at the 46th 
meeting on 10 June 1997 
concerning a preliminary draft 
decision relating to Case IV/M.890 -
Blokker/Toys 'R' Us... 
C 363 98/C 363/03 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/M. 1333 - Kingfisher/ 
Castorama)... 
24/11/98 
C 361 98/C 361/06 Non-opposition 
to a notified concentration (Case No 
IV/M.1319 - Smurfit Condat/CVC) 
20/11/98 
C 355 98/C 355/04 Non-opposition 
to a notified concentration (Case No 
IV/M. 1326 - Toyota/Daihatsu) 
19/11/98 
C 353 98/C 353/05 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/M. 1335 - Dana/Glacier 
Vandervell) 
C 353 98/C 353/04 Non-opposition 
to a notified concentration (Case No 
IV/M. 1143 - DSM/Koninklijke 
Gist-Brocades) 
C 353 98/C 353/06 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/M. 1342 - Knorr-
Bremse/Robert Bosch) 
17/11/98 
C 348 98/C 348/04 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/M. 1336 - Deutsche 
Bank/Vianova) 
C 348 98/C 348/03 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/M. 1366 
Paribas/CDC/Beaufour) 
C 348 98/C 348/05 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/JV.13 - Wintershall/ 
EnBW/MVV/WV/DEO) 
14/11/98 
C 346 98/C 346/08 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/M. 1356 - Metsä-Serla/UK 
Paper) 
C 346 98/C 346/07 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/M. 1305- Eurostar) 
C 346 98/C 346/06 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/ECSC.1289 - British 
Steel/Layde) 
No IV/M. 1361 
Tankstätten AG) 
Rast- und 
12/11/98 
C 344 98/C 344/06 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/M. 1320 - LGV/Dorana/ 
Emtec) 
C 344 98/C 344/05 Non-opposition 
to a notified concentration (Case No 
IV/M. 1279 - CDE/La Henin) 
C 344 98/C 344/04 Inapplicability 
of the Regulation to a notified 
operation (Case No IV/M.1315 -
ENW/Eastern) 
11/11/98 
C 343 98/C 343/06 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/M. 1332 - Thomson/Lucas) 
10/11/98 
C 342 98/C 342/05 Renotification 
of a concentration (Case No 
IV/M. 1293 - British Petroleum/ 
Amoco) 
C 342 98/C 342/03 Non-opposition 
to a notified concentration (Case No 
IV/M. 1188 
Kingfisher/Wegert/Promarkt) 
C 342 98/C 342/06 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/M. 1339 - ABB/Elsag Bailey) 
C 342 98/C 342/07 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/M. 1252 - AT& T/TCI) 
C 342 98/C 342/04 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
N0IV/JV.I5-BT/AT&T) 
7/11/98 
C 339 98/C 339/02 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/M. 1359 - Royale 
Belge/Anhyp) 
21/11/98 
C 357 98/C 357/04 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
No IV/M.1171 - PTA/Telecom 
Italia/Telekom Austria)... 
13/11/98 
C 345 98/C 345/03 Initiation of 
proceedings (Case No IV/M.1313 -
Danish Crown/Vestjyske Slagterier) 
C 345 98/C 345/02 Prior 
notification of a concentration (Case 
6/11/98 
C 338 98/C 338/04 Non-opposition 
to a notified concentration (Case No 
IV/M. 1306 - Berkshire Hathaway/ 
General RE) 
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4/11/98 
C 336 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M. 1314 
- Framatome/Berg Electronics) 
C 336 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M. 1194 
- SGB/Fortis AG) 
C 336 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M. 1304 
- Hercules/Betzdearborn) 
C 336 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M. 1271 
- Pirelli/Siemens) 
31/10/98 
C 334 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/JV.14 -
PanAgora/DG Bank) 
30/10/98 
C 332 Renotification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M. 1327 
- Canal+, CDPQ and Bank 
America/NC) 
29/10/98 
C 331 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M. 1337 
- Koch/Saba/Hoechst) 
C 331 Initiation of proceedings 
(Case No IV/M. 1246 - LHZ/Carl 
Zeiss) 
27/10/98 
C 329 Opinion of the Advisory 
Committee on Concentrations 
delivered at its 49th meeting, held 
on 30 September 1997, concerning a 
preliminary draft Decision in Case 
IV/M.938 - Guinness/Grand 
Metropolitan 
C 329 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1114 
- SAP/Heidelberger) 
23/10/98 
C 325 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M. 1331 
- ING/BHF) 
- Wacker/Air Products) 
21/10/98 
C 322 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M. 1334 
- Volvo Aero/ABB/TurboGen) 
20/10/98 
C 321 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M. 1325 
- Bayer/Chiron Diagnostics) 
16/10/98 
C 319 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M. 1326 
- Toyota/Daihatsu) 
C 319 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M. 1303 
- ADEG/EDEKA) 
14/10/98 
C 316 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M. 1269 
LSG/Onexcorp/Sky Chefs/ 
Caterair) 
10/10/98 
C 311 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M. 1313 
Danish Crown/Vestjyske 
Slagterier) 
C 311 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M. 1301 
- Texaco/Chevron) 
9/10/98 
C 309 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M. 1291 
- Bosch/ZF Friedrichshafen) 
C 309 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M. 1219 
- Seagram/Polygram) 
C 309 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M. 1300 
- Allied Signal/AMP) 
8/10/98 
C 308 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1318 
- Constructor/Dexion) 
- BT/ESB) 
C 307 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M.1161 
- Alcoa/Alumax) 
C 307 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M. 1282 
- Retevisión Móvil) 
C 307 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M. 1168 
- DHL/Deutsche Post) 
C 307 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M. 1276 
- NEC/PBN) 
6/10/98 
C 306 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M. 1293 
- BP/Amoco) 
C 306 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M. 1273 
- Crédit Suisse/Nikko/Msa) 
C 306 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M. 1258 
- GEC Marconi/Alenia) 
C 306 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M. 1296 
- Norske Skog/Abitibi/Hansol) 
C 306 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M. 1254 
- Dexia/Argentaria/Crédito Local) 
2/10/98 
C 303 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M. 1246 
- LHZ/Carl Zeiss) 
C 303 Initiation of proceedings 
(Case No IV/M. 1221 
REWE/Meinl) 
C 303 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M. 1319 
- Smurfit Condat/CVC) 
1/10/98 
C 302 Prior notification of a 
concentration (Case No IV/M. 1327 
- Canal+, CDPQ and Bank of 
America/NC) 
STATE AID 
22/10/98 
C 324 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M. 1097 
7/10/98 
C 307 Non-opposition to a notified 
concentration (Case No IV/M. 1132 
29/01/99 
C 24 1999/C 024/06 Authorisation 
for State aid pursuant to Articles 92 
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and 93 of the EC Treaty - Cases 
where the Commission raises no 
objections... 
C 24 1999/C 024/05 Authorisation 
for State aid pursuant to Articles 92 
and 93 of the EC Treaty - Cases 
where the Commission raises no 
objections ... 
C 24 1999/C 024/04 Commission 
notice on the extension of the period 
of validity of the Code on aid to the 
synthetic fibres industry ... 
27/01/99 
C 22 1999/C 022/05 State aid - C 
68/98 (ex N326/98) - Greece ... 
23/01/99 
C 20 1999/C 020/16 Judgment of 
the Court (Fifth Chamber) of 1 
December 1998 in Case C-200/97: 
(reference for a preliminary ruling 
from Corte Suprema di Cassazione): 
Ecotrade Sri v. Altiforni e Ferriere 
di Servóla SpA (AFS) (State aid -
Definition - Advantage conferred ... 
21/01/99 
C 16 1999/C 016/04 National 
ceilings for regional aid coverage 
under the derogations provided for 
in Article 92(3)(a) and (c) of the 
Treaty for the period 2000 to 2006 
C 16 1999/C 016/03 Authorisation 
for State aid pursuant to Articles 92 
and 93 of the EC Treaty - Cases 
where the Commission raises no 
objections ... 
C 16 1999/C 016/05 State aid - E 
23/95 - Sweden ... 
15/01/99 
C 11 1999/C 011/02 Authorisation 
for State aid pursuant to Articles 92 
and 93 of the EC Treaty - Cases 
where the Commission raises no 
objections ... 
13/01/99 
C 9 1999/C 009/06 State aid -
C61/98 (ex NN 189/97) - Austria ... 
30/12/98 
C 409 98/C 409/06 Authorisation 
for State aid pursuant to Articles 92 
and 93 of the EC Treaty - Cases 
where the Commission raises no 
objections ... 
C 409 98/C 409/05 Authorisation 
for State aid pursuant to Articles 92 
and 93 of the EC Treaty - Cases 
where the Commission raises no 
objections... 
24/12/98 
C 405 98/C 405/04 State aid - C 
60/98 (NI 96/98)- Portugal... 
23/12/98 
C 403 98/C 403/07 State aid -
C48/98 (ex NN60/98) - Italy ... 
19/12/98 
C 397 98/C 397/25 Judgment of the 
Court (Sixth Chamber) of 12 
November 1998 in Case C-415/96: 
Kingdom of Spain v. Commission 
of the European Communities (State 
aid for undertakings in the textile 
sector) 
C 396 98/C 396/03 Authorisation 
for State aid pursuant to Articles 92 
and 93 of the EC Treaty - Cases 
where the Commission raises no 
objections... 
C 396 98/C 396/02 State aid -
C62/98 (ex Nl 18/98) - Greece ... 
18/12/98 
C 395 98/C 395/08 State aid -
E/l/98 - Ireland... 
C 395 98/C 395/07 State aid - C3/97 
(ex N546/96)-Italy... 
C 395 98/C 395/09 State aid -
E/2/98 - Ireland... 
17/12/98 
C 394 98/C 394/09 Corrigendum to 
Guidelines on National Regional 
Aid (OJ C 74, 10.3.1998)... 
16/12/98 
C 392 98/C 392/05 Authorisation 
for State aid pursuant to Articles 92 
and 93 of the EC Treaty - Cases 
where the Commission raises no 
objections ... 
C 392 98/C 392/03 Authorisation 
for State aid - Measures not 
constituting aid in the meaning of 
Article 4(c) of the ECSC Treaty ... 
C 392 98/C 392/04 Authorisation 
for State aid pursuant to Articles 92 
and 93 of the EC Treaty - Cases 
where the Commission raises no 
objections... 
15/12/98 
C 390 98/C 390/05 Initiation of 
proceedings (Case No IV/JV.15 -
BT/AT& T)... 
C 390 98/C 390/04 State aid -
C57/98 (ex N826/97) - Italy ... 
12/12/98 
C 387 98/C 387/04 State aid -
C23/97 (ex N90/97) - Germany ... 
C 387 98/C 387/05 State aid - C8/98 
(ex N237/97, NN151/97) - Germany 
10/12/98 
C 384 98/C 384/08 Authorisation 
for State aid pursuant to Articles 92 
and 93 of the EC Treaty - Cases 
where the Commission raises no 
objections... 
C 384 98/C 384/03 Commission 
notice on the application of the State 
aid rules to measures relating to 
direct business taxation ... 
C 384 98/C 384/07 State aid -
C49/98 (ex NN75/98 and 
NN164/97)-Italy... 
9/12/98 
C 382 98/C 382/08 State aid -
C26/98 (exNN79/96) - Italy ... 
4/12/98 
C 376 98/C 376/02 State aid - C 
32/98 (ex NN 22/98) - Greece ... 
2/12/98 
C 372 98/C 372/05 State aid -
C59/98 (N701/97) - The 
Netherlands... 
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1/12/98 
C 371 98/C 371/04 Authorisation 
for State aid pursuant to Articles 92 
and 93 of the EC Treaty ­ Cases 
where the Commission raises no 
objections ... 
28/11/98 
C 369 98/C 369/03 State aid ­
C45/98 (ex NN45/97) ­ Germany ... 
27/11/98 
C 367 98/C 367/04 State aid ­
C47/98 (NN41/98)­Italy ... 
25/11/98 
L 316 Commission Decision of 6 
May 1998 concerning the extension 
of eligibility for regional aid for the 
acquisition costs of intangible 
property for large firms provided for 
in the 25th outline plan for the joint 
Federal Government/Länder 
programme for improving regional 
economic structures (notified under 
document number C(1998) 1942) 
(Only the German text is authentic) 
(Text with EEA relevance) 
L 316 Commission Decision of 1 
July 1998 on State aid granted by 
the Republic of Austria and the 
Land of Upper Austria to Actual 
Maschinenbau AG (notified under 
document number C(1998) 1943) 
(Only the German text is authentic) 
(Text with EEA relevance) 
L 316 Commission Decision of 25 
February 1998 concerning aid 
awarded by Germany to HIBEG and 
by HIBEG via Krupp GmbH to 
Bremer Vulkan AG, facilitating the 
sale of Krupp Atlas 
Elektronik GmbH from Krupp 
GmbH to Bremer Vulkan AG 
(notified under document number 
C(1998) 582) (Only the German 
text is authentic) (Text with EEA 
relevance) 
L 316 Commission Decision of 16 
December 1997 on State aid granted 
by the Land of Thuringia to 
Thüringer Motorenwerke GmbH 
(notified under document number 
C(1997) 4341) (Only the German 
text is authentic) (Text with EEA 
relevance) 
C 363 98/C 363/08 Authorisation 
for State aid pursuant to Articles 92 
and 93 of the EC Treaty ­ Cases 
where the Commission raises no 
objections... 
C 363 98/C 363/07 Authorisation 
for State aid pursuant to Articles 92 
and 93 of the EC Treaty ­ Cases 
where the Commission raises no 
objections ... 
C 363 98/C 363/04 State aid ­
C51/98 (ex N852/97 and N6/98) ­
Portugal... 
24/11/98 
C 361 98/C 361/04 Authorisation 
for State aid pursuant to Articles 92 
and 93 of the EC Treaty ­ Cases 
where the Commission raises no 
objections ... 
C 361 98/C 361/03 State aid ­
C80/97 (ex NN53/97) ­ Germany ... 
19/11/98 
C 353 98/C 353/03 State aid ­ C 
22/98 (ex NN 9/98 (N 433/97)) ­
Germany 
18/11/98 
C 351 98/C 351/04 Authorisation 
for State aid pursuant to Articles 92 
and 93 of the EC Treaty ­ Cases 
where the Commission raises no 
objections 
14/11/98 
L 304 Commission Decision of 14 
July 1998 concerning aid schemes 
in Germany under which aid could 
be awarded which is subject to the 
notification requirement of the 
multisectoral framework on regional 
aid for large investment projects 
(notified under document number 
C(1998) 2271) (Only the German 
text is authentic) (Text with EEA 
relevance) 
11/11/98 
C 343 Framework on Training Aid 
C 343 98/C 343/07 Framework on 
training aid 
7/11/98 
C 340 98/C 340/32 Judgment of the 
Court of First Instance of 15 
September 1998 in Joined Cases Τ­
Ι 26/96 and T­127/96: Breda Fucine 
Meridionali SpA (BFM) and Ente 
Partecipazioni e Finanziamento 
Industria Manifatturiera (EFIM) v. 
Commission of the European 
Communities 
C 340 98/C 340/29 Judgment of the 
Court of First Instance of 15 
September 1998 in Case T­140/95: 
Ryanair Limited v. Commission of 
the European Communities (State 
aid ­ Formal investigation procedure 
under Articley93(2) of the Treaty ­
Conditional decision approving aid 
C 340 98/C 340/30 Judgment of the 
Court of First Instance of 16 
September 1998 in Case T­188/95: 
Waterleiding Maatschappij Noord­
West Brabant NV v. Commission of 
the European Communities (State 
aids ­ Tax exemptions ­ Refusal to 
open the procedure laid down by 
Article 93(2) 
C 340 98/C 340/31 Judgment of the 
Court of First Instance of 15 
September 1998 in Case T­95/96: 
Gestevisión Telecinco SA v. 
Commission of the European 
Communities (State aid ­ Public 
service television ­ Complaint ­
Action for declaration of failure to 
act 
C 340 98/C 340/27 Judgment of the 
Court of First Instance of 15 
September 1998 in Case T­11/95: 
BP Chemicals Limited v. 
Commission of the European 
Communities (State aid ­ Action for 
annulment ­ Time­limits ­ Persons 
individually concerned ­ Private 
market economy investor) 
6/11/98 
C 338 98/C 338/03 State aid ­ C 
15/98 (ex NN 191/97) ­ Germany 
5/11/98 
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C 337 Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections 
C 337 Authorization of State aid 
pursuant to Article 61 of the EEA 
Agreement and Article 1(3) of 
Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and 
Court Agreement - EFTA 
Surveillance Authority decision not 
to raise objections 
C 337 Authorization of State aid 
pursuant to Article 61 of the EEA 
Agreement and Article 1(3) of 
Protocol 3 to the Surveillance and 
Court Agreement - EFTA 
Surveillance Authority decision not 
to raise objections 
4/11/98 
C 336 STATE AID C 54/98 (ex N 
101/98) Germany 
31/10/98 
C 334 State aid - C 44/98 (ex N 
708/97) - Netherlands 
C 334 State aid - C 56/98 (ex NN 
42/98) - Germany 
C 334 State aid - C 10/97 (ex NN 
9/97) - Portugal 
27/10/98 
C 329 Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections 
20/10/98 
C 321 Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections 
13/10/98 
C 314 Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections 
10/10/98 
C 311 State aid - C 36/96 (ex N 
963/F/95) - Netherlands 
9/10/98 
C 309 State aid - C 53/98 (ex N 
31/98)-Italy 
8/10/98 
C 308 Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections 
C 308 Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections 
C 308 Authorisation for State aid 
pursuant to Articles 92 and 93 of the 
EC Treaty - Cases where the 
Commission raises no objections 
7/10/98 
C 307 State aid - C 37/98 (ex N 
124/98)-France 
C 307 State aid - C 20/98 (ex NN 
166/97, NN 169/97, NN 170/97) -
Germany 
C 307 State aid - C 43/98 (ex N 
558/97) - Netherlands 
C 307 State aid - C 35/98 (ex N 
783/97 and N 160/98) - Italy 
COURT OF JUSTICE / COURT OF 
FIRST INSTANCE 
Devant le Tribunal 
Aff. T-108/98AJ 
Udo Platte / Commission : 
Demande d'assistance judiciaire 
présentée antérieurement au recours 
concernant le refus de la 
Commission de donner suite à la 
plainte du requérant visant à ce que 
celle-ci retire à l'importateur de 
véhicules «Mazda Motors 
(Deutschland) GmbH» le bénéfice 
de l'exemption par catégorie prévue 
dans les règlements n. 123/85 et n. 
1475/95 
Aff. T-110/98 
RJB Mining pic / Commission : 
Annulation d'une décision de la 
Commission, du 10 juin 1998, 
portant sur des interventions 
financières de l'Allemagne en faveur 
de l'industrie houillère en 1997, en 
ce qu'elle autorise un certain 
nombre de mesures 
Aff. T-lll/98 
RJB Mining pic / Commission : 
Annulation de trois décisions de la 
Commission, du 3 juin 1998, 
statuant sur des interventions 
financières complémentaires de 
l'Espagne en faveur de l'industrie 
houillère en 1994, 1995 et 1996, en 
1997 et en 1998, en ce qu'elles 
autorisent le versement d'un certain 
nombre d'aides 
Aff. T-112/98 
Mannesmannröhren-Werke AG / 
Commission : Annulation de la 
décision de la Commission, du 15 
mai 1998, relative à une procédure 
aü titre de l'art. 11, paragraphe 5, du 
règlement CEE/17/62 du Conseil -
Demande de renseignements dans le 
cadre d'une enquête sur une 
infraction à l'article 85 du traité CE 
Aff. T-116/98 
Compañía Trasmediterránea SA / 
Commission : Annulation de la 
décision de la Commission, du 18 
février 1998, d'engager la procédure 
prévue à l'article 93, paragraphe 2, 
du traité en ce qui concerne le 
système d'aides à la navigation 
maritime que les autorités 
espagnoles se proposent de mettre 
en place (nouveau contrat de service 
public maritime) 
Aff. T-121/98 
Taurus Beteiligungs-GmbH & Co. 
KG / Commission : Annulation de 
la décision de la Commission 
K(1998) 1439, du 27 mai 1998, 
modifiée par la décision K(1998) 
1518 de la Commission, du 2 juin 
1998, relative à une procédure 
d'application du règlement (CEE) n. 
4064/89 du Conseil, déclarant 
incompatible avec le marché 
commun et le fonctionnement de 
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l'accord EEE l'opération de 
concentration visant au contrôle 
conjoint des sociétés Premiere 
Medien GmbH & Co. KG, 
BetaDigital Gesellschaft für digitale 
Fernsehdienste mbH et 
BetaResearch Gesellschaft für 
Entwicklung und Vermarktung 
digitaler Infrastrukturen mbH par 
les sociétés CLT­UFA SA et Taurus 
Beteiligungs­GmbH & Co. KG 
Aff. Τ-12 7/98 
UPS Europe SA / Commission : 
Recours en carence visant à faire 
constater que la Commission s'est 
illégalement abstenue de prendre 
une décision définitive dans le cadre 
d'une procédure concernant la 
prétendue infraction de l'article 86 
du traité CE par la Deutsche Post 
AG 
Aff. T-128/98 
Aéroports de Paris / Commission : 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission C(1998) 1417 final, du 
11 juin 1998, relative à une 
procédure d'application de l'article 
86 du traité CE concernant des 
redevances commerciales 
discriminatoires imposées par 
l'exploitant des aéroports parisiens 
Aff. T-139/98 
Amministrazione Autonoma dei 
Monopoli di Stato (AAMS) / 
Commission : Annulation de la 
décision de la Commission, du 17 
juin 1998, relative à une procédure 
d'application de l'art. 86 du traité CE 
­ Position dominante dans le marché 
italien de la distribution en gros de 
cigarettes 
Aff. T-148/98 
J.G. Evans e.a. / Commission : 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission, du 30 juillet 1998, 
. rejetant les plaintes déposées par les 
requérants contre le Central 
Electricity Generating Board 
(CEGB) et British Coal, relatives à 
une prétendue entente concernant 
les prix de vente du charbon destiné 
à la production d'électricité 
Aff. T-154/98 
Asia Motor France SA e.a. / 
Commission : Annulation des 
décisions de la Commission, du 16 
juillet 1998, rejetant les plaintes des 
requérants relatives à des prétendues 
pratiques d'ententes concernant 
l'importation en France de véhicules 
de marques japonaises 
Aff. T-162/98 
South Wales Small Mines 
Association / Commission : 
Annulation de la décision de la 
Commission, du 30 juillet 1998 
(affaire IV/E­3/SWSMA), rejetant 
la plainte déposée par la requérante 
contre le Central Electricity 
Generating Board (CEGB) et ses 
successeurs National Power et 
PowerGen, relative à une prétendue 
entente concernant les prix de vente 
du charbon destiné à la production 
d'électricité 
Aff. T-181/98 
Georgsmarienhütte Holding GmbH 
/ Commission : L'annulation de la 
décision de la Commission, du 29 
juillet 1998, K(1998) 2556 
concernant une aide du Land 
Niedersachsen à l'entreprise 
Georgsmarienhütte GmbH 
Aff. T-182/98 
UPS Europe SA / Commission : 
L'annulation de la décision de la 
Commission de ne pas engager la 
procédure prévue à l'art. 93, par. 2, 
du traité CE, suite à la plainte de la 
requérante concernant les aides 
prétendument accordées par les 
autorités allemandes à Deutsche 
Post 
Devant la Cour 
Aff. C-279/98 Ρ 
Cascades SA / Commission : 
Pourvoi contre l'arrêt du Tribunal 
(troisième chambre élargie), rendu 
le 14 mai 1998, dans l'affaire n 
94/60 du 13 juillet 1994, relative à 
une procédure d'application de l'art. 
85 du traité CE ­ Carton ­ Maintien 
des amendes, malgré l'insuffisance 
constatée en ce qui concerne la 
motivation de leur calcul. 
Interprétation erronée de la notion 
d'«effets de l'infraction sur le 
marché» ­ Violation du principe de 
non­discrimination 
Aff. C-280/98 Ρ 
Moritz J. Weig GmbH & Co. KG / 
Commission : Pourvoi contre l'arrêt 
du Tribunal (troisième chambre 
élargie), rendu le 14 mai 1998, dans 
l'affaire T­317/94 opposant Moritz 
J. Weig GmbH & Co KG à la 
Commission à une procédure 
d'application de l'article 85 du traité 
CE ­ Carton ­ Annulation ou 
réduction de l'amende 
Circonstances atténuantes 
Aff. C-282/98 Ρ 
Enso Española SA / Commission : 
Pourvoi contre l'arrêt du Tribunal 
(troisième chambre élargie), rendu 
le 14 mai 1998, dans l'affaire n 
94/60 Commission, du 13 juillet 
1994, relative à une procédure 
d'application de l'art. 85 du traité CE 
­ Carton ­ Calcul d'une amende 
exprimée dans une monnaie qui a 
subi des dévaluations 
Aff. C-283/98 Ρ 
Mo och Domsjö AB / Commission : 
Pourvoi contre l'arrêt du Tribunal 
(troisième chambre élargie), rendu 
le 14 mai 1998, dans l'affaire n 
94/60 de la Commission, du 13 
juillet 1994, relative à une 
procédure d'application de l'art. 85 
du traité CE ­ Carton 
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Aff. C-286/98 Ρ 
Stora Kopparbergs Bergslags AB / 
Commission : Pourvoi contre l'arrêt 
du Tribunal (troisième chambre 
élargie), rendu le 14 mai 1998, dans 
l'affaire n 94/60 de la Commission, 
du 13 juillet 1994, relative à une 
procédure d'application de l'art. 85 
du traité CE ­ Carton 
Aff. C-288/98 
Istituto nazionale della previdenza 
sociale (INPS) / Mario Maraldi 
SpA : Préjudicielle ­ Corte suprema 
di cassazione ­ Interprétation des 
art. 92 et 93, par. 3, du traité CE ­
Sociétés en état d'insolvabilité qui 
n'ont pas été déclarées en faillite et 
qui, bénéficiant d'une suspension 
des créances, sont autorisées à 
poursuivre leur activité productive 
et sont exonérées du paiement 
d'amendes pour le non versement de 
contributions sociales 
Aff. C-291/98 Ρ 
Sarrio SA / Commission : Pourvoi 
contre l'arrêt du Tribunal (troisième 
chambre élargie), rendu le 14 mai 
1998, dans l'affaire n 94/60 13 
juillet 1994, relative à une 
procédure d'application de l'art. 85 
du traité CE ­ Carton 
Aff. C-294/98 Ρ 
Metsä­Serla Oyj e.a. / Commission : 
Pourvoi contre l'arrêt du Tribunal 
(troisième chambre élargie), rendu 
le 14 mai 1998, dans les affaires 
jointes T­339/94, T­340/94, T­
341/94 et T­342/94 opposant Metsä­
Serla Oyj e.a. à la Commission ­ n 
94/60 d'application de l'art. 85 du 
traité CE ­ Carton ­ Entreprises 
membres d'une association à 
l'encontre de laquelle la 
Commission a constaté une 
infraction ­ Responsabilité solidaire 
des entreprises membres pour 
l'amende 
Aff. C-297/98 Ρ 
SCA Holding Ltd / Commission : 
Pourvoi contre l'arrêt du Tribunal 
(troisième chambre élargie), rendu 
le 14 mai 1998, dans l'affaire n 
94/60 Commission, du 13 juillet 
1994, relative à une procédure 
d'application de l'art. 85 du traité CE 
­ Carton 
Aff. C-298/98 Ρ 
Metsä­Serla Oy (anciennement 
Teollisuus) / Commission : Pourvoi 
contre l'arrêt du Tribunal (troisième 
chambre élargie), rendu le 14 mai 
1998, dans l'affaire n 94/60 
Commission, du 13 juillet 1994, 
relative à une procédure 
d'application de l'art. 85 du traité CE 
­ Carton ­ Motivation défectueuse 
complétée au cours de la procédure 
judiciaire ­ Pratique des «rabais» 
pour «aveu» ou «non­contestation» 
Aff. C-332/98 
France / Commission : Annulation 
de la décision de la Commission 
(C( 1998) 1728 final), du 10 juin 
1998, relative à l'aide du 
gouvernement français au Centre 
d'exportation du livre français 
(CELF) 
Aff. C-336/98 
Agenzia R di Recapito Sri et Poste 
Italiane Ente Pubblico Economico : 
Rinaldo Agenzia di Ricapito Sri : 
Préjudicielle ­ Tribunale 
amministrativo regionale per la 
Lombardia ­ Interprétation des art. 
86 et 90 du traité CE ­ Entreprise 
publique chargée de la gestion de 
l'ensemble des services relevant du 
monopole postal se désaisissant de 
la gestion directe de certains de ces 
services par le biais de concessions 
à des tiers désignés directement sans 
passer par des procédures 
concurrentielles ­ Service de 
courrier rapide 
Aff. C-344/98 
Masterfoods Ltd et HB Ice Cream 
Ltd: HB Ice Cream Ltd et 
Masterfoods Ltd, agissant sous le 
nom commercial «Mars Ireland» 
Préjudicielle ­ Supreme Court ­
Application d'une décision de la 
Commission relative à une 
procédure d'application des art. 85 
et 86 du traité CE ­ Obligations des 
juridictions nationales lorsqu'une 
telle décision fait l'objet d'un 
recours devant le Tribunal de 
première instance ­ Décision 
interdisant la pratique de mise à la 
disposition des détaillants de 
surgélateurs affectés en exclusivité à 
la vente de glaces produites par le 
fournisseur desdits surgélateurs 
Aff. C-351/98 
Espagne / Commission : Annulation 
de la décision (C( 1998)2048 final), 
du 1 juillet 1998, relative au régime 
espagnol des aides à l'achat de 
véhicules industriels «Plan Renove 
Industrial» (avril 1994 à décembre 
1996) 
DG IV's ADDRESS ON THE WORLD 
WIDE WEB 
http://europa.eu.int/ 
comm/dg04/index_en.htm 
COMING UP 
Competition law in the EC­ Volume 
IIA ­ Rules applicable to State aid ­
Edition 1998 
Competition Policy Newsletter 99 ­
June­
European Community on Compe­
tition Policy 1998 
XXVIII Report on Competition 
Policy 1998 
Application of EC State aid law by 
the Member State Courts 
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Cases covered in this issue 
Anti-Trust Rules 
17 
27 
31 
33 
35 
35 
37 
39 
Group exemption for liner conferences 
The District Heating Pipe Cartel 
SICASOV 
British Sugar 
Greene King/Roberts 
Info-Lab/Ricoh 
Greek Ferries 
Eudim 
Mergers 
40 
40 
41 
Skanska/Scancem 
Enso/Stora 
ABB/ Elsag Bailey Process Automation NV 
State Aid 
49 
49 
50 
51 
51 
52 
53 
53 
54 
54 
55 
55 
Fiscalité directe des entreprises 
Synthetic Fibres industry 
Aides Régionales 
Banking sector 
Sweden - employment and training 
The Netherlands - heavy rain damage 
Germany - ship-building 
Italie - Seleco 
Allemagne - Infraleuna Infrastruktur & Service GmbH 
France - Nouvelle Filature Lainière 
Allemagne - Adinol 
Germany - Riedel-de Haen 
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